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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I present three projects related to the topic demand and welfare in health eco-
nomics by leveraging changes in technology, institutions and policies through quasi-experimental
and experimental approaches.
In the first essay "Television, Health, and Happiness", which is joint work with Adrian Chadi,
we study the consequences of television consumption. Watching television is the most time-
consuming human activity besides work but its role for individual well-being is unclear. Negative
consequences portrayed in the literature raise the question whether this popular activity consti-
tutes an economic good or whether it is an economic bad and hence serves as a prime example
of irrational behavior reducing individual health and happiness. We are the first to comprehen-
sively address this question by exploiting a large-scale natural experiment in West Germany, where
households in a few geographically restricted areas received commercial television via terrestrial
frequencies. Rich panel data allow us to determine how signal availability over time changes in-
dividual time-use and well-being. Contrary to previous research, we find no health impact when
television consumption increases. For life satisfaction, we even find positive effects. Additional
data support the notion that television is not an economic bad and that non-experimental evidence
seems to be driven by negative selection.
The second essay "Vaccines at Work", which is joint work with Roberto Mosquera and Adrian
Chadi, is investigating the causes and consequences of vaccination. Influenza vaccination could
be a cost-effective way to reduce costs in terms of human lives and productivity losses, but low
take-up rates and vaccination unintentionally causing moral hazard may decrease its benefits. We
ran a natural field experiment in cooperation with a bank in Ecuador, where we experimentally
manipulated incentives to participate in a health intervention, which allows us to determine the
personal consequences of being randomly encouraged to get vaccinated using administrative firm
data. In a first stage, we find strong evidence that opportunity costs and peers matter to increase
vaccination demand. In the second stage, contrary to the company’s expectation, vaccination did
ii
not reduce sickness absence during the flu season. Getting vaccinated was ineffective with no mea-
surable health externalities from coworker vaccination. We rule out meaningful individual health
effects when considering several thresholds of expected vaccine effectiveness. Using a dataset of
administrative records on medical diagnoses and employee surveys, we find evidence consistent
with vaccination causing moral hazard, which could decrease the effectiveness of vaccination.
The third essay studies "The Unintended Consequences of Health Insurance" in a universal
health care system. Universal healthcare is associated with desirable health and equity outcomes
and often allows individuals to purchase supplementary private health insurance. While the pur-
chase of private health insurance is clearly beneficial in the absence of public insurance, it is more
difficult to evaluate individual costs and benefits when baseline coverage exists for everyone. The
perceived benefits of insurance and the increase in health costs due to premium payments can lead
to hidden costs and unintended consequences of supplementary health insurance. To study those
costs, I use a regression kink design in conjunction with a policy implemented in Australia in 2000
to overcome selection. The policy punishes agents for delaying the purchase of private health until
later in life. Following the policy-guided instrumentation of insurance purchase, it appears that
private health insurance does not cause moral hazard. There is a zero effect on medical expendi-
tures despite evidence of adverse selection. Supplementary insurance does not change mortality or
work expenses but it changes the budget. We observe an increase in student debt which is consis-
tent with premium payments crowding out debt repayments. There is a loss of gross income from
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1. TELEVISION, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
1.1 Introduction
“We know today that television makes you fat, stupid, sad and violent.”
(Ursula von der Leyen)
Television consumption and modern forms of it via the Internet are one of the most time-
consuming daily activities worldwide. Over the lifespan, watching TV even surpasses work under
plausible assumptions.1 Since TV consumption is voluntary, one might hypothesize that spending
so much time on this activity yields large individual benefits. On the contrary, a sizable body of re-
search suggests that TV consumption is a threat to both individual health and happiness (Dietz and
Gortmaker 1985; Hu et al. 2003; Hancox et al. 2004; Frey et al. 2007; Bruni and Stanca 2008; Be-
nesch et al. 2010; Cuñado and Gracia 2012). While at the social level positive consequences of TV
are discussed in research on education and gender (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008; Jensen and Os-
ter 2009), numerous potentially detrimental effects of TV consumption are also well documented,
such as reduced political involvement, destruction of social capital, higher divorce rates, increased
household debt and reductions in IQ (Gentzkow 2006; Olken 2009; Chong and La Ferrara 2009;
Baker and George 2010; Hernæs et al. 2019). Consistent with these findings and exemplified by
our introductory quote from the current President of the EU Commission, there is a wide-held be-
lief that television is generally harmful. However, it is unclear whether television consumption is
individually detrimental and if so: why do individuals then watch so much television in the first
place?
The puzzling empirical contradiction of individuals engaging in an activity that could be both
socially and individually harmful is reconciled in the happiness literature as a self-control problem
1. Assume that an average individual works 40 years, 250 workdays per year, and 8 hours per day. Further assume
the same person watches 3 hours of TV per day, which is below official numbers in many countries, such as the United
States. To surpass our lifetime work estimate of 80,000 hours (=40×250×8), this fictitious person needs to watch TV
for 74 years or less when the person watches more hours per day. Millions of United States citizens born in the 1940s
easily exceed that number.
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with TV watching being interpreted as a case of irrational behavior (Frey 2008, 2018).2 This idea
of using happiness data to examine irrational choices has been applied by economists in various
contexts, such as in the case of smoking, for which cigarette taxes and bans have been shown to
serve as self-control devices making smokers happier (e.g. Gruber and Mullainathan 2005; Oder-
matt and Stutzer 2015).3 Given a large general interest in discussing self-control problems in eco-
nomics (e.g. Laibson et al. 1998; Frederick et al. 2002; Loewenstein et al. 2003), it is no surprise
that there are also intense discussions about policy solutions for such phenomena, reaching from
asymmetric paternalism to nudges to other types of intervention (e.g. Camerer et al. 2003; Thaler
and Sunstein 2009). To draw such policy conclusions for the case of television, it is imperative to
first clarify whether watching TV actually belongs into the category of irrational behaviors that im-
ply negative individual consequences. If not, and agents are rationally benefitting from consuming
an economic good, then social consequences are a problem of negative externalities that can be ad-
dressed by internalizing those costs. Whereas previous research seems clear that TV consumption
is an economic bad, implying that individuals do not benefit at all from pursuing this activity, there
is reason to question this wide-spread belief and in particular the empirical evidence provided so
far. Arguably, unhappy or unhealthy individuals could sort themselves into higher levels of TV
consumption, making it difficult for the empirical researcher to determine whether television con-
sumption is individually harmful when the data are of non-experimental nature. While we are not
the first to recognize this possible sorting problem, we are the first to credibly address it with data
from a natural experiment.4 By doing so, we find evidence inconsistent with the idea that television
2. Evidence for negative effects of television on individual happiness are based on survey data containing measures
of both happiness and TV viewing. In an oft-cited study, Bruni and Stanca (2008) ask: “Why do rational people
allocate their time and resources without maximizing their well-being?”
3. In other research strands, there are discussions on whether and how reported happiness may reveal individual
choices, so that such measures could be interpreted as a production input factor of preferences and, hence, are of
interest in itself (Benjamin et al. 2014). Evidence indeed shows that happiness is a determinant of economic choices
and behavior, be it time preferences (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2011), work effort (Oswald et al. 2015) or voting (Liberini
et al. 2017). Note that we treat the terms happiness and life satisfaction synonymously, in line with many contributions
in the field of happiness research, while we consider well-being to be a broader term that also incorporates health.
4. Most of the studies on health and happiness do point out that the identification of the causal effect of TV watching
is difficult and practically impossible with the empirical approaches used so far. For example, Frey et al. (2007)
mention in their study a lack of a “natural experiment” to find out about causality. In this context, see Kataria and
Regner (2011) for a comment on identification issues in the research on TV and happiness. In regard of health, see
DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2015) who point out that studies from outside economics typically “lack a convincing
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is an economic bad or that individuals behave irrationally.
In our study, we investigate the consequences of television consumption on happiness and
health by exploiting the occurrence of a natural experiment in West Germany. We use this unique
setting in conjunction with detailed longitudinal information on the provision of television, individ-
ual time-use and well-being measures through multiple sources of data, thereby providing credible
evidence on the individual implications of TV in ways not possible so far. By discovering a natural
experiment with unique historical facets, we add a novel research setting to a set of studies using
regional heterogeneity in the provision of media during periods of implementation or expansion,
such as the case of cable-TV in the US (Gentzkow 2006; Baker and George 2010; Campante and
Hojman 2013).5 In contrast to research in economics exploiting variation in terrestrial TV sig-
nals from West Germany reaching into East Germany (Hyll and Schneider 2013; Hennighausen
2015; Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016; Slavtchev and Wyrwich 2017; Hornuf et al. 2017; Laudenbach
et al. 2018; Friehe et al. 2018, 2019), we are the first to exploit the setup of West Germany with its
regional variation in terrestrial signals of private TV, thereby studying individual behavior within
a fully developed country at the center of Europe. Arguably, it is not a surprise that natural experi-
ments with strong variation in TV consumption rarely present findings from the developed world.
For a country like the US, we would have to return to the middle of the 20th century, when sys-
tematic surveys were far less common as today, to find strong variation in TV viewing. Due to an
overlap of nation-wide surveys in West Germany with our historical incidence, our setup is one of
the few that allows to comprehensively check whether television consumption actually increases
after signal reception.
The historic natural experiment on television in West Germany starts with a baseline of a de-
facto ban of commercial TV until the early 1980s and, by international standards, low levels of
design” to credibly determine the effects of TV. They conclude: “Surprisingly given the interest in health economics,
the evidence is limited” (p. 744).
5. For a review of different settings used in the research on TV so far, see DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2015) who
emphasize the significant developments in methodological respects and list influential papers that have been published
in major economics journals over the last years. Apart from research on TV, there is related work by economists on the
impact of media, e.g. by Strömberg (2004), DellaVigna et al. (2014), Adena et al. (2015), Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)
for radio as well as by Bauernschuster et al. (2014) and Falck et al. (2014) for the internet.
3
TV consumption with two hours per day for the average German. As a result of a Supreme Court
decision in 1981, private television became legal in Germany and several new channels emerged.6
Despite new technological opportunities such as cable and satellite, for years most citizens could
not watch any of the new programs due to the failure of the responsible and later dismantled public
institution (the Deutsche Bundespost) to roll out private TV in a timely manner. In consequence,
there was a time window of several years, in which commercial TV providers searched for options
other than cable or satellite to reach their potential viewership. They found a cost-effective way:
terrestrial frequencies of public media stations that by chance were still available. However, in
the late 1980s almost all powerful frequencies were in use by public broadcasts for which the sta-
tions were built in the decades before, so this opportunity was clearly limited. Only a few stations
still had open frequencies that offered the opportunity to send out terrestrial signals to millions of
households. Due to a German Supreme Court ruling, there was no opportunity for commercial
TV to expand upon pre-existing terrestrial frequencies since transmitter stations in West Germany
could only be built for public media. In consequence, a technically limited transmitter reach cre-
ated naturally emerging borders that split citizens into receivers and non-receivers of private TV
via antenna.7
Due to available technical data on all terrestrial stations transmitting commercial TV in Ger-
many, we determine broadcast signals in a precise fashion to distinguish between TV treatment and
control regions. Following recent studies on the impact of media, we use special software based
on the Longley-Rice signal propagation model to identify regions with reception and without by
considering not only technical data, e.g. the power of the station, but also geographical information
such as mountains or valleys. A major benefit of our empirical setting is the fact that two large
longitudinal household studies of the German population were ongoing during our investigation
6. We use the terms private and commercial TV simultaneously. While public TV in Germany is partly financed
by mandatory fees, private TV channels do not receive fees but have to rely on revenues from advertisement and are
in private ownership. For example, in our investigation period, media tycoon and later prime minister of Italy Silvio
Berlusconi was one of the owners of private TV channel Tele5.
7. The success of the TV channel RTLplus with David Hasselhoff in the role of the channel’s first superstar is a
testament of an exogenously triggered increase in TV consumption, as nation-wide market shares more than doubled
within the year of 1989 due to heavy TV consumption in just a few areas of the country (see Section 2).
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period. First, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provides us with detailed survey infor-
mation on the situation of individuals at the time of the signal introduction, including the county of
residence. We merge our technical calculations with the SOEP data at the regional level and com-
pare how individual behavior responds in regions where commercial TV via terrestrial frequencies
suddenly became available vs. regions where it did not. We study the implications of TV access
for a set of daily individual time-use activities which allows us to inspect whether private TV re-
ception increases TV consumption in our setting. The SOEP questionnaire also includes several
outcome variables of interest capturing the individuals’ overall satisfaction with their lives and in-
dicators for their health. To capture variations in health, we analyze information on use of medical
services (doctor visits, hospital stays) as well as subjective self-assessments (health satisfaction).
By exploiting the panel structure of the data, we employ an individual fixed-effects approach to
examine how TV consumption changes at the individual level due to commercial TV reception
and how well-being is affected as a result of watching more television, without any influence of
time invariant individual or regional characteristics. Second, we merge the signal calculations with
the German Income and Expenditure Sample (EVS) at the municipality level.8 The sample drawn
from the Federal Statistical Office provides us with household expenses on components relevant to
individual health which allows us to investigate the consequences of TV consumption on health-
related behavior.
Due to available technical data on all terrestrial stations transmitting commercial TV in Ger-
many, we determine broadcast signals in a precise fashion to distinguish between TV treatment and
control regions. Following recent studies on the impact of media, we use special software based
on the Longley-Rice signal propagation model to identify regions with reception and without by
considering not only technical data, e.g. the power of the station, but also geographical information
such as mountains or valleys. A major benefit of our empirical setting is the fact that two large
longitudinal household studies of the German population were ongoing during our investigation
8. The German federal statistical office conducts the EVS for various purposes, especially to inform public policies.
For example, the data are taken into account when determining the level of social benefits paid do welfare recipients in
Germany. Apart from that, the data has been the basis for numerous studies on savings and consumption in particular
(e.g. Fuchs-Schundeln 2008; Friehe and Mechtel 2014).
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period. First, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provides us with detailed survey infor-
mation on the situation of individuals at the time of the signal introduction, including the county of
residence. We merge our technical calculations with the SOEP data at the regional level and com-
pare how individual behavior responds in regions where commercial TV via terrestrial frequencies
suddenly became available vs. regions where it did not. We study the implications of TV access
for a set of daily individual time-use activities which allows us to inspect whether private TV re-
ception increases TV consumption in our setting. The SOEP questionnaire also includes several
outcome variables of interest capturing the individuals’ overall satisfaction with their lives and in-
dicators for their health. To capture variations in health, we analyze information on use of medical
services (doctor visits, hospital stays) as well as subjective self-assessments (health satisfaction).
By exploiting the panel structure of the data, we employ an individual fixed-effects approach to
examine how TV consumption changes at the individual level due to commercial TV reception
and how well-being is affected as a result of watching more television, without any influence of
time invariant individual or regional characteristics. Second, we merge the signal calculations with
the German Income and Expenditure Sample (EVS) at the municipality level. The sample drawn
from the Federal Statistical Office provides us with household expenses on components relevant to
individual health which allows us to investigate the consequences of TV consumption on health-
related behavior.
In line with the historical background, we find that private TV significantly increases TV con-
sumption. According to our time-use analysis, increased TV consumption due to private TV may
be to the detriment of time spent on housework, suggesting a substitution effect between those two
activities. For our main outcomes, we contradict previous findings on the consequences of TV. In-
dividual happiness improves due to TV consumption in terms of life satisfaction, while individuals
do not suffer health impairments from watching TV more often. Television consumption does not
reduce health satisfaction nor does it lead to an increase in doctoral visits, be it on the extensive
margin or overall. This main conclusion does not change if we inspect long-run effects by exploit-
ing the longitudinal nature of our empirical setup in a dynamic treatment analysis. In fact, we can
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rule out negative health effects for a time window of several years of television treatment.
Our contributions are several fold: First, we provide a textbook example how a negative result
from the literature is flipped completely with a credible empirical setting. Using evidence from
a complementary survey we conducted ourselves in 2015, we confirm a negative relationship be-
tween TV viewing and both health and life satisfaction decades later. By juxtaposing different
pieces of evidence, we offer an explanation for previous findings, according to which there might
be a selection of unhealthy or unhappy types of individuals into the group of intense TV viewers.
Second, we provide a new setting for research on the effects of TV based on a unique natural ex-
periment that took place in a large and fully developed Western country, allowing findings with
generalizability from the relatively recent past. The setting further allows for longitudinal analy-
ses of the long-run impacts of TV in a time window of several years until the regional disparity
in access to private TV due to terrestrial frequencies became irrelevant.9 Third, the data include
information on possible behavioral changes, enabling us to empirically verify whether the new
opportunity to watch TV due to technological advancements actually affected media consumption.
In fact, the available time-use data inform us how individuals re-adjust their daily activities to have
more time for watching TV, which is a novelty in the research on the causal impact of television in
representative populations of adults, while consumption data inform us about the possible effects
of television on health-related behavior. Fourth, we complement ongoing research on TV con-
sumption with policy-relevant findings on important outcomes which so far have not received the
attention from economists that they arguably deserve. Thereby, we contribute to the debate about
the impact of media on society, which has focused mainly on the social costs and benefits but
less on the individual. According to our results, TV watching does not appear to be an economic
bad. Individuals seem to make a rational choice in a sense that television does yield a benefit to
them. This supports the notion of individual welfare maximization. While externalities for soci-
9. The rise of Germany’s No.1 private TV channel RTL ended in 1993 when market shares reached a historic peak
(see Figure A1), suggesting that the channel could not substantially benefit from further growth in viewership as a
result of increasing proliferation of cable and satellite. As receiving private TV via terrestrial frequencies became
relevant for millions of Germans throughout the second half of 1988, our setting provides us with a treatment phase of
roughly four years.
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eties could be either positive or negative, our findings explain why TV consumption is one of the
most popular activities, despite its possible social costs.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the early phase of pri-
vate TV in West Germany and describes the natural experiment (with supplementary details on the
history in Appendix A). Section 3 describes the data, which rely on technical calculations of local
TV signal reach and survey data to analyze its implications (Appendix B provides supplementary
information on technical details and checks). Section 4 presents a replication of earlier findings
in the literature and Section 5 contains the main results, including checks and extensions (with
Appendix C providing more information on the EVS data and Appendix D offering supplementary
output). Section 6 offers a discussion of the findings, with a focus on the content of television,
to learn more about external validity. Section 7 concludes by illustrating implications for public
policy and provides alternative interpretations of our evidence, thereby addressing the question
whether the proliferation of television could be seen as a success story or not.
1.2 Background
The historical development of commercial TV in West Germany involves a variety of different
actors, such as media tycoons, politicians, some transmitter stations with limited reach, a TV su-
perstar with a speaking car and Germany’s Supreme Court. We focus on those relevant aspects of
the history to understand the occurrence of a true and original natural experiment in the center of
Europe.10
Long before the rise of commercial TV in Europe, Germans have been very skeptical towards
television as a technology. Many individuals in Germany associate TV and its proliferation with
the stultification of the masses (“Volksverdummung”), which could explain why there was no re-
sistance to the legal ban of private TV for many decades. As a result of this consensus, TV only
10. Harrison and List (2004) provide a nice and not-so-serious definition: “Natural experiments arise when the
experimenter simply observes naturally occurring, controlled comparisons of one or more treatments with a baseline.
The common feature of these experiments is serendipity: policy makers, nature, or television game-show producers
conspire to generate these comparisons.” As we document, it appears that the history of commercial TV in West
Germany contains all three of these ingredients. For a timeline of events (Figure A1) and documentation of the
proliferation of TV in Germany based on excerpts from historical media reports, see Appendix A.
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existed in a limited form with a few public TV channels. In contrast to other developed countries
at the time, such as the US, watching TV took a relatively minor role in the daily lives of West
German citizens with two hours per day allowing for substantial increases in TV consumption
(Oltmanns 1993). The television landscape started to change dramatically in the 1980s. First,
Germany’s Supreme Court clarified its position on commercial television in a 1981 decision by
recognizing a modern development allowing media providers to overcome the scarcity of trans-
mission avenues. Thereby, the court referred to the justification of the ban on private TV which
until then was based on the idea that terrestrial broadcasting via frequencies can only work for a
limited number of media offers. This technical bottleneck was no longer an issue in times of cable
and satellite emerging as alternative transmission avenues. Second, a new conservative federal
government under the leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl decided to proliferate commercial
TV in Germany, which starkly contrasted the policies of the former social-democratic government
that was poised to protect the monopoly of public TV.
When the first commercial TV channels emerged in 1984, only a few thousand households in
Germany were able to watch the new programs. In order to change this quickly, the new con-
servative government assigned the task to roll out commercial TV to the Deutsche Bundespost.
However, this public institution failed to provide German households with those new private TV
channels in a timely manner and was dismantled in 1994. The Bundespost focused on cable, as
the preferred avenue to reach potential TV consumers, and invested large sums of money into what
critics called a “billion-dollar grave”. In the late 1980s, still only a minority of Germans watched
private TV via cable, whereas satellite TV was no alternative yet. The result was a time window of
several years, in which both politicians who supported private TV as well as officials of the emerg-
ing TV channels had the incentive to find an alternative way to reach German households. While
politicians were interested in good relations with the media, the media companies had the goal to
obtain a first-mover advantage in the emerging and growing media landscape in one of Europe’s
economically most relevant countries. It soon became clear that there was a simple way: terrestrial
frequencies on public-media transmitter stations that were not in use yet.
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It was apparent, however, that powerful frequencies were extremely rare, given that most of
those frequencies were in use by the public media broadcasts for which the stations were built.
The stations that could be used for private TV in the late 1980s were mainly constructed in the
1960s to provide the country with a second public TV channel in the aftermath of a 1961 Supreme
Court decision. Due to the ban of private TV, it was unforeseeable during the construction phase
that decades later there could be a strong commercial desire for more frequencies. Therefore, al-
most all of the powerful terrestrial frequencies with significant reach were in use by public media
broadcasts in the late 1980s. There were only a small number of stations that coincidentally had
still an open slot with a powerful frequency (Table D1).
Apart from this first technical limitation of the availability of powerful frequencies, there was
a legal limitation on the expansion of terrestrial broadcasting. According to the Supreme Court
decision in 1961, the management of Germany’s network of transmitter stations was seen as a
politically sensitive issue and, hence, building new stations was a public task that should be orga-
nized independently from political influences. In consequence, there was no legal option for any
commercial TV provider to expand upon the existing network of transmitter stations.
Powerful frequencies ensured that households without particular technical equipment could
easily watch the program, which was different for frequencies with low power.11 At the state level,
German politicians realized the importance of the powerful frequencies to reach a significant num-
ber of households and they allowed opening up public-media frequencies for non-public TV. As
an example, consider the densely populated federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The
available powerful frequencies in that state were called “juicy” by the media due to their extraor-
dinary desirability. The representatives of private TV channels applied for those frequencies to
the state government which would decide about the frequency usage. After the frequencies were
given to TV companies in 1988, millions of citizens in some areas of NRW suddenly were able to
watch commercial TV due to strong terrestrial signals available in the western part of the state. At
the same time, other citizens, including those in the eastern parts of NRW, could not receive those
11. Figure D1 shows an example of a 1980s TV set, which could be used to watch RTLplus via terrestrial television
signals in 1989. Usually, TV sets with indoor antenna receive terrestrial broadcasts provided a powerful signal.
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terrestrial signals due to a higher distance to transmitting stations. Similar to other empirical TV
settings, e.g. in Brazil (see La Ferrara et al. 2012), favoritism played a role in our context, as media
tycoons exerted enormous efforts to convince state officials to receive frequencies. However, such
form of favoritism only affected the decision which one of the commercial TV providers received
the “juicy” frequency but not whether a powerful frequency was technically available or not. This
was determined by ex-ante pre-determined factors and the coincidence of still available capacities
at transmitter stations that were built many years earlier for the sole purpose of public TV and radio
broadcasts.
Figure 1 shows the private TV signal reach across West Germany in 1989.12 Due to limitations
in signal reach, naturally emerging borders split the country into areas of potential receivers (col-
ored) and non-receivers (not colored). In addition to the NRW frequencies in the West, there were
a few powerful frequencies in use for private TV in the North of Germany. There were also some
smaller areas throughout Germany in which it was technically possible to receive private TV via
terrestrial frequencies, but it is an empirical question whether the power was sufficient to affect
individual TV consumption in significant ways.
The year 1989 was crucial for the proliferation of commercial TV in Germany. Among vari-
ous competitors, RTLplus became the country’s number one private TV channel in this year and
remained at the top for decades. The channel’s market share reached 10%, which is very large
since only a minority of households in Germany could watch this program (KEK 1998).13 The
program organizers behind RTLplus were able to establish their own superstar, David Hasselhoff,
12. This graphical illustration is a product of our own calculations and aligns with ad-hoc maps, drawn by technical
experts and shown to us. In personal communications with experts of terrestrial frequencies in Germany, we discovered
that there is no exact calculation of access patterns describing the reach of private TV in Germany so far. As a result,
we are the first who have done this laborious task. A comparison reveals that 1989 was the first year in which private
TV was widespread in Germany. We provide details on the most powerful private TV frequencies (with at least a
power of 10kW) in that year in Table D1.
13. Based on our own calculations using SOEP data, we find that the terrestrial RTLPlus signals reached 29.31%
of the individuals. This is an optimistic estimate, as we consider signals from all stations, including low-power
frequencies. As documented in Appendix A, satellite played no role at the time. For cable TV, official statistics are
available for 1988. Accordingly, 14.8% of households in West Germany had access. This number includes West
Berlin, which had the highest state-level access rate with 31.6%. While cable access rates could have increased further
in 1989, those numbers would still be far above the actual rate of RTLPlus cable viewers, as many households with
access did not order cable TV due to high connection fees.
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with a popular TV show called “Knight Rider”.14 Germany’s number two commercial TV channel
Sat.1 did not do as well. While the owner Leo Kirch received powerful frequencies in the North of
Germany, he was unsuccessful in the state of NRW. The situation in 1989 was even worse for the
third private TV broadcast, Tele5, owned by Italian media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. Tele5 did not
receive any of the powerful frequencies (see Table D1).
Given the importance of powerful frequencies, it is not surprising that media companies de-
manded more terrestrial frequencies and new transmitter stations. However, it was legally impos-
sible to build additional transmitter stations to reach more German households with private TV.
The legal framework was clear about the fact that construction of stations was only allowed for
the purpose of public media broadcasts. Given that the Supreme Court justified the broadcast of
private TV and the revision of the ban with new technical developments that go beyond terrestrial
broadcasting, commercial TV channels could only receive slots on public-media transmitters that
were still open. Attempts by these commercial TV providers to expand terrestrial TV in Germany
thus were doomed to fail and did fail. In particular, Silvio Berlusconi exerted enormous efforts
to expand terrestrial television in Germany for his channel Tele5 but finally failed and he sold his
shares during the 1990s when he left the German TV market.15
14. Knight Rider, like many other shows, was produced in the US and dubbed into German. An intriguing aspect
of the success story of David Hasselhoff in Germany was that the actor’s popularity through RTLplus allowed him to
start a music career. Although the public media did not play his music, at that time, he reached the top position in
Germany’s music charts in April of 1989.
15. As part of our historical documentation (Appendix A), several media reports covered the role of Berlusconi in
the German TV market. First, he tried to convince officials in NRW to get the powerful frequencies, and, then, offered
to expand the net of terrestrial frequencies in Germany, both approaches were unsuccessful.
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Figure 1.1: Private TV via Terrestrial Frequencies in Germany of 1989
Notes: The map illustrates counties of West Germany with and without reception of private TV via terrestrial fre-
quencies based on the Longley-Rice propagation model in 1989. In counties without private TV reception (white),
the aggregated mean value of all square-kilometer-based signal strength values is below 55 dBuV/m. In counties with
private TV reception, the aggregated mean value of all square-kilometer-based signal strength values is at least 55
dBuV/m. These counties are colored according to the effective radiated power (ERP) in kW of the frequency that pro-
vides the county with the strongest signal, using six intervals (maroon: min. 200 kW, red: 100 – 200 kW, red-orange:
50 – 100 kW, orange: 20 – 50 kW, gold: 10 – 20 kW, yellow: 0 – 10 kW) in line with Table 3. All signals of private




We obtained copies from the original documentation containing information about the trans-
mitter stations for public television and radio using terrestrial frequencies in West Germany (NDR
1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992). These so-called “Wittsmoor lists” are annual overviews
of information about all transmitters, including basic facts such as geographic position and effec-
tive radiated power (ERP) in kilowatts (kW). While related studies have used the 1989 Wittsmoor
list for geographically precise investigations into the effects of terrestrial TV signals from West-
ern stations broadcasting public TV to East German households (Crabtree et al. 2015; Bursztyn
and Cantoni 2016), we are the first to consider information on private TV channels within West
Germany by constructing a longitudinal dataset on signal reach. We benefit from additional infor-
mation from the official records of each transmitter station, which – like the Wittsmoor list – are
stored in Hamburg at the NDR (“Norddeutscher Rundfunk”). Those records contain information,
such as the height of the transmitter station and the month when the broadcast started.16 We are
also the first to collect information on antenna patterns of the transmitter stations. Since patterns
can differ substantially across stations, this information further increases precision when calculat-
ing TV signal reach.17
To determine the TV signal reach, we employ the so-called Communication System Planning
Tool (CSPT), which was developed for the US Department of Defense. The CSPT is an add-on
to the geographic analysis software ArcGIS to calculate the signal reach based on the Longley-
Rice signal propagation model. To consider geographical information for the entire region of West
Germany, we rely on digital maps incorporated in ArcGis version 9.3 and employ a resolution of
16. Records also include hand-written notes, such as information on initial phases of lower power. In some cases,
stations did not immediately broadcast signals with full power, especially for stations that potentially could reach the
territory of other countries.
17. For example, a transmitter station can send out its signal with the exact same strength in all directions or the
signal can be aimed at a certain direction. See Appendix B for more information and an exemplary antenna pattern.
Figure D2 displays the power of the signal from the transmitter station Wesel used by RTLplus which was mainly
directed to the south-east, away from the Dutch territory in the North and in the West of Wesel, and instead targeting
the populated Ruhrgebiet area.
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1000m. Thereby, our calculation of TV signals takes topographic aspects of the terrain into ac-
count, such as mountains and the earth’s curvature.
The aim of the signal calculation procedure is to determine whether a TV signal from a trans-
mitter reached a region in West Germany or not. For this purpose, we obtained additional digital
maps that allow us to identify borders of both counties and municipalities in West Germany.18 We
determine the signal strength for each square kilometer of West Germany first, and then aggregate
this information at the regional level. We thereby obtain a mean value for each region, be it a
municipality or a county. This average signal strength value allows us to determine whether indi-
viduals in a given region likely could watch a certain TV channel with their TV set.19
To separate treatment regions with access to terrestrial private TV from those without access,
we determine two important technical thresholds. The first parameter is the minimum strength of a
signal (dBuV/m) at which a region is considered to receive a TV signal. 55 dBuV/m is our default
value. As discussed in the sensitivity analysis in Appendix B, we obtained this value empirically
by employing various alternative thresholds for the first stage while considering related literature
in the process. It turns out that our main findings are insensitive to this choice (Table B2). For the
second parameter, the power underlying the frequency, we have limited ex-ante knowledge from
the literature about the role of less powerful frequencies. For example, in research on Western TV
signals in East Germany (Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016), ERP values of below 100kW are not used,
given that less powerful frequencies could only reach those areas close to the border that were
already provided with Western TV on more powerful frequencies. In our case of West Germany,
low powerful frequencies could in principle reach households, so we pay special attention to the
parameter of minimum ERP. Our expectation from studying the historical records was that 20kW
of ERP could serve as a suitable threshold to define a powerful and, thus, relevant frequency (see
18. We use the oldest available border files from 1997 provided by the German Federal Agency for Cartography and
Geodesy.
19. We follow the procedure in Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016). To illustrate the result of this procedure, in Appendix
Figures D3 and D4 are maps for the signal reach of the most powerful RTLplus frequency (on the transmitter station
Wesel) for both county and municipality level. In addition to averaging all cell values within a region, we also
determine the median of signal strength as an alternative measure. Our findings are insensitive to this decision (Table
B1).
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Section 2). This is in line with the media attention that the “juicy” frequencies of NRW received.
According to the technical documents available to us, the historic media coverage can only refer
to the two following stations: Wesel with 200kW and Dusseldorf with 20kW. However, the latter
frequency was actually below usual ERP levels of public TV broadcasts, for which most of the TV
antennas in the 1980s were configured. Therefore, we inspect how results change with a sequential
increase in the ERP threshold from 10 to 20, 50, 100 and 200kW, thereby excluding comparatively
weaker frequencies, to ascertain which signals did affect TV consumption in our period of investi-
gation.
Finally, we consider the month-exact start information for any private TV channel on each fre-
quency in our longitudinal data on TV signal reach. This data includes binary variables for each
region and year from 1987 to 1992. It reflects whether a region received a private TV signal or
not.20 The month-exact information identifies cases when the start of a private TV channel in a
given year took place but the SOEP fieldwork of the same year already concluded.21
1.3.2 SOEP
The main data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel, which is Germany’s largest panel
survey. We use version 29 (SOEP 2013) of this ongoing longitudinal investigation into the lives of
the German people (Wagner et al. 2007). The SOEP contains representative data for the adult pop-
ulation of Germany from 1984 onwards. Fieldwork happens mainly in the first few months of each
year when interviewers visit participating households.22 Prior to re-unification, West Germany had
more than 300 counties with varying numbers of SOEP participants in each county. To identify the
impact of television on individual outcomes, we use our longitudinal data on the reach of private
20. We prefer a dummy variable for TV signal reception instead of a linear signal strength. See Appendix B for
more information and sensitivity analyses (Table B3).
21. For example, the transmitter station Hennstedt provided the surrounding area with private TV since November
of 1988, according to the official records. Since the transmitter start month was later than the data collection for the
1988 SOEP, we consider 1989 as the first treatment year for SOEP participants living in regions receiving private TV
from the 100kW frequency of the station. See Appendix B for an overview of relevant stations with information on
timing, including official start dates and the occurrence of an initial phase of low power.
22. Due to early SOEP interviews within the year of 1989, the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall do not
play any role in our main analysis from 1987 to 1989. Note that we focus on West Germany, which in our definition
always excludes (West) Berlin.
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TV signals and merge that information with the SOEP data on the county-year level.23
To examine implications for individual health, the SOEP includes information on doctor visits
reported by participants for the last three months prior to the interview.24 A second health-specific
outcome variable in the SOEP are hospital stays reported by participants for the entire year prior
to the annual interview. Because this question was not included in the questionnaire of 1990, we
have no information on hospital stays for our crucial year of 1989. We do not use this variable in
our main specification, but we provide supplementary analyses where we adjust the time window
of our investigation. The SOEP also contains subjective self-assessments in the form of health
satisfaction (wording: “How satisfied are you with your health?”) and life satisfaction (wording:
“How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”), which are routinely asked in each
SOEP questionnaire. Respondents in the SOEP always assess their satisfaction levels on a scale
ranging from 0 (“completely dissatisfied”) to 10 (“completely satisfied”).
For the purpose of investigating individual daily time-use changes as a result of private TV
reception, we exploit the SOEP time-use battery. This survey module contains information about
the hours per day an individual engages in different activities, e.g. childcare (Table D2). The
questions are asked for workdays (including Saturday) and Sundays. In contrast to recent SOEP
waves, questionnaires until 1989 included an item called “TV/Video”. We use all responses from
this item to establish a manipulation variable called “watching TV” with a broad understanding of
television, in which we include watching videos.25 We cumulate the reported numbers of hours by
the respondents for a typical workday multiplied by six and add a typical Sunday to obtain weekly
23. Regional identifiers are available for data users after signing a special agreement with the SOEP organizers.
Analyses of regional data are possible via remote access using SOEPremote and on-site at the DIW Berlin.
24. In 1988, this question changed. Before 1988, participants could respond to have visited no doctor or provide the
doctor visits for different types of doctors (dentist, etc.). Since 1988, the wording in the SOEP aggregates all doctor
visits without any separation into types of doctors: “Have you visited doctors in the last 3 months? If yes, please
indicate how often.” For the pre-1988 data, we aggregate all cases of different types of doctor visits to generate a
variable reflecting the total number of doctor visits. Given many survey items due to 11 different doctor categories,
this exercise leads to a relatively large number of missing values. Using year fixed effects, ameliorates this issue. Note
that the binary indicator for having visited any doctor is not subject to this missing-value issue.
25. At the time, individuals in Germany mainly used their video recorders to watch self-recorded TV shows and
movies. A check based on EVS data reveals that ownership of video recorders is not affected by receiving private TV
via terrestrial frequencies, while we find significant positive effects of receiving private TV on the number of TV sets
owned by EVS participants (see Appendix C).
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time-use. While this serves as our main time-use variable of interest, we run sensitivity analyses
to check the role of this particular definition (Appendix B). We also analyze the remaining time of
a 24-hours day after subtracting the sum of all reported hours spent on all activities and interpret
this residual as sleeping time.
A potential caveat of the time-use information is its hour-based measurement. Changes of half
an hour for instance could remain unreported. Given negative views and the social stigma attached
to watching TV in Germany (Appendix A), it is likely that many individuals stick to their reported
hours of TV consumption from the previous interview and do not increase their self-reports even
if they actually do watch more after receiving commercial TV. We believe that the merger of the
workday information with the Sunday information mitigates this issue somewhat, given that re-
porting on having watched TV on a weekend might be less stigmatizing than during the week, but
we still expect changes in TV consumption to be underreported.26
Table D2 shows descriptive statistics for the resulting main sample from 1987 to 1989. We ex-
pand this period beyond 1989 for additional reduced-form analyses without the TV consumption
variable. As an important data restriction to allow for clustering of standard errors at the regional
level, we ensure that our analysis is not affected by individuals moving between regions. Each
individual observation is included in the analysis only if the person is observed in the same county,
in which he or she lived in 1989. This restriction maximizes the number of observations in this par-
ticular year and implies a left-skewed distribution of observations across years in our main sample.
In Appendix B, we show that the results are insensitive to this restriction.27
26. Self-reported time-use on TV consumption typically reveal much lower estimates about watching behavior in
comparison to electronic measures for the same population (Frey et al., 2007). In contrast, electronic measures might
yield over-reporting due to individuals that activate the TV in the background while they do not actually watch or
listen. Note that we find in sensitivity analyses (Table B6) that TV consumption is affected more heavily on Sunday
than during the workweek.
27. Selective relocations are no issue in the context of our natural experiment on private TV signals via terrestrial
frequencies. This is because of i) the social stigma associated with (private) TV in Germany (see Appendix A), ii) the
uncertainty surrounding private TV on terrestrial frequencies, and iii) the fact that everybody in Germany could expect
to get the option to watch private TV eventually. To the best of our knowledge, there was no case of a person moving
from one place to another within Germany just to watch private TV earlier.
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Table 1.1: Means of Summary Statistics in TV Regions across Survey Years
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
Table 1 illustrates differences between characteristics of SOEP respondents across treatment
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and control regions for the three main years of our investigation phase. For a TV signal definition
of 20kW and more, there are a few significant differences. This check provides an indication that
the frequencies with low power might be endogenous and, hence, less useful as an instrument. This
empirical insight conforms to the historical circumstances as documented in the media coverage
of the 1980s (Appendix A), according to which some low-power frequencies were not in use by
private TV, albeit available, depending on politically motivated actions. For a TV signal definition
that includes only maximum frequency power, randomization is more plausible.
1.3.3 EVS and Own Survey
In addition to the SOEP, we use the German Income and Expenditure Sample (“Einkommens-
und Verbrauchsstichprobe”, EVS) that covers the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s.28 Every
five years, the German Federal Statistical Office asks tens of thousands of representative house-
holds in Germany to report in detail on their income and consumption behavior. The data includes a
variety of different expenditure items, from pharmaceutical products to TV sets. The EVS waves of
1988 and 1993 are of interest to investigate possible differences in behavior due to exposure to pri-
vate TV signals. We describe the process of merging the EVS data with the TV signal information
in detail in Appendix C where we discuss limitations and present results from a complementary
TV signal check, for which we use information on purchases of TV sets.
We further conducted a representative telephone survey of the German public on the topic of
television in 2015.29 One goal of this survey was to obtain information from individuals about
TV program content perceptions in Germany and to assess differences between public and private
TV (see Section 6). Another objective of the survey was to obtain new data on the link between
well-being and TV consumption in present time. To infer weekly TV consumption, we asked in-
terviewees the question: “How much time per day (in hours respectively minutes) do you spend on
average watching TV?” We inspect associations between self-reported hours of weekly TV con-
28. The 1988 EVS wave was specifically prepared for this project by Germany’s Federal Statistical Office to allow
a regional analysis at the municipality level.
29. The survey was conducted at and financed by the Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the Euro-
pean Union, a research institute located at the University of Trier in Germany.
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sumption and life satisfaction as well as health satisfaction as the two dependent variables in a
complementary analysis. The latter two variables are observed on an 11-point scale, in the same
way as in the SOEP.
1.4 Reproducing Findings from the Literature
1.4.1 Model
First, we reproduce previous findings on TV and its empirical relationship with (ill) health and
(low) life satisfaction. We use data from our own 2015 survey as well as the SOEP data from the
1980s for a first correlational inspection. This allows us to juxtapose the historical evidence from
the SOEP with recent evidence on correlations between well-being and TV consumption. We use
the following model, which allows us to test the role of individual fixed-effects:
Well Beingit = θ0 + θ11(FE) + θ2TV Watchingit + uit (1.1)
Initially, we employ a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression linking TV consumption
to outcomes reflecting individual well-being (i.e. health and life satisfaction), which is possible
for both datasets. For our own survey, the fixed effects indicator 1(FE) is zero. When we use the
panel structure of the SOEP data, we transition to a fixed effects model with the binary 1(FE) set
to one to control for individual time-invariant characteristics.
1.4.2 Results
Panel A of Table 2 shows the relationship between TV watching and satisfaction outcomes from
our 2015 survey. Consistent with findings in the literature, we find that higher TV consumption is
linked to lower health satisfaction and life satisfaction scores on average. The results imply that
zero TV consumption is connected to the highest satisfaction scores. Adding covariates does not
qualitatively change the finding.30
30. The results also hold if we consider survey factors, such as weekday of the interview.
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Table 1.2: TV Consumption and Well-Being Associations
Notes: The independent variable is weekly TV consumption in hours. In Panel A, the dependent variables are health
and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale. The set of control variables contains gender, age, quadratic age, household
size, and living in West Germany in 1989. See Table D3 for descriptive statistics on all variables considered. In Panel
B, the dependent variables are health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the extensive
margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. The baseline specification contains
year-fixed effects. The set of control variables contains gender, age, quadratic age, household size, owner of dwelling,
main tenant of dwelling, education (in years), and survey month. See Table D2 for descriptive statistics on the control
variables used. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Own data collected in 2015 (Panel A) and SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989 (Panel B).
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Panel B of Table 2 shows that the relationship for the SOEP participants in the 1980s are similar
to the ones in our survey from 2015. Again, lower health and life satisfaction is connected to more
hours of TV watching. However, we can already observe that the coefficient on life satisfaction
attenuates as soon as we add control variables. When we include fixed-effects, the results change
even more drastically. There is no negative effect of changes in TV consumption on individual
health or life satisfaction. This is evidence opposing the idea of negative effects from TV viewing
for well-being and it demonstrates the importance to consider time-invariant characteristics when
analysing differences in health and happiness. Our longitudinal findings indicate a selection of
unhappy and unhealthy types into the group of more intense TV viewers. Since the endogeneity
between TV watching and well-being cannot be addressed by an even more comprehensive set of
controls, we turn to the private TV signal from the natural experiment.
1.5 Exploiting Exogenous Variation in TV Watching
1.5.1 Model
To identify the causal effect of TV on well-being, we exploit differential timing and geograph-
ical occurrence of new TV signals though an instrumental variable (IV) fixed-effects approach as
follows:
TV Watchingit = ρ0 + ρi + ρt + ρ1Private TVit + εit (1.2)
Well Beingit = γ0 + γi + γt + γ1Private TVit + ηit (1.3)
In the first stage of our model, we regress TV Watching on the Private TV signal (2) and in
the reduced form we use the health and happiness indicators as dependent variables (3). To arrive
at the local average treatment effect of TV Watching on Well-Being we use only the exogenous
variation of ̂TVWatchingit from the Private TV signal, assuming that the TV signal only affects
Well-Being through TV Watching:
Well Beingit = β0 + βi + βt + β1 ̂TVWatchingit + uit (1.4)
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By employing individual fixed-effects (ρi, γi, βi), we exploit individual changes in private TV
reception resulting in individuals watching more or less TV. We also control for any time trend in
Well-Being or TV Watching using time fixed effects (ρt, γt, βt).
In the following, we conduct first-stage regressions to inspect how different definitions of our
instrument affect time-use, before we turn to reduced-form and IV results for our main outcomes.
Afterwards, we discuss the exclusion restriction underlying the IV analysis and report results from
several sensitivity analyses.
1.5.2 Time-use
Table 3 shows the manipulation of TV consumption through potential instruments of access
to private TV. In line with historical market shares of German TV channels in the late 1980s,
having the opportunity to watch terrestrial private TV channels increases time spent watching TV.
This finding is robust when adding control variables in column two. The first definition of our
private TV instrument in row one includes the two big NRW frequencies (see Section 2). Row two
shows the instrument based on all private TV frequencies, including those with very low power.
We observe a significant but comparatively weak effect, in line with our expectation that more
powerful signals are more likely to ensure TV program reception and, thus, alter behavior. Varying
the kW threshold of frequency powers sequentially supports this idea, as more power generally
increases the hours watched per week from 0.9 hours per week for all transmitters and up to 1.6
hours per week for the most powerful frequency of 200 kW. To ensure a maximum F statistic for
a relevant first stage, we focus on the highest ERP threshold of 200 kW, which is in line with our
randomization check (Section 3.2) and with further evidence from the EVS based on TV ownership
as manipulation variable (Appendix C).
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Table 1.3: Effect of Private TV Signal on TV Consumption
Notes: Dependent variable is weekly TV consumption in hours. The baseline model is an individual fixed effects
specification with year-fixed effects showing potential first stages. The set of control variables contains gender, age,
quadratic age, household size, owner of dwelling, main tenant of dwelling, education (in years), and survey month.
See Table D2 for descriptive statistics on the control variables used. F is the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic. County-level
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
In Figure 2, we expand our time-use analysis to other activities. We make use of the 200
kW instrument of private TV access via terrestrial frequencies. For a comparison we include TV
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consumption as part of the seven time-use items and the residual interpreted as hours of sleep.
We do not find any changes in this variable which contradicts the idea that individuals substitute
sleep to watch more TV. The same is true for child care, work, training, repairs and hobbies. This
suggests that respondents differentiate between hobbies and TV watching since the latter increases
significantly. As the second significant finding in Figure 2, we observe that access to private TV
leads to a reduction of about one and a half hours of time spent on housework per week. While TV
signals cannot affect this activity other than through the effect of watching TV, the results suggest
that housework is a possible substitute. This interpretation is further supported by the observation
of a similar effect size compared to the increase in hours of TV watching.
Figure 1.2: Private TV Signal and Time-Use
Notes: Dependent variables reflect time in hours per week that a person spends on various activities taken from the
SOEP time-use battery, with the exception of the residual time variable (which is 24 times 7 minus the total sum of
all seven activities). The Private TV is a 200 kW dummy variable indicating whether the respondent lives in a county
for which a TV signal based on terrestrial frequencies was calculated. The baseline specification contains year-fixed
effects and county-level clustered standard errors. 95 percent confidence interval levels are displayed.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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1.5.3 Main Results
Table 4 presents the intent-to-treat effects of TV on individual well-being. We regress well-
being indicators on TV signal receipt in an individual fixed effects model as shown in column
one. In column two, we add a set of control variables. The results show no evidence for any
health impairments from the health satisfaction measure due to the opportunity to watch more TV.
Similarly, both visiting the doctor (extensive margin) and the amount of doctoral visits show no
significant effect from getting a terrestrial private TV signal.
Table 1.4: Intent-to-treat Terrestrial TV on Well-Being
Notes: The independent variable is the 200 kW private TV signal. The dependent variables are health and life satisfac-
tion on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits
in the last three months. The baseline model is an individual fixed effects specification with year-fixed effects showing
reduced form estimates. The set of control variables contains gender, age, quadratic age, household size, owner of
dwelling, main tenant of dwelling, education (in years), and survey month. See Table D2 for descriptive statistics on
the control variables used. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
Table 4 also shows the effect of TV signal reception on life satisfaction. Here, we obtain a
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significantly positive effect that is robust to the inclusion of control variables. Receiving private
TV increases individual happiness, which contrasts previous results in the literature as well as our
initial correlates (Section 4.2). Overall, unhappy individuals in bad shape seem to select themselves
into the group of intensive-viewers. When we get rid of the selection problem, television appears
irrelevant for health conditions and it even benefits individual happiness.
Table 1.5: Instrumental Variable Effects of TV Consumption on Well-Being
Notes: The dependent variables are health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the
extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. The instrumented independent
variable is weekly TV consumption in hours and the instrument is the 200 kW private TV signal. The baseline model
is an individual fixed effects specification with year-fixed effects showing instrumental variable estimates. The set
of control variables contains gender, age, quadratic age, household size, owner of dwelling, main tenant of dwelling,
education (in years), and survey month. See Table D2 for descriptive statistics on the control variables used. County-
level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
Table 5 shows IV fixed effects to obtain the local average treatment effect. We use the occur-
rence of private TV signals via terrestrial frequencies as an instrument for TV consumption, which
is the endogenous variable on the second stage of our fixed-effects IV model. We find no effect
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on individual health from watching more TV, rejecting the expectation of corresponding health
impairments, throughout all the specifications. As indicated by the F statistics, this zero result is
not due to weak manipulation of TV watching. The life satisfaction result supports the idea that in-
creases in TV consumption (if exogenously manipulated) increases individual happiness, which is
robust to adding control variables. One more hour of TV consumption per week increases the LSF
score by about 0.17 points. To put that into perspective, happiness research based on SOEP data
shows significant reductions in life satisfaction when individuals become unemployed, with effect
sizes that roughly vary between 0.5 and 1 on the 11-point scale (Clark et al. 2008, Kassenboehmer
and Haisken-DeNew 2009, Chadi 2010). This suggests that increasing TV consumption by 3 to 6
weekly hours could compensate the unemployed for their unhappiness.
1.5.4 Discussion of Exclusion Restriction and Sensitivity Analyses
For a credible interpretation of the IV results, the exclusion restriction has to hold. The re-
sults are only valid under the assumption that TV consumption is the only channel through which
well-being is affected by the television signal. We discuss possible violations of this assumption,
including ideas that may be to some extent speculative, before we provide a summary of sensitivity
analyses regarding our main results in the second part of this subsection.
First, the program on private TV might be politically biased in favor of those individuals who
are more likely to receive a certain channel. Given the historical incidence (Appendix A), one
could speculate that RTLplus possibly had a rather social-democrat leaning audience, which be-
came happier due to politically convenient coverage. However, as we discuss later in Section 6, the
political content was certainly not the focus of commercial TV organizers, but rather entertainment
offers based on fiction were dominant in their programs. Second, there may be a direct health ef-
fect linked to TV signals and possible radiation. This is unlikely to affect our results, even if those
health concerns were justified, since individuals are only exposed to additional frequencies from
transmitter stations, which already broadcasted public media programs on even more powerful fre-
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quencies.31 Further, our results throughout the paper show that health is not reduced due to signal
reception. Third, , one might conjecture that the probability of receiving TV signals on powerful
frequencies is more likely in densely populated areas and that individual life satisfaction increases
in big cities for other reasons during our period of investigation, which then would induce a spuri-
ous result. However, our sensitivity analyses show that regions with large cities are not differently
affected (Table B4). In summary, the discussion of our empirical checks together with the balance
of covariates check (Table 1) increase our confidence that the exclusion restriction holds for the
instrument used in our empirical analyses.
We further conduct a series of checks to be certain that our main findings are robust (see Ap-
pendix B for details). First, we change the calculation method for the TV signals at the regional
level. Aggregation via mean (our default) or median on the raster level or calculating the signal on
the municipality level and aggregating signals at the county level or directly calculating the signal
at the county level does not change the results. Only calculating the signal based on the centroid
of each county results in a drop in power but still with an F above 10, the result is qualitatively the
same (Table B1). We interpret this as confirmation of our precise calculation procedure based on
square-kilometer raster method, as higher precision indeed goes along with a stronger manipulation
of TV consumption. Second, we vary the signal threshold for counties to be defined as treatment
regions (50-55-60-65 dBuV/m) and we find that the results are robust (Table B2). Third, we check
our decision to focus on signal strength thresholds for a binary distinction between treatment and
control regions, instead of employing a linear signal strength variable. The results conform qual-
itatively to the results established via binary treatment indicator (Table B3). Fourth, we vary the
definition of the control group to minimize the likelihood that households in the “control” areas had
private TV access through alternative ways. First stage results are robust or become even stronger
when we exclude, for example, counties with early cable projects and regions at the border (Tables
31. In case of the transmitter station Wesel, which was built in the 1960s construction phase to establish Germany’s
second public TV channel ZDF (see Figure A1), more powerful frequencies existed than the one that RTLplus received
in the late 1980s. In line with our historical documentation (Appendix A), public media programs were preferred, while
RTLplus received a remaining but still quite powerful 200 kW frequency. Given the historical relevance of this station,
the “Wesel transmitter” (“Sender Wesel”) is covered on Wikipedia where additional information can be found.
30
B4). Fifth, we check our empirical procedure regarding cases when individuals move between
regions throughout our investigation period. It turns out that the findings are qualitatively similar
if we modify our choices in this regard (Table B5). Sixth, we examine whether the definition of
our time-use variable is of importance (Table B6). In fact, there are a few outliers with more than
70 hours of reported TV consumption per week.32 To avoid arbitrary decisions, we keep those ob-
servations in our main data, but for the purpose of robustness, we recode the variable by reducing
the reported number to a maximum of either 100 or 70 hours of TV consumption per week. We
also employ a monotone logarithmic transformation of TV watching. All those changes do not
affect our results, they are not driven by outliers. Seventh, the results do not change significantly,
when we expand our model by adding survey factors as control variables, such as the week of the
survey and interview mode. In a final check, we also merge the SOEP data with information about
weather conditions on the day of the interview and weeks before. Adding such controls also does
not change our results (Table B7). All in all, we conclude that the results are robust and confirm
our finding: TV makes people happy, not unhappy.
1.5.5 Effect Heterogeneity
We further investigate the main findings based on groups that are expected to be most affected
by the treatment of television to understand the plausibility of the main effects. Previous research
suggest that females are more susceptible to TV than men. Benesch et al. (2010) therefore conduct
separate analyses for the sexes, and they make a distinction by age. Differentiating by age also
makes sense in our setting since commercial TV providers focus on younger audiences that are
believed to be more susceptible to advertisement. Motivated by recent research on TV, such as
Durante et al. (2019), we also examine differences between low and high educated individuals,
testing the idea of private TV as light entertainment for the uneducated, and we distinguish between
households with children vs. those without, given that private TV programs could be particularly
attractive for minors.
Table 6 suggests evidence for gender differences in the effect of television on life satisfaction. A
32. In the sample used for our analyses, the share of reported TV hours per week above 70 hours is 0.5 percent.
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direct test via interaction terms shows no statistically significant difference, but the point estimates
as well as statistical significance levels indicate that the happiness effect due to having access to
private TV is driven by females. This finding could be seen as informative in light of research
on the empowerment of women via TV (Jensen and Oster 2009), since role models of successful
women may be particularly effective in changing behavior if women enjoy watching even more
than men do. As a second observation, it appears that our main finding is not driven by one
specific age-group. The effect is highly significant for individuals below 50. Again, we do not
observe a statistically significant interaction term in a separate regression analysis, which could
be due to lack of statistical power. Nevertheless, there is a visible difference when we compare
the results in Table 6 after conducting subgroup splits, since the effect is highly significant for the
young and insignificant for older individuals.
Table 1.6: Heterogeneous Intent-to-Treat Effects of TV Consumption on Life Satisfaction
Notes: The independent variable is the 200 kW private TV signal. The dependent variable is life satisfaction on a 0 to
10 scale. High Education is defined as more than 11 years of education and young is defined as being below the age
of 50. The baseline model is an individual fixed effects specification with year-fixed effects showing heterogeneous
reduced form estimates. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
32
For education, our finding is somewhat surprising at first, given Table 6 reveals that higher-
educated individuals respond more positively to private TV. This seems to counter the idea of
TV as light entertainment. However, recent research on the cognitive development of children in
Norway finds similar effect heterogeneity when comparing the impact of private TV on educational
outcomes in high vs. low educated families (Hernæs et al. 2019). Finally, Table 6 shows that the
happiness effect seems to be driven by individuals living in a household with children, whereas
the effect is insignificant for households without children. We interpret this finding in such a way
that families with children benefit the most from television since they can substitute other forms
of spending time with children by watching TV together. At this point, it would be interesting
to know more about health and life satisfaction implications of television for minors, but due to
the SOEP focus on adults at the time of the natural experiment, we cannot pursue this avenue of
further research.
1.5.6 Extension of Time Period
An interesting question is, whether the happiness effect is short-term or long-term in nature.
Recall that we focus on the main phase of 1987 to 1989, as the SOEP time-use battery does not
include information on TV consumption beyond 1989. Therefore, we are restricted in our efforts
to inspect the long-term effects of exposure to private TV via terrestrial frequencies, but we can
expand the data for supplementary intent-to-treat analyses, in which we continue to employ our
main outcomes as dependent variables and private TV access as the independent variable without
consideration of any manipulation variable. By expanding the investigation until 1992, we add
several years of treatment via terrestrial TV signals from the time before private TV became uni-
versally accessible in Germany. Simultaneously, we expand the number of treatment-free years
without private TV signals for both control and treatment regions by adding data from 1985 and
1986, allowing for a balanced number of treatment and control years. We present results from
the expanded data based on a dynamic treatment analysis for both outcome variables that are con-
tinuously available in the SOEP, i.e. life satisfaction and health satisfaction, in order to find out
whether we can confirm the previous findings from our short-run analysis.
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Figure 1.3: Dynamic Perspective of Satisfaction Measures
Notes: The illustrations are based on a dynamic effects reduced form model showing intent-to-treat coefficients within
a 95 percent confidence interval. Life and health satisfaction are both measured on a scale ranging from 0 (“completely
dissatisfied”) to 10 (“completely satisfied”).
Source: SOEP data are from 1985 to 1992.
Figure 3 displays the dynamic evolution of our reduced form results for individual well-being
in two panels. In Panel A, we confirm that across all treatment years, the effect of receiving private
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TV on health satisfaction is not negative. Instead, the panel displays minor positive effects that
are not instantaneous but seem to grow slowly, reaching even statistical significance in two years.
Panel B shows that the life-satisfaction effect from TV consumption is immediately positive in
1989, in line with our short-run analysis, and also continuously positive. Statistical significance
is reached in three out of four post-treatment years without any clear evidence for a fading-out of
the happiness effect, despite increasing availability of private TV via cable and satellite in control
regions without terrestrial TV signals.
The results in Figure 3 indicate that the happiness effect of TV is not just of short-term na-
ture. It appears that individuals do not just watch private TV because it is a novel and exciting
experience for them at first. For health, the results are clear evidence against the hypothesis that
TV viewing increases individual sickness. This does not seem to be the case, despite a year-long
TV treatment effect in our setting. Quite the contrary, our evidence for health satisfaction rather
raises the question if television might even improve individual health. One interpretation could be
that increases in life satisfaction have spill-overs on health, as happier individuals might be less
immune towards psychological problems like depression.33 This interpretation is amplified by the
visual evidence in Figure 3 showing that the positive life-satisfaction effect happens first, and pos-
itive health-satisfaction effects seem to trail behind.
We use the other health measures in the SOEP to conduct further analyses of possible long-run
effects. Table D5 (Panel A) reveals that the measures for doctoral visits (i.e. visited a doctor,
number of doctor visits) are unaffected when we exploit two additional years of TV treatment
in a reduced-form analysis. By using our long panel, we can now also analyze information on
hospital stays, which are available for two treatment years and may reflect strong differences in
individual health. Table D5 (Panel B) shows no significant effects of television in this indicator
for ill-health, independent of the chosen definition (i.e. incidence of a hospital visit, number of
hospital visits, number of nights in hospital, log number of nights in hospital). While these find-
ings do not provide additional support for the idea of positive health effects, the evidence against
33. See Argyle (1997) who discusses the idea of happiness as a cause of health by highlighting the role of positive
moods.
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negative long-run health effects is now well-grounded on a set of three different indicators. We dis-
cuss the possibility of positive (or negative) health effects due to television further in the following
subsection by turning to a different dataset.
1.5.7 Health-related Expenditures
We proceed by using the EVS data to investigate different effects of exposure to private TV
on consumer activities. Due to the restriction of our data on two waves, i.e. 1988 and 1993, we
compare the changes in outcomes over time for municipalities receiving private TV on a powerful
terrestrial frequency since 1988 as the treatment regions against municipalities not receiving a
signal. Our main outcomes are informative about health-related behaviors and are analyzed using
the following difference-in-difference model:
Expendituresit = δ0 + δ1PrivateTVit + δ21(1993)it + δ3PrivateTV × 1(1993)it + ζit (1.5)
We deviate from models used for our SOEP analysis, as we cannot consider individual fixed-
effects when analysing two waves of the EVS with its repeated cross-sectional nature. However, we
do examine possible pre-treatment differences between regions and consider those in the regression
analysis. Furthermore, we shed light on the robustness of results by checking our findings for a
different definition of control regions, i.e. by excluding municipalities that receive signals for a
shorter period of time (starting after 1988) as well as signals from transmitters on less powerful
frequencies.34 To check the definition of the TV signal regarding signal strength and power, we
show the results for the “number of own TV sets” in Appendix C. Based on this alternative indicator
for changes in TV consumption, we find evidence in favor of successful manipulation via terrestrial
TV signals similar to the TV/Video time-use item in the SOEP data.
To understand possible effects of TV on individual health, we focus on expenditures for health-
34. Excluding low-power frequency regions could play a particular role in the analysis of the EVS due to increased
geographical precision of TV signal identification. In some cases, a low-power signal might be insufficient to affect
outcomes county-wide, as analyzed in the SOEP, but within counties, at the municipality level, such local frequencies
could have an impact.
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related products and services. Table 7 shows expenditures on doctoral services as a first outcome.
Assuming that sick individuals pay more for doctoral services to become healthy again, higher
expenditures could indicate bad health. However, higher expenditures can also indicate higher
health awareness. A second variable is expenditures on medical products, which may serve as
another health proxy, assuming that sick individuals pay more for products that promise to tackle
their sickness.
Table 1.7: Health-related Expenditures
Notes: The dependent variable is expenditures on medical products and doctoral services. Private TV is defined as
living in regions with 200kW powered TV signals starting in 1988. The baseline model is a difference-in-difference
specification showing reduced form estimates. Municipality-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels
of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: EVS data are from 1988 to 1993.
Column one, row one of Table 7 shows that in 1993 the annual expenditures for doctoral ser-
vices were about 160 DM higher compared to 5 years earlier.35 In 1988, there were no visible
differences in such expenditures between treatment and control regions of private TV (row two).
For the main effect of private TV on doctoral services, we observe an increase of approximately 60
35. At the time, the currency “Deutsche Mark” (DM) was used in West Germany.
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DM. While the effect is weakly significant for the main data, it becomes somewhat stronger and
significant at the 5% level for the smaller dataset with only clean control regions in column two.
Given the zero result for the number of doctor visits in the SOEP, a possible interpretation is
that individuals in the treatment regions went to the doctor with more severe health issues and thus
had to pay more. However, several points contradict such a conclusion in favor of negative health
effect from watching TV. First, the effect is not robust. Adding control variables to our regression
model based on the full dataset renders the effect insignificant.36 The effect is also insignificant
when we add region fixed effects using dummy variables for all of the several thousand munic-
ipalities in Germany. Second, since most Germans are part of the social healthcare system and
do not have to pay for doctoral services in general, there could be a change in the total amount
of expenditures on doctoral services due to more individuals being privately insured in the treat-
ment regions. In fact, further evidence from employing the same approach on an EVS variable for
private health insurance supports this idea, suggesting that private TV induces more individuals
to become privately insured (either as main insurance or as an add-on to public healthcare). This
could be due to more advertisement for such services on private TV compared to public TV. Third,
if treated individuals went to the doctor because of more severe health issues, we would expect
to see similar evidence for a positive TV effect in medical products, but the remainder of Table 7
does not support this. If at all, there seems to be a reduction in monthly expenditures on medical
products when clean control regions are used. However, effect sizes of roughly 2 DM reductions
in expenditures are rather small and adding control variables to our regression model based on the
full data shows an insignificant effect, which we also find when adding region fixed effects.
For interpretation of the results on medical products, one has to keep in mind that our starting
hypothesis was that TV reduces health. In line with our findings based on the SOEP data, the
result for the EVS data does not support this hypothesis. Given our results, another interpretation
is that TV actually increases individual health, for example, through better mood. Indeed, if we
assume that independent of health status, the expenditures on medical products increase separately
36. The control variables are similar to those used in our SOEP-based analysis and include gender, age, quadratic
age, household size, having children, house ownership, renter, municipality size and month of expenditure elicitation.
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because of more advertisement for pharmaceutical drugs on private TV, then this could mean that
we underestimate the positive effects on individual health. In the absence of further evidence, we
conclude that positive health effects of TV are a possibility.
1.6 Discussion
To learn more about the generalizability of our results we discuss the content of the TV pro-
grams which were watched by millions of Germans in the late 1980s. One might argue that com-
mercial TV in West Germany differs from other types of television, such as television in the US,
and could be a very specific form of TV. However, a strong similarity to US television exists for en-
tertainment content. TV viewers of RTLplus and other commercial channels often watched movies
and series that originated in the US (e.g. the hit series “A-Team” or the top movie ”E.T.”). A more
difficult question is whether commercial TV in West Germany was substantially different from
public TV, which could be helpful to understand our positive result for life satisfaction.
Research on potential differences in content between commercial and public TV finds some
differences in content analyses for the 1980s programs. According to Krüger (1989), information-
related programs on the two major public TV channels had a higher share of the total content
(ARD: 33,5%, ZDF: 39,8%) compared to their main competitors in commercial TV (Sat.1: 26%,
RTLplus: 22,4%). Instead, entertainment offers based on fiction were more prevalent in private
TV (Sat.1: 50,6%, RTLplus: 49,3%) compared to public TV (ARD: 30,8%, ZDF: 30,0%). This
seemed to be what German TV consumers particularly liked about commercial TV, according to
research based on early cable-TV projects in the 1980s, which shows how viewers focused on en-
tertainment programs, albeit not solely (Hasebrink 1989).37 While public broadcasts in Germany
follow a mandate to educate the public as justification to collect fees, private TV channels also
37. Indirect evidence for the claim of very similar program offers between public and private TV, both focusing
on light entertainment, can be derived from the work on individual’s willingness to protest in East Germany (Kern
and Hainmueller 2009, Kern 2011, Crabtree et al. 2015). This research shows that there was no anti-communist
propaganda effect due to receiving Western public TV in regions close to the Western border, since any ideological
effect was over-compensated by a general reduction of political activity induced by television with its emphasis on
entertainment.
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agreed to have some political content with an educational purpose.38 Therefore, private TV in
West Germany has some characteristics of public TV, and differs from it mainly in the sense that
it is even closer to the television offer that individuals in the United States watch.
This narrative of private TV as light entertainment with some additional sophisticated content,
in ways not very dissimilar to public TV in Germany, is further supported empirically. First, our
subgroup analysis shows that not just individuals with low education were attracted by private TV
in West Germany. Second, in our 2015 survey we asked questions about the role of commercial
TV and its program quality in comparison to public broadcasts. A minority of 40.5% believe that
public broadcasts fulfil their educational mandate. As that is the justification for the compulsory
charge of TV license fees in Germany, it is no surprise that, in a question about the amount of fees
that are justified, many respondents deviate from the actual level of pay. Four out of five respon-
dents stated amounts below the actual fees and a fifth of the respondents considered zero fees to
be justified, thereby supporting an abolishment of publicly financed TV in Germany. In a third
survey question on the differences of the two forms of TV, public and private, half of the survey
participants stated either “yes” the program quality was similar or that this “more or less” was the
case (29.4% respectively 21.3%). While we cannot say which direction the other half of the re-
spondents perceived differences, it provides further credence that many viewers of TV in Germany
do not perceive a quality premium of public broadcasts over commercial channels.
In summary, our evidence suggests that private TV and public TV in Germany do not differ
substantially in individuals’ perception, which leaves the question open whether there were any
specifics in our setting that can explain the positive life satisfaction effect. A novelty effect of
commercial TV seems plausible, given low expectations and negative views (see Appendix A).
However, our long-run analysis in Section 5.6 rejects this idea, leaving us with the simple expla-
nation that television in general can facilitate increases in individual happiness.
38. Commercial TV providers dedicated parts of their program to sophisticated political and cultural topics. Apart
from image concerns, broadcasts like RTLplus had agreed to air shows like Spiegel TV as a major step to convince
skeptics in the political sphere who opposed private TV and its proliferation in Germany.
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1.7 Conclusion
Despite the large amount of evidence on the economic and social impact of television, no study
so far has provided a sufficient answer to the question why individuals do watch so intensely. We
align the observation that watching TV is one of the most important single activities of humans
with the basic idea that individuals make rational decisions that are not to the detriment of their
well-being. In contrast, we find that by watching TV, individuals do not suffer health impairments,
and they certainly do not experience unhappiness as a result. Quite the contrary, based on our
evidence from a natural experiment in West Germany, we can answer the question “Does watching
TV make us happy?” (Frey et al. 2007) with a simple “Yes.”
Our findings seem to tell a very positive story. First, we can reject claims that watching TV is
necessarily bad for health and, hence, a major public-policy concern. While we want to be clear
that our study does not inform us about the consequences of heavy TV viewing in a lifelong con-
text, we argue that increases in TV consumption of one or two hours per week, even for longer
periods, do not threaten individual health. Second, our study is the first to provide evidence on
a happiness-increasing effect of television, which is good news for those who want to promote
the maximization of national happiness as a public policy goal. Television seems to be a very
cheap and effective policy instrument, if one follows that notion. The attractiveness of TV, as
demonstrated in our study, allows using it as a means to affect individual views and behavior, as it
has been implicitly or explicitly suggested in research on edutainment offers (Kearney and Levine
2019) and development policies (La Ferrara 2016).
Having said this, one could also draw very different policy conclusions. In fact, given the ma-
nipulative nature of TV, as demonstrated in research on political bias (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007,
Enikolopov et al. 2011, Durante et al. 2019), our findings explain why individuals have difficulties
in resisting the TV set, given that it makes them happy without inducing any apparent and imme-
diate costs in terms of ill-health. Our findings also help us to understand the paradox finding on
the natural experiment of TV in East Germany where viewers of anti-communist West TV in East
Germany were not less supportive of their own regime. The term “opium for the masses” chosen
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by political scientists Kern and Hainmueller (2009) describes well how television, according to our
results, increases individual happiness by so much that it could help stabilize a political system in
decline even if it is under ideological attack by the very same TV program. In consequence, there
is reason to concur with skeptics of TV such as Germany’s former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
describing television as “dangerous” (Appendix A). The other interpretation of our finding on life
satisfaction is therefore that individuals maximize their own welfare while TV consumption leads
to negative externalities. This narrative would be supported by the findings on TV affecting social
outcomes, as listed in the introduction. In addition, the effects of TV for the family in form of more
divorces and lower fertility (Boenisch and Hyll 2015) might be of particular importance in devel-
oped countries like Germany, which faces major demographic and economic challenges as a result
of historically low birth rates. Intriguingly, all the examples of possible negative externalities were
pointed out as drawbacks of television by those who tried to defend the national ban on private
TV in West Germany. While these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, they have allowed us as
researchers to analyze a unique and fascinating natural experiment, but looking into the past, we
have to wonder whether allowing television to flourish has made individuals happier at the expense
of exactly the consequences that the skeptics of TV warned about.
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2. VACCINES AT WORK
2.1 Introduction
Seasonal influenza causes substantial morbidity and mortality around the world. The World
Health Organization (WHO) estimates that the flu is associated with three to five million cases
of severe respiratory illnesses and between 290,000 to 600,000 deaths per year worldwide (WHO
2018). The flu is associated with an economic burden of approximately $34.7 billion in the United
States, most of it due to lives lost and foregone work (Rothman 2017), and 16 million days of
productivity lost (Molinari et al. 2007). Flu vaccination has the potential to be a cost-effective way
to reduce the incidence of the disease and its costs. From an immunological perspective, the flu
vaccine increases the level of individual immunity by generating antibodies, which promises to
reduce the transmission rate of the disease (Gross et al. 1989; Cox et al. 2004).
However, individual behavior can counter the potential benefits of vaccination in two ways.
First, according to the World Bank, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), and other public health
institutions, vaccination rates in most countries of the world are substantially below recommended
levels.1 Therefore, it is essential to understand the factors that affect vaccination take-up, particu-
larly of working adults who are the least likely to get the vaccine. Second, economic theory and
empirical evidence suggest that the adoption of protective technologies may induce individuals to
behave riskier. Vaccinated individuals may overestimate the protection that the vaccine grants and
engage in risky behaviors like waiting longer before going to the doctor when feeling sick and tak-
ing fewer protective measures to prevent illnesses. Thus, moral hazard could counter the benefits
of adopting a preventive medical technology like the flu vaccine.
In this paper, we exploit the background of a company’s vaccination campaign to comprehen-
sively study for the first time both determinants and consequences of influenza vaccination. In
1. Public health institutions recommend that everybody over six months should vaccinate against the flu. However,
flu vaccination rates in European countries ranges from 2% to 70% (Mereckiene 2015), and only 38.5% of adults 18
and older were immunized in the United States during the 2017-2018 flu season (Srivastav et al. 2018).
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cooperation with a bank in Ecuador that provides annual vaccination campaigns to improve its
employees’ health, we implement a natural field experiment by randomizing incentives to get a
flu shot.2 Our design introduced three modifications to the bank’s 2017 vaccination campaign
to create exogenous variation in vaccination take-up. First, implementing a company policy of
income-dependent subsidies, we selected an income threshold at which the vaccine’s price for em-
ployees changed. Second, due to capacity constraints, employees had to be assigned to vaccinate
during the workweek or on Saturday. By randomizing the assignment of employees for vacci-
nation, we could manipulate the opportunity costs of vaccination because employees would need
to incur additional transportation costs and arrange their weekend schedules to get vaccinated on
a Saturday. In contrast, assigning employees to the workweek minimizes their opportunity costs
because the bank allows them to take time off their duties to get vaccinated at the firm’s location.
Third, we varied the content of the invitation emails by appealing to altruistic or selfish motives.
Exogenous variation in vaccination generated by these modifications of the campaign allows
us to study the consequences of getting a flu shot. First, we analyze the effects of peer vaccination
on the propensity for a co-worker to also get vaccinated. Second, we study the impact of individual
vaccination as well as peer vaccination on employees’ health and sickness-related absence. Third,
we analyze how getting vaccinated affects the behavior of employees in order to discuss the possi-
bility of moral hazard when adopting medical technology.
Our design overcomes several challenges that arise when studying the causal effects of vac-
cination on health-related outcomes. The first challenge is to identify the causal effect of getting
vaccinated. While the medical literature documents modest positive health effects of flu vaccina-
tion, many of the studies could be affected by selection and other biases (Jefferson et al. 2010;
Osterholm et al. 2012; Demicheli et al. 2014; Østerhus 2015 and Demicheli et al. 2018). For
instance, researchers describe the problem of a “healthy vaccine recipient effect” that could bias
observational studies. If healthier individuals are more likely to get vaccinated, such a positive se-
2. We follow the definition of a natural field experiment by studying individual behavior in an environment where
subjects naturally make their decisions without knowing that they are participants in an experiment (Harrison and List
2004).
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lection bias could lead to an overestimation of the health effects. Nevertheless, observational stud-
ies without randomization of vaccination are often preferred because of ethical concerns regarding
randomized controlled trials with placebos in the context of health (Sanson-Fisher et al. 2007;
Baxter et al. 2010). For the same reason, RCTs are often conducted using other types of vaccines
instead of clean placebos to provide potential health benefits for experimental participants in the
control group (Loeb et al. 2010). We present a methodological alternative that addresses ethical
concerns by using the exogenous variation in vaccination generated through the manipulation of
incentives to take part in the campaign. To study the impact of vaccination on health-related out-
comes, we thus employ a random encouragement design (Bjorvatn et al. 2015; List et al. 2017).
This is an innovative idea in the context of preventive medical technologies circumventing the eth-
ical dilemma of withholding a potentially effective medical treatment while allowing for causal
evidence.
The second challenge we overcome is capturing the total effect of vaccination. Public health
institutions and companies are interested in the total effect of health interventions that includes
medical and behavioral responses. However, medical research on vaccines focuses solely on the
medical effects, without considering changes in behavior that may affect health. In randomized
controlled trials, participants know that they are in an experiment but do not know if they received
a specific type of vaccine or not. This eliminates the possibility of identifying changes in behavior
when comparing experimental conditions. In contrast, our random encouragement design intro-
duces no uncertainty in treatment, capturing both the behavioral and medical effects of getting
vaccinated. This allows us to explore if vaccination induces individuals to adopt riskier behaviors.
The bank’s data allows us to address a third challenge. We may underestimate the medical
effectiveness of the vaccine because of positive health-spillovers from the vaccinated to the un-
vaccinated (White 2019). The empirical setting attenuates this concern as flu vaccination rates
in Ecuador fluctuate around 2% (ENSANUT 2012). To assess the role of spillovers directly, we
estimate the effect of peer vaccination on health outcomes. For a comprehensive analysis of health-
related outcomes, we have access to the bank’s administrative data that we merge with information
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on treatment assignment at the individual level. The data include detailed medical diagnoses for
each employee so that we can identify illnesses, including flu diagnoses, and the resulting sick
days. We can also distinguish flu-related sickness from non-flu-related sickness, which allows us
to study the behavioral effects of vaccination. Finally, employee surveys before and after the vac-
cination campaign complement the administrative data and allow inspection of mechanisms for the
effects on employee health and behavior.
Regarding the incentives to vaccination we exogenously introduced, we find the following first-
stage results. A change of $2.48 in the vaccine’s price did not affect take-up. Conversely, decreas-
ing opportunity costs by assigning employees to get vaccinated during the workweek increased
take-up by slightly more than ten percentage points, which constitutes an increase compared to
Saturday of roughly 100 percent. Thus, reducing opportunity costs has a remarkably strong effect
on take-up for working adults. Finally, we find no effect from providing information on altruistic
or personal benefits of vaccination. The coefficients are close to zero, negative, and statistically
insignificant.
Next, we exploit the exogenous variation in vaccination created by randomly assigning em-
ployees to get vaccinated in the workweek to study the consequences of vaccination. First, we
study the effect of peer vaccination on individual take-up. For this purpose, we exploit exogenous
variation in the proportion of peers who get vaccinated. In our setup, coworkers that work directly
together every day define the relevant social groups. Given randomization at the employee level,
by chance, some units have more employees assigned to the workweek than other units, and hence,
are encouraged to get the vaccine more than in other units. We find that when the proportion of
peers that get vaccinated increases by ten percentage points, take-up increases by 7.9 percentage
points. More in-depth analyses of the mechanisms behind these peer effects suggest that peers are
not changing information or beliefs about vaccination, but instead, employees follow behaviors
that they deem socially acceptable by conforming to the peer prescriptions of their working group.
Second, as a question of high relevance for policymakers and firms that run vaccination cam-
paigns, we investigate the consequences of vaccine take-up by examining if flu vaccination is
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effective in improving working adults’ health, thereby potentially lowering sickness-related ab-
sence. If flu vaccination decreases flu cases, we expect that offering employees the opportunity to
get vaccinated during the workweek would reduce the number of flu cases and absence from work.
However, the estimates show no evidence that exogenously triggered vaccination decreased sick-
ness in general or sickness-related absence. By using the data from the medical records, we also
cannot find that the probability of getting the flu changed due to participation in the vaccination
campaign. The confidence intervals rule out effects that correspond to meaningful thresholds of an
effective vaccine based on CDC figures.
There are several potential explanations why we cannot find evidence for health improvements
due to vaccination. It could be that positive health-spillovers from vaccinated to unvaccinated
individuals explain why we underestimate health benefits. However, the results show that peer
vaccination does not affect the probability of being diagnosed sick or having a sick day, which
is consistent with unit vaccination rates being below herd immunity levels. It could also be that
the flu vaccine was medically ineffective, which our design cannot rule out. Finally, independent
of the vaccine’s medical effectiveness, employees could adopt riskier and thus health-threatening
behavior that could mitigate the vaccine’s immunity benefit.
We provide evidence from several behavioral tests consistent with the notion of individuals
adopting riskier behaviors when they get vaccinated. Vaccinated individuals could overestimate
the protection of the vaccine and avoid going to the doctor when they have flu-like symptoms. We
test this hypothesis by investigating the effects of vaccination on non-flu respiratory illness during
a national health emergency. The flu vaccine does not provide immunity against non-flu respira-
tory illnesses, so flu vaccination should not affect the probability of being diagnosed with these
diseases. However, flu and non-flu respiratory diseases share symptoms, so a person cannot dis-
tinguish them unless she goes to the doctor. In January 2018, as a result of a significant increment
of flu cases nationwide, the Ecuadorian government launched a massive media campaign asking
the population to go to the doctor if they felt any flu-related symptom. If vaccinated individuals
felt protected, they would have been less likely to follow the government’s calling when feeling
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flu-like symptoms, resulting in fewer visits to the doctor and fewer diagnoses of non-flu respiratory
diseases that share symptoms with the flu in that month compared to unvaccinated employees.
First, we check if vaccination affects the likelihood of being diagnosed with a non-flu respi-
ratory disease. If vaccinated individuals feel more protected, they might think flu-like symptoms
correspond to a minor respiratory illness, and not heed the government’s calling, which would re-
duce non-flu diagnoses. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results show that assigning individuals
to the workweek decreased the likelihood of being diagnosed with a non-flu respiratory disease by
7.2 percentage points during January, with no effect in other months.
Second, by the same logic, we check if vaccination affects the likelihood of going to the bank’s
doctor at the on-site health center. This health center is a convenient feature for the employees
because they can visit the doctor during work hours without asking for permission and without
charge. Before our intervention, on-site doctors accounted for 77 percent of all diagnosed sickness
cases. Vaccinated individuals may have been less likely to visit these doctors when the government
launched its media campaign because they felt more protected. In January 2018, we find that being
assigned to the workweek for vaccination decreased the probability of going to the onsite doctor
by 8.6 percentage points, with no effect in other months.
As the final test of moral hazard, we check if individuals report abandoning practices believed
to be effective in improving health, regardless of their actual medical effectiveness. We find that
assigning employees for vaccination on the workweek decreased the frequency of individuals re-
porting to engage in practices culturally believed to help prevent the flu and other respiratory
diseases. Moreover, these effects are driven by individuals who believe the vaccine is beneficial to
prevent the flu, which supports the idea of vaccinated individuals feeling protected and engaging
in riskier practices.
Our findings contribute to two strands of literature. The first is the literature on the determi-
nants of take-up of vaccines and other medical technologies. Previous studies mainly discuss how
vaccination take-up is affected by laws, information, education, age, health status, health behav-
ior, and lifestyle (Maurer 2009; Schmitz and Wübker 2011; Godinho et al. 2016; Bradford and
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Mandich 2015; Chang 2018; Oster 2018). Few studies have considered how compensating the
opportunity costs of vaccination affects vaccine take-up of children and vulnerable groups in rural
areas in developing countries (Banerjee et al. 2010; Sato and Takasaki 2018b) or populations with
limited income (Bronchetti et al. 2015) by providing in-kind transfers.3 For the effect of peers on
the adoption of medical technologies, the theoretical literature predicts free-riding on vaccination
benefits due to herd immunity, but empirical research based on non-hierarchical peer networks
such as friends or neighbors finds mixed results (Geoffard and Philipson 1997; Kremer and Miguel
2007; Chen and Toxvaerd 2014; Rao et al. 2017; Sato and Takasaki 2018a). Rao et al. (2017) find
that providing information and changing beliefs is the mechanism through which non-hierarchical
peers affect the adoption of medical technologies.
Our study contributes to this literature in several ways. First, we employ a unique setup that
allows for variation in different types of costs. We manipulate the opportunity costs of vaccination
directly by changing the day of vaccination, which changes the next best alternative participants
face. Thus, we directly test the effect of changing these costs, which can be different from com-
pensating through reward incentives.4 We find that reducing opportunity costs has a substantial
effect on vaccination of working-age adults who are not constrained by income and who live in
locations where access to vaccines is not an issue, as in most major cities in both developing and
developed countries. The estimates are of similar magnitude as previous studies that focused only
on vulnerable populations, which implies that opportunity costs are an important factor for any
population. In contrast, a small change in the vaccine’s price did not raise take-up suggesting that
financial incentives must be substantial in order to be effective. Also, information nudges were
ineffective, like those in previous studies (Bronchetti et al. 2015; Godinho et al. 2016). Second, we
study how the adoption of medical technologies can be affected by a peer group that has received
3. Economic theory identifies both monetary and opportunity costs as a relevant component in the decision to adopt
medical technologies like vaccination (Brito et al. 1991; Geoffard and Philipson 1997; Kremer and Miguel 2007; Chen
and Toxvaerd 2014).
4. Behavioral economics studies have found that losses are treated differently than gains since the seminal theory
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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little attention in this research area so far: co-workers.5 Most working adults share at least half of
their awake time with their coworkers. Unlike friends and other non-hierarchical peers, employ-
ees cannot choose the individuals they are going to work with after they are hired. We document
that this peer group can have a significant positive influence on the adoption of preventive medical
technologies like vaccines, which is inconsistent with the theoretical concept of free-riding in this
context. Our evidence indicates that the primary mechanism for peer effects in vaccine take-up is
the employee conforming to the norms of their workgroup. This result provides a new policy lever
to influence the adoption of preventive medical technologies in working adults.
Our study contributes to the literature on the consequences of medical technologies as well
as the literature of on-site health interventions (Just and Price 2013; List and Samek 2015; Belot
et al. 2016), and the broader literature on public health interventions (Cawley 2010; Butikofer and
Salvanes 2018). Our findings on the health effects of vaccine take-up add to an ongoing discussion
that predominantly takes place in the medical literature, with a few recent exceptions in the eco-
nomics literature (Ager et al. 2017, Lawler 2017, Carpenter and Lawler 2019). Regarding studies
on flu vaccines, Ward (2014) finds that flu vaccination increased sickness absences in years when
the flu vaccine had a bad match with the prevalent flu viruses, and it had no effect in years when
the vaccine had a good match. The difference between these two results, which would control for
moral hazard, points to the medical benefits of the vaccine. In another vaccination study, Anderson
et al. (2020) found no effect of vaccination on hospitalization and mortality on the elderly using a
regression discontinuity design. Very few medical studies consider the possibility of medical tech-
nologies unintentionally causing moral hazard (Richens et al. 2000; Prasad and Jena 2014) while
the few papers in economics that study moral hazard in the context of medical interventions find
mixed results (Klick and Stratmann 2007; Margolis et al. 2014; Moghtaderi and Dor 2016; Doleac
and Mukherjee 2018).6
5. In contrast, there is a large body of research about the effects of co-workers on the productivity of their peers at
the workplace (Mas and Moretti 2009; Herbst and Mas 2015).
6. There is a large literature studying whether the adoption of safety devices lead individuals to adopt riskier prac-
tices (Peltzman 1975; Richens et al. 2000; Auld 2003; Cohen and Einav 2003; Klick and Stratmann 2007; Peltzman
2011; Prasad and Jena 2014; and Talamàs and Vohra 2018) and also a large literature that studies moral hazard in
insurance, e.g. see Einav et al. (2013) and Einav and Finkelstein (2018).
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We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we employ a novel design for public health
and medical interventions, allowing us to circumvent measurement and ethical problems. We hope
to encourage other researchers to use the same methodology in the field of health to obtain causal
estimates. Second, with our evidence on the consequences of flu vaccination for sickness-related
absence, we contribute to the research on the determinants of this workplace outcome (Ziebarth
and Karlsson 2010; Bütikofer and Skira 2018). Third, we provide behavioral evidence based on
experimental variation that getting vaccinated induces individuals to feel protected and to forgo
preventive practices like going to the doctor in the presence of illness symptoms. This result is
consistent with preventive medical technologies causing moral hazard and with the theoretical
model of Talamàs and Vohra (2018). Finally, by showing that preventive medical technologies
can unintentionally cause moral hazard, we offer an explanation of why health interventions may
not always be as successful in improving health. This finding implies that firms and policymakers
should consider moral hazard when promoting the adoption of preventive medical technologies.
2.2 Experimental Design
We ran the field experiment in cooperation with a bank in Ecuador. This bank focuses on con-
sumer credit and is one of the largest credit card issuers in the country. Its headquarters are in
Quito, Ecuador’s capital, and it has six branches across the country with over 1,300 employees,
distributed in 31 divisions with 142 working units. The bank had run small vaccination campaigns
in the past. These campaigns included only some employees in crowded areas and ran during the
workweek in the bank’s offices.7 In 2017, the bank decided to extend its annual campaign to all its
employees and allowed us to experimentally modify it to investigate how to increase take-up and
the effects of vaccination. We implemented three interventions: we changed the vaccine’s price
for some employees using income-dependent subsidies, we randomized assignments for on-site
vaccinations across weekdays, and we implemented information nudges by varying the content of
the emails used to invite employees to vaccinate.
7. These areas included the call center and the collections departments, which only have few employees. We
exclude the call center from our analysis of the 2017 campaign, as we have evidence that the call center supervisors
pushed their employees into taking the vaccine leading to a take-up of almost 100%.
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The bank decided to provide the vaccine for free to areas that participated in campaigns in
previous years and to partially subsidize it for new participants. Since the company opposed the
randomizing subsidies, we used information on employees’ income to allocate this subsidy. Em-
ployees who earned less than $750 per month would pay $4.95 to get vaccinated, while those who
earned more than $750 would pay $7.43. Note that the vaccine’s full price is $9.99. Employees
were informed about the vaccine’s price in their invitation email. This email included basic infor-
mation about the campaign and informed employees that the payment for the vaccine was directly
deducted from their paycheck if they opted to get vaccinated. The email also contained informa-
tion on the assigned day and time. Appendix Figure A1 shows an example of an invitation to a
low-price flu shot on Thursday morning.
To examine the effects of opportunity costs and information, we randomly assigned all employ-
ees into one of four groups.8 First, employees assigned to the control group (Control) were invited
to get vaccinated during the workweek (Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday) and were allowed to take
time off their duties to get vaccinated. The specific day was selected randomly for each employee.
The first treatment increased the opportunity costs of vaccination by assigning employees to get
vaccinated on Saturday. The employees usually do not work during the weekend, so they would
incur extra transportation costs and have to arrange their schedules to go to the bank and get vacci-
nated.9 Otherwise, this group received the same information as the Control (see Figure A2). This
treatment was only applied in Quito because all the other branches are substantially smaller (82%
of the employees work in Quito), and their employees could get vaccinated in a single day, which
was not possible in Quito.10
We also implemented two information nudges. We kept the additional messages as unobtrusive
as possible to prevent confounding the effect of information with salience or other behavioral fac-
8. The bank requested that we exclude the CEO and another high executive from the intervention. We also excluded
our contact in the Human Resources department and four employees who work in the local branches and did not have
a company email address to deliver the treatments.
9. Based on data from the employees’ magnetic swipe cards to enter the bank, only 0.4% of the employees work
regularly on Saturdays.
10. Branches in the coastlands were randomly assigned to get vaccinated on Wednesday, and branches in the high-
lands were assigned to Thursday.
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tors. The first nudge highlights the social benefits of flu immunization (Altruistic Treatment). In
addition to the information provided to the control group, the email included the phrase: “Getting
vaccinated also protects people around you, including those who are more vulnerable to serious
flu illness, like infants, young children, the elderly and people with serious health conditions that
cannot get vaccinated” (see Figure A3). The second nudge highlights the individual benefits of flu
immunization (Selfish Treatment). In addition to the information provided to the control group, the
email included the phrase: “Vaccination can significantly reduce your risk of getting sick, accord-
ing to both health officials from the World Health Organization and numerous scientific studies”
(see Figure A4). Employees in these two treatments were assigned to get vaccinated during the
workweek, while the specific day was selected randomly.
Our intervention targeted the Ecuadorian flu season, which usually covers the period from
November to the end of February (Ropero 2011). The bank ran a pre-intervention survey from
October 25 to October 29, 2017. Human Resources sent the intervention emails on November 1,
2017, using its official email account. Employees were not aware that this study was taking place.
For them, the campaign was just a regular activity organized by the Human Resources department.
Employees are used to receiving emails from Human Resources, and according to the Human Re-
sources manager, they typically read these emails carefully. The bank sent out a reminder using the
same email account a week later. The vaccination campaign ran from November 8 to November
11, 2017, at locations within the bank’s offices in each branch. The bank hired an external medical
team to supply and inject the vaccines. Finally, the bank conducted a post-survey during March
and April 2018.11
2.3 Data
This section describes the data used in our analyses for assessing how monetary and non-
monetary determinants can affect take-up and the effects of flu vaccination. First, we have access
to the firm’s administrative records about its employees: gender, age, education level, and de-
11. The geographic locations of the banks’ branches are displayed in Figure A5 and a depiction of the timeline is
shown in Figure A6. Figure A7 provides information about the flu vaccine used and Figure A8 shows an individual
getting vaccinated during the campaign.
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pendents; job and its position within the bank’s organizational structure; tenure and income; and
medical diagnoses and sick days. Second, we collected vaccination take-up data from the bank’s
campaign records. Third, we use data from pre- and post-intervention surveys. These surveys
asked employees about previous illnesses and general health, knowledge, and beliefs about vac-
cination and the flu vaccine, habits related to health, relations with coworkers, opinions about the
campaign, motivation, organizational attachment and work satisfaction, and risk and time prefer-
ences.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Notes: This table characterizes the mean employee of the bank, where we implemented our intervention. We present
statistics for the full sample and the four treatment groups. The last column presents the p-value of a joint significance
test to check whether there are significant differences across the treatment groups. The proportion of employees
diagnosed sick or granted a sick day corresponds to the period between January 1 and November 7, 2017, before the
vaccination campaign.
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Table 1 presents the mean characteristics of the bank’s employees (Column 1). On average,
employees earn a total monthly income of $1,760. As a reference, in 2017, the average total in-
come in Ecuador was $479, which implies that the bank’s employees are in the three highest deciles
of the Ecuadorian income distribution (ENEMDU 2017). The average employee has been in the
company for more than seven years and is around 36 years old. The company employs roughly
the same number of men and women, and more than 90% of its employees have at least some
college education, close to education levels in developed countries. Almost 50% of the employees
completed the pre-intervention survey, a high completion rate compared to previous surveys from
Human Resources. The completion rate decreased to 36% for the post-intervention survey.
The administrative data include two measures of health: medical diagnoses and sick days.
These measures come from two sources: onsite doctors and medical certificates from outside doc-
tors (72 different physicians in total). It is important to note that Ecuadorian law establishes that
employees must present a medical certificate to receive a sick day.12 Consequently, the onsite doc-
tors report every visit they receive to Human Resources. The doctors report the diagnosis (the type
of disease), whether they granted a sick day or not, and the number of sick days granted. Also, by
law, if an employee takes time off work to go to an outside doctor, then she has to present a med-
ical certificate to Human Resources that indicates the diagnosis and number of sick days granted,
if any. Hence, in addition to sick days, we can also observe employees being diagnosed sick with
no sick days granted for cases where a doctor did not consider the illness severe enough. Thus,
sick days are a measure of more severe illness. From January to early November 2017, before the
intervention, two out of three employees were sick from any disease, and 37% had at least one sick
day (see Table 1).
Doctors diagnose their patients using a combination of a physical examination, blood tests and
culture tests. The specific procedure is part of individual medical records to which we do not have
access. Diagnoses that name the ‘flu’ as the reason for being diagnosed sick provide us with the
narrowest definition of flu-related sickness. If flu cases presented complications, then the data
12. By law employees in Ecuador also have up to one year of paid leave due to sickness. Employers are not allowed
to terminate employment during sick leave.
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reports the complication as the diagnosis and does not mention the flu explicitly. To address this
issue, we have an extended definition of flu-related sickness, which includes diagnoses that could
likely be complications due to the flu, according to a third-party physician. We focus on this mea-
sure in our empirical analysis and check the robustness of the results by employing the narrowest
definition and an even broader definition, also provided by this physician. Any other respiratory
disease that was not classified by this doctor as flu is by definition listed as a non-flu respiratory
disease. A second physician verified these measures to be sure about the distinction between flu-
related and non-flu-related health problems.
Table 1 also shows evidence on the balance of treatment assignment. Columns 2 to 5 present the
mean employee characteristics across the four groups. All variables have almost identical means
across groups. For each characteristic, Column 6 shows the p-value of a joint significance test of
differences of means. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the means are the same across the
four treatments, which suggests that our randomization was successful. The Kruskal-Wallis rank
test shows the same result. Finally, we test whether participating in the pre and post surveys is
different across treatments. We find no statistically significant difference.
2.4 Analysis of Vaccination Take-Up
In this section, we study how monetary and non-monetary determinants affect working adults’
decision to vaccinate. Specifically, we consider the effect of opportunity costs, information nudges,
and peers on take-up in detail. We do not find any effect of the $2.48 price difference on vaccination
take-up from the income-dependent vaccine subsidy.13 We conclude that such price change may
be too small to induce changes in take-up behavior.
The last row in Table 1 presents the flu immunization take-up rates for the different treatments
during the campaign. The Control group has a take-up rate of 22%, the Altruistic treatment has
a take-up of 17%, and the Selfish treatment has a take-up of 19%. Comparing across the three
groups suggests that the information treatments were not sufficient to increase take-up. In contrast,
13. Figure A9 shows no visible discontinuity across the threshold. Regression discontinuity estimates also do not
indicate any significant change in take-up at the cutoff which is robust to different bandwidths (see Table A1).
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being assigned to get vaccinated during the workweek increases take-up by 14 percentage points
in contrast to Saturday (112%).14 We extend the analysis of these effects in the next section.
2.4.1 Effects of Opportunity Costs and Information on Individual Take-up
We model the effect of opportunity costs, altruistic information, and selfish information on
vaccination take-up for employee i in city c using the following equation:
Takeupic = α + γc + π1Saturdayic + π2Altruismic + π3Selfishic + uic (2.1)
where Takeupic is an indicator of getting vaccinated. We include Quito fixed effects γc to
account for differences in implementation of the vaccination day assignment across branches as
discussed in Section 2. Saturdayic, Altruismic, and Selfishic are dummy variables that indicate
treatment assignment. Thus, we estimate the effect of the different treatments relative to those in-
dividuals who were assigned to vaccination on the workweek and did not receive any information
nudge.
Table 2 presents the effects of the different treatments on take-up. Column 1 shows the baseline
results of the effect of opportunity costs and information on vaccination take-up. The estimates in-
dicate that assigning employees to Saturday decreased take-up by 7.9 percentage points compared
to the Control. This effect is approximately 46% of the take-up in Quito for the Control and is
statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, minimizing the opportunity costs associated with
vaccination is a useful measure to increase take-up.
14. In the post-intervention survey 59 employees report that they got vaccinated outside the campaign. Vaccination
outside the campaign is not significantly different by treatment status. All employees who stated they got vaccinated
outside, did not get vaccinated during the campaign. One individual stated not getting vaccinated, even though the
person did get vaccinated according to our records. 18 individuals stated they got vaccinated during the campaign
but did not. If we exclude those 19 individuals, which misremember vaccinations, the estimates do not change. Also
note that between November 2017 and February 2018, 20 treated employees quit the bank. Attrition is not affected by
treatment assignment.
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Table 2.2: Effects of Treatments on Vaccination Take-Up
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of the different treatments
on vaccination take-up. All specifications control for Quito fixed effects. Column 1 presents our main estimates from
equation (1) without adding additional controls. In Column 2, we test the robustness of the main estimates controlling
for the vaccine’s price, income, tenure, division in the company, gender, age, and education level. Column 3 presents
the estimates using only employees in Quito, the city where we implemented our four treatments. In Column 4,
we exclude 12 individuals who were assigned to vaccinate in the workweek but went to vaccinate on Saturday. In
Column 5, we test for different effects across the different days of the week using only data from Quito that has all
the treatments. Using clustered standard errors at the work unit level (142 clusters) yields similar standard errors with
no loss of statistical significance. For Columns 1-3, we define the base group as the Control group in Quito. For
Column 4, it is the same group but adjusting the sample for non-compliance, and for Column 5, it is the take-up rate
on Wednesday in Quito.
Conversely, we find that emphasizing either the altruistic or the selfish benefits of vaccination
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does not affect take-up. The coefficients are close to zero, negative, and statistically insignificant.
It is plausible that supplying a sentence of additional information is not enough to further increase
take-up, given that reducing opportunity costs has a substantial effect on it.15 One interpretation
of these results is that information would have to be very salient to accrue an effect on vaccine
take-up in a company context such as this.
Columns 2-4 of Table 2 show the robustness of the results to the inclusion of controls, to
the use of a restricted sample, and to controlling for non-compliance. Specifically, Column 2
shows that controlling for the vaccine’s price, income, tenure, division in the company, gender,
age, and education level does not affect the estimates. Column 3 addresses the fact that only
employees who work in the bank’s headquarters in Quito were assigned to vaccinate on Saturday.
In this subsample, assigning employees to Saturday decreased take-up by almost nine percentage
points (51% of the control group take-up), significant at the 1% level. This result is slightly larger
than the main result, but we cannot reject that they are statistically the same. Both information
treatments have small, negative, and statistically insignificant effects. Column 4 shows the effect
of controlling for non-compliance.16 In this subsample, assigning employees to Saturday decreased
take-up by 6.7 percentage points, significant at the 5% level. We cannot reject that this estimate is
statistically the same as the baseline result. The estimates of the effect of the information treatments
are practically the same as the main estimates.
Lastly, in Column 5, we check whether assignment to different days in the week affects take-up
differentially. We exploit the fact that vaccination days are randomly assigned, and we regress our
indicator of vaccination take-up on dummies for the assigned day (Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, or
Saturday), using Quito’s subsample.17 These estimates show that take-up on Thursday and Friday
15. The post intervention survey asks if the employee recalls the altruistic and selfish information statements. Ap-
pendix Table A2 shows that neither employees assigned to the Altruistic treatment nor those assigned to the Selfish
treatment remember their respective statements better than the control. Another issue could be spillovers of informa-
tion, but this is unlikely given that our design provides information directly to the treated individuals via email.
16. We identified in the campaign records 12 employees assigned to the workweek who vaccinated on Saturday. The
bank asked the medical team in charge of the vaccination campaign to enforce the day assigned to each employee, but
they failed to enforce this requirement on Saturday and were unable to send employees back home if they showed up
that day. In contrast, nobody of those assigned to Saturday got vaccinated during the workweek.
17. Of the bank’s employees in Quito, after excluding the call center, 23.4% where assigned to vaccinate on Wednes-
day, 26.7% to Thursday, 26.5% to Friday, and 23.4% to Saturday.
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is not statistically different from take-up on Wednesday, while the effect of Saturday is substantially
larger in magnitude and very close to the baseline estimate in Column 1.18 These results do not
support time-inconsistent preferences that would induce procrastination as the mechanism behind
the Saturday effect and are consistent with increasing opportunity costs.19
2.4.2 Further Evidence on Opportunity Costs
We analyze heterogeneous treatment effects across different subgroups of our study popula-
tion, which may yield further evidence that opportunity costs are driving the difference in take-up
between being assigned to vaccinate on the workweek and Saturday.20 We focus on differences
across gender, distance to work, and employees with and without children.21 Figure 1 shows that
assignment to Saturday has more substantial effects for men than for women, although the differ-
ence is not statistically significant.
Distance to work reflects the transportation costs that an individual regularly incurs. The me-
dian employee lives 6.5 km away from work. Figure 1 shows that those who live further away
than the median are slightly less likely to get vaccinated when they were assigned to Saturday than
those who live closer to the bank, but this difference is not statistically significant. This result
is consistent with increasing travel costs, but the magnitude suggests that travel costs are not the
main factor driving the difference in take-up between employees assigned to the workweek and
Saturday.
Finally, we consider differences in the effect between employees with and without children.
Having children may imply higher opportunity costs at the weekend by increased family obliga-
tions. Figure 1 shows that assignment to Saturday decreased take-up by 10.6 percentage points for
employees with children, while the effect is smaller (5.3 percentage points) and insignificant for
18. While the effect of assignment to Friday is not significant, it is 44% of the effect of Saturday and two orders of
magnitude larger than the effect of Thursday. Being assigned to Friday can slightly increase the opportunity cost of
vaccination because it is only a 6-hour workday instead of an 8-hour workday.
19. Also, the Control includes employees assigned to Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, so any effect of procrasti-
nation is included in the comparison made in the baseline estimates.
20. We find that the information treatments have no differential effect across subgroups. These estimates are small
and statistically insignificant. See Appendix Table A3.
21. Distance to work was calculated with a geo-location service using employees’ home addresses.
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employees without children. Although the difference between these two effects is not significant,
its magnitude is consistent with the idea that opportunity costs increase for individuals assigned to
Saturday.
In conclusion, these results suggest that the difference in take-up between employees assigned
to the workweek and Saturday corresponds to a change in the opportunity costs of vaccination. We
use only this variation in take-up created by lowering opportunity costs as an instrument in the rest
of our analyses.
Figure 2.1: Heterogeneous Effects of Assignment to Vaccination on Saturday on Take-up
Notes: This figure presents the intent-to-treat effect of assignment to Saturday on vaccination take-up for different
subgroups in the sample. All specifications control for city fixed effects. The figure presents the point estimate and
the 90% heteroscedastic robust confidence interval for each subgroup.
61
2.4.3 Peer Effects on Vaccination Take-up
Peer effects may play an important role in vaccination behavior by either increasing or decreas-
ing take-up. When a person gets vaccinated, the prevalence of the disease may decrease, making
it less likely for others to get sick. Thus, if getting vaccinated has costs, then it may be optimal
for some people not to do so if their peers got vaccinated. Theoretically, this free-rider problem
can result in a Nash equilibrium, where nobody takes the vaccine (Chen and Toxvaerd 2014).
Conversely, peers may increase take-up by exchanging information that affects individual beliefs
about the flu and the vaccine. Also, individuals may imitate the health care behavior of their peers
to conform to social norms (Kremer and Miguel 2007).
The exogenous variation in take-up created by assigning individuals to get vaccinated in the
workweek allows us to estimate peer effects in vaccination. The bank’s units define the social
groups of employees that work directly together. Thus, we can identify the effect of social groups
with whom adults share a large portion of their daily time on vaccine take-up. We will also use
this approach to analyze peer effects in health caused by vaccinated peers below (Section 5).
We model the effect of the proportion of peers in unit j who take the vaccine on employee i’s
decision as
Takeupijc = γc + β1Prop.Takeupjc + β2Xic + β3X̄jc + π3Workweekic + uijc (2.2)
where Prop.Takeupjc is the proportion of peers in unit j who get vaccinated and X̄jc are the
average observable characteristics of peers j. Manski (1993) shows that if we estimate equation
(2) by OLS, self-selection, common environmental factors and reflection confound the true peer
effects β1 and β3. However, in our design, employees are randomly assigned to vaccinate on
the workweek independently of their unit. This creates an exogenous variation that affects the
proportion of peers who get vaccinated independently of employee i’s decision to get vaccinated
because, by chance, some units have more employees assigned to the workweek than other units.
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where the proportion of peers in unit j who get vaccinated is a function of the proportion of
peers who were randomly assigned to the workweek (Prop.Workweekjc). Random assignment













In our design, the exclusion restriction holds because the proportion of peers that got vaccinated
is the only channel through which the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek can affect the
individual’s vaccination decision. Hence, we can combine the estimates from equations (3) and (4)
to obtain an IV estimate of the effect of the proportion vaccinated peers on the employee’s take-up.
The error term in equation (4) includes both the individual error from equation (2) and the average
error from equation (3), so we cluster the standard errors at the unit level.
Panel A in Table 3 presents the main results. The first stage estimate in Column 1 indicates
that a ten-percentage-point increase in the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek increased
the proportion of peers that get vaccinated by 3.1 percentage points. The effective F-statistic of
Montiel Oleas and Pflueger is 16.48, so we can reject the null of weak instruments for a threshold
of 20%, which suggests that the instrument is relevant. The estimates in columns 2-4 show that
peer vaccination has a positive effect on individual take-up and that not accounting for endogeneity
biases the effect downwards. The IV estimate in Column 4 indicates that a ten percentage points
increase in the proportion of peers that get vaccinated increased take-up by 7.9 percentage points.
The results are robust to controlling for the total number of employees in the unit and mean age
and gender of the peers (Appendix Table A4).22
22. Mechanically, smaller units may have larger proportions. We also control for the proportion of peers in the unit
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Table 2.3: Effect of Peer Vaccination on Individual Take-up
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. The bank has 116 units with more than one employee.
This table presents the effect of peers’ vaccination take-up on the individual’s vaccination decision. We measure the
proportion of peers vaccinated and the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek in percentage points. Thus, the
estimates represent the effect of a one percentage point change in the proportion of peers, and the reported coefficients
measure percentage point changes. We define peers as all employees who work in the same unit. All specifications
control for Quito fixed effects and individual assignments to the workweek. Column 1 presents the results for the
first stage. Column 2 displays the results of the reduced form. Column 3 presents OLS estimates of the effect of a
change in the proportion of peers that get vaccinated. Column 4 presents 2SLS estimates of the effect of a change in
the proportion of peers that get vaccinated.
Two potential mechanisms behind the positive peer effect on individual take-up are peers
changing personal beliefs about vaccination or individuals following behavior that they deem so-
cially acceptable. To disentangle these potential channels, we first explore if peers might be chang-
ing personal beliefs. We exploit the post-intervention survey questions on beliefs and knowledge
of flu vaccines and interactions with coworkers related to vaccination. Even though answering
the post-intervention survey is not correlated with treatment assignment (Table 1), the first stage
loses precision due to the smaller sample size in the survey. We focus on reduced-form analyses to
prevent issues with finite sample bias in the IV estimate.
who have some managerial position. The point estimates are not affected by including this control variable.
64
Table 2.4: Potential Mechanisms for Peer Effects
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. This table presents the reduced form effect of peers
assigned to the workweek on a series of outcomes identified by the row headers. The measurement unit of each
outcome is in parentheses next to the outcome’s name. We measure the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek
in percentage points. Thus, the estimates represent the effect of a one percentage point change in the proportion of
peers. We define peers as all employees who work in the same unit. All specifications control for Quito fixed effects
and individual assignments to the workweek. Column 1 presents estimates, Column 2, the baseline value for each
outcome, and Column 3, the sample size.
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Panel A in Table 4 shows the results on a set of 12 outcomes. Of these outcomes, the pro-
portion of peers assigned to the workweek had a negative and significant effect only on talking
with coworkers about vaccination.23 Employees assigned to the workweek are less likely to men-
tion this to their coworkers because usually, events organized by the bank take place during the
workweek.24 There is no significant effect on any of the questions regarding information or beliefs
about the vaccine or on questions that measure how much coworkers influenced the vaccination
decision. Moreover, the point estimates are small compared to the baselines, which suggests that
peer behavior did neither affect beliefs nor supplied new information about the vaccine.
As another mechanism of the positive peer effects on vaccination take-up, we test if employ-
ees following behavior that they deem socially acceptable. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) show that
identity-related behavior, i.e., conforming with the prescriptions or norms of a group, can ratio-
nalize a series of behaviors by bolstering a sense of belonging or preventing a loss of image in
the group. This creates a channel through which an individual’s actions can cause responses from
others. To test this mechanism, we estimate how the behavior of different subsets of peers affects
individual vaccination, following the idea that groups create feelings of belonging that could affect
behavior (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Hoffman et al. 1996; Perkins 2002). For instance, Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) argue that as every person is assigned a gender, individuals have an incentive
to follow the prescriptions of their gender to reaffirm their own identity. A similar behavioral re-
sponse can appear for other groups to which the individual has a sense of belonging. However,
to which group individuals react is an empirical question that depends on the context. Table 5
presents these results.
23. This effect is robust to adjusting for the false discovery rate as in Anderson (2008).
24. Additionally, an employee who learns she is in a unit with a large proportion of employees assigned to Saturday
might feel lucky that she was assigned to the workweek and get vaccinated. This would bias downwards the estimate
of the effect of the proportion of vaccinated peers on take-up in Table 3.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Individual Take-up
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses, first stage F-values in brackets. The bank has 116
units with more than one employee. This table presents the heterogeneous effects of different types of peer vaccination
take-up on the individual’s vaccination decision. The column headers identify the type of peer, for example, in the
first column, we present the effect of the proportion of peers of the same gender who got vaccinated on individual
vaccination. We measure the proportion of peers vaccinated and the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek in
percentage points. Thus, the estimates represent the effect of a one percentage point change in the proportion of peers.
The first row presents the first stage results; for example, the fifth cell indicates that if the proportion of peers of the
same gender assigned to the workweek increased by one percentage point, then the proportion of peers of the same
gender who got vaccinated increases by 0.22 percentage points. The second row presents reduced form results. For
example, for the fifth column, if the proportion of peers of the same gender assigned to the workweek increased by one
percentage point, then individual take-up increases by 0.17 percentage points. The third row presents 2SLS estimates.
For example, for the fifth column, if the proportion of peers of the same gender assigned who got vaccinated increases
by one percentage point then individual take-up increases by 0.76 percentage points. All specifications control for
Quito fixed effects and individual assignments to the workweek. Sample size changes because not everybody has
a peer in the same category. For example, if a manager has no manager peers in her unit, then that observation is
dropped.
First, we study if managers influence an individual’s vaccination decision. If individuals react
to their managers’ behavior, this could be in response to an order and not because of the unit’s
norms. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 show that individuals do not follow the behavior of peers in
managerial positions, but follow the behavior of peers not in those positions, those who constitute
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the majority of the working unit.25 A ten percentage point increase in the proportion of vaccinated
peers not in managerial positions increased take-up by 8.9 percentage points.
Second, Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 show that individuals do not react to the behavior of peers
of similar age (within a three-year bandwidth) but react to peers of different ages. A ten-percentage
point increase in the proportion of peers of different ages who get vaccinated increased take-up by
5.3 percentage points. Given the large age dispersion within the units (Appendix Figure A10), it is
unlikely that age groups can create feelings of belonging. Hence, these results are in line with the
idea that individuals follow the behavior of the working unit.
Third, we test whether employees follow behavior they deem socially acceptable from their
gender. Column 5 shows that a ten-percentage point increase in the proportion of peers of the
same gender who get vaccinated increased take-up by 7.6 percentage points. This effect is almost
identical to the main estimate and is driven by men. Column 6 shows that the effect of peers of a
different gender is 37% smaller and is not significant. These results indicate that the behavior of
gender groups influence individual actions, which is consistent with previous research.
Finally, we check if extrinsically motivated employees are more likely to be affected by peer
behavior. Intuitively, intrinsically motivated individuals like doing their job and are more likely
to work hard. These employees do not need extrinsic incentives from their employers to be mo-
tivated to comply. In contrast, the extrinsically motivated employees respond to external stimuli
from their surrounding environment, which implies that they should be more likely to follow peer
behavior. The pre-intervention survey has questions to determine if employees are intrinsically
or extrinsically motivated.26 Panel B in Table 4 shows the reduced form effect of the proportion
of peers assigned to the workweek on these subgroups. For extrinsically motivated employees, a
ten-percentage point increase in the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek would increase
take-up by five percentage points, while intrinsically motivated employees’ take-up would increase
25. Managerial positions include supervisors, line bosses, assistant managers, and managers.
26. The intrinsic motivation measure is a dummy variable based on a median split of a summation of four measures
of motivation in the workplace where employees state how important it is that they (i) learn something interesting, (ii)
get motivated to think about things, (iii) gain a thorough understanding of content and (iv) feel that their opinions are
considered.
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by only 2.2 percentage points. Together, these pieces of evidence indicate that the estimated peer
effects are a consequence of individuals conforming to the norms of their workgroup.
2.5 Analysis of the Effects of Vaccination on Health and Risky Behavior
In this section, we exploit random assignment to get vaccinated in the workweek as an in-
strument to study if flu vaccination improves health and thereby reduced sickness absence in our
intervention. In order to shed light on one of the potential mechanisms underlying these results,
we use the same approach to explore if getting vaccinated can induce health-threatening behaviors,
i.e., moral hazard.
2.5.1 Effects of Flu Vaccination on Health and Absence
Flu vaccines may affect health through multiple avenues, direct and indirect. First and fore-
most, getting vaccinated could have a direct effect on health by increasing immunity against four
strands of the flu virus. Besides, the results in the previous section show that if a person gets
vaccinated, the likelihood that her peers get vaccinated increases. This effect would imply that
an employee’s peers are more protected against the flu, which may decrease the transmission rate
of the disease. Thus, positive peer effects on vaccination take-up could create an indirect chan-
nel through which getting vaccinated might have a positive effect on health. The proportion of
vaccinated peers within the 142 units in the firm varies substantially between 0 and 67%, which
indirectly could play a role in health outcomes.27 Ideally, we could estimate the effect of flu immu-
nization on health-related outcomes (Yijc), such as medical diagnoses and sick days, through these
two channels as:
Yijc = α + γc + θTakeupijc + δProp.Takeupic + νijc (2.5)
However, vaccination take-up and the proportion of peers who get vaccinated are potentially
endogenous. For example, individuals with healthier lifestyles could be more likely to vaccinate
27. Figure A11 displays the number of employees by unit. The CDC and WHO indicate that vaccination rates over
75% grant herd immunity.
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and less likely to need a sick day, so the estimates of equation (5) by OLS would be biased down-
wards. This speaks for instrumenting i) take-up with an indicator of assignment to vaccination
during the workweek, and ii) the proportion of vaccinated peers in the unit with the proportion of
peers assigned to the workweek. The unadjusted first stage equations have F-statistics of 6.6 and
8.9, respectively, implying that IV estimates of equation (5) may have a problem of finite sample
bias.28 Thus, we focus on the valid reduced form estimates of regressing the health outcomes on
the instruments.
Table 2.6: Effects of Vaccination on Overall Sickness
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. This table presents the effects on the probability of
being diagnosed sick in general. The estimates include only units with two or more employees. All specifications
control for Quito fixed effects. Column 1 presents OLS estimates. Column 2 presents the reduced form estimates.
Table 6 presents the effects of flu vaccination on the probability of being diagnosed sick for
any reason between November 2017 and February 2018. The OLS estimate in Column 1 suggests
that getting vaccinated decreased the probability of being diagnosed as sick by 0.7 percentage
28. The results of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013) only apply for the case of one endogenous variable.
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points (1.4% of the baseline), although the effect is insignificant. The reduced form estimates in
Column 2 imply that getting vaccinated did not affect the probability of being diagnosed sick.
Being randomly assigned to the workweek – which increases vaccination take-up – decreased the
probability of sickness by 1.5 percentage points (3.4% of the baseline), which is insignificant at
conventional levels. Additionally, the results in columns 1 and 2 indicate that the proportion of
vaccinated peers does not affect the probability of being diagnosed sick.
Table 2.7: Effects of Vaccination on Overall Sick Days
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. This table presents the effect on the probability of
having a sick day. The estimates include only units with two or more employees. All specifications control for Quito
fixed effects. Column 1 presents OLS estimates. Column 2 presents the reduced form estimates.
Table 7 shows the effects of flu vaccination on the probability of having a sick day. The OLS
correlation suggests that vaccination decreased the probability of having a sick day by 4.1 percent-
age points, but this effect is not significant. Conversely, the reduced form estimates in Column 2
imply that getting vaccinated did not affect the probability of having a sick day. Being randomly
assigned to the workweek, which increases vaccination take-up, increased the probability of hav-
71
ing a sick day by 1.3 percentage points (5% of the baseline), which is insignificant at conventional
levels. From an overall perspective of the firm, the results suggest that the investment in the health
campaign was not worthwhile.29
Table 2.8: Effects of Vaccination on Flu Diagnoses
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. This table presents the effects of flu vaccination on
the probability of being diagnosed sick because of the flu. All specifications control for Quito fixed effects. Column 1
presents OLS estimates. Column 2 presents the reduced form estimates. The sample includes only units with two or
more employees.
There are many diseases over which the flu vaccine has no immunity benefit. Hence, we exploit
the data on medical diagnoses and estimate the effect of vaccination on the probability of being
diagnosed with the flu (Table 8). The OLS estimates in Column 1 suggest that getting vaccinated
decreases the probability of being diagnosed with the flu. However, the reduced form estimate
in Column 2 indicates that being assigned to the workweek increased the probability of being
29. We reach the same conclusion based on findings for the number of sick days. Note that sick diagnoses include
severe illnesses, such as cancer, which leads to large numbers of sick days not related to the flu. If we exclude outliers
with more than 100 sick days, the coefficient of the reduced-form is insignificantly positive, in line with our finding
in Table 7on the probability of having a sick day or not. Note also that our results for sickness and sick days do not
change if we take out the proportion of peers and estimate only the individual effect of vaccination.
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diagnosed with the flu by 0.4 percentage points (9% of the baseline), not significant at conven-
tional levels. This result further suggests that getting vaccinated was ineffective in decreasing the
probability of having the flu. Also, the estimates in columns 1 and 2 show that the proportion of
vaccinated peers do not affect the probability of being diagnosed with the flu, which suggests that
vaccination rates are too low to provide herd immunity. Thus, we drop the proportion of vaccinated
peers in the following analyses.30
To evaluate if the estimates rule out meaningful effects of vaccination, we implement an equiv-
alence test based on two one-sided hypothesis tests (King et al. 2000; Rainey 2014; Lakens 2017;
Hartman and Hidalgo 2018). The equivalence test has two parts. First, we have to define what
constitutes a meaningful effect of vaccination. This value defines two thresholds to evaluate if
the estimates rule out meaningful effects. To define this value, we use flu vaccine effectiveness
estimates from CDC data. While these estimates come from observational studies on flu hospital-
izations and might be biased, they constitute the criteria policymakers use to evaluate the vaccine’s
effectiveness. Since our experimental design guarantees that getting vaccinated is the only chan-
nel through which assignment to the workweek in the campaign affects health outcomes, we can
use reduced-form estimates to evaluate if vaccination has a meaningful effect on the probability
of being granted a sick day because of the flu.31 According to the CDC, the 2013-2014 vaccine
had the highest effectiveness (it reduces hospitalizations by 16 percentage points), the 2014-2015
vaccine had the lowest effectiveness (it reduces hospitalizations by 2.2 percentage points), and the
2017-2018 vaccine’s effectiveness during time of the campaign was in between those estimates (it
reduces hospitalizations by 8.4 percentage points) for working adults. To compare these values
with the reduced form estimates, we multiply the CDC effectiveness estimates by the smallest ef-
30. As can be seen in Appendix Table A5, the main result is robust to the inclusion of controls (gender, age, tenure
and income) and to using a broader and narrower definition of flu-related illness. Also note that we check the main
result by performing a bounding exercise (Appendix Table A6), in which we consider a possible role of vaccinations
outside of the firm for our results (see Section 5.3 for details).
31. The CDC provides the percentage effectiveness of the vaccine. However, we require percentage point changes
for the equivalence test. These percentage changes come from CDC cross-tabulations on the number of individuals
vaccinated and not vaccinated and the number of individuals who got sick with the flu or not. The CDC further adjusts
these estimates controlling for demographic characteristics that affect natural immunity to the flu resulting in larger
estimates, so the reported percentages are a conservative lower bound of the CDC estimates.
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fect of assignment to the workweek on take-up reported in Table 2, the most conservative estimate
of the first stage (6.7 percentage points). This calculation yields reduced form reference values of
-1.1 percentage points, -0.1 percentage points, and -0.6 percentage points, respectively.
Figure 2.2: Equivalence Test for the Effectiveness of Vaccination
Notes: This figure presents the reduced-form estimate of the effect of assignment to the workweek to adjusted CDC
estimates of the effectiveness of the flu vaccine for 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2017-2018 seasons.
In a second step, we test if the reduced form effect is smaller than each reference value (-
1.1, -0.1, -0.6) and higher than the absolute value of the reference values (1.1, 0.1, 0.6). This is
equivalent to comparing both the reference values and their respective absolute values to the 90
percent confidence interval of the estimated effect (Rainey 2014; Lakens 2017). If the 90 percent
confidence interval lies between the reference and its absolute value, then the estimated effects are
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consistent only with meaningless effects. If the confidence interval goes over one of these bound-
aries, it means we cannot rule out meaningful effects in the direction in which the confidence
interval overlaps the boundary.
Figure 2 presents the comparisons. We can reject the CDC’s effectiveness estimate for the best
season (2013-2014) and the CDC’s estimate for our campaign season (2017-2018). The estimated
effect is consistent with the effectiveness of 2014-2015, the worst season for which there are data
available. These results imply that we can safely rule out meaningful health benefits of the flu vac-
cination based on public health figures provided to policymakers from this intervention. However,
the confidence interval in Figure 2 does not rule out potentially large positive values, which would
suggest that getting vaccinated might increase illness. We study this potential issue in the next
section.
2.5.2 Can Getting Vaccinated Cause Moral Hazard?
The previous results imply that vaccinating employees against the flu appears to be ineffective.
A simple explanation could be that the 2017-2018 vaccine did not match the flu strains in that
particular flu season. The flu vaccine grants protection against four strands of the flu virus. If the
vaccine does not match the prevailing strands of the flu virus, then vaccination would be ineffective
in improving health. Taking into account that the quality of the flu vaccine could vary by year and
by country, the bank and its employees may have had just bad luck. While our setup does not
allow us to test this, we can study if getting vaccinated induces individuals to engage in riskier
practices, which may separately contribute to decreasing the effectiveness of flu vaccination and
increase illness.
Vaccinated individuals could overestimate the protection of the vaccine and engage in riskier
behaviors. As a consequence, vaccinated individuals may avoid going to the doctor or wait longer
than the unvaccinated to do it when they feel flu-like symptoms. Also, vaccinated individuals could
take fewer protective measures, such as washing hands less frequently. These changes in behavior
would expose individuals more to strands of the flu virus that the vaccine does not cover and other
diseases that share transmission mechanisms with the flu.
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To explore if flu vaccination may cause moral hazard, we test if getting vaccinated induces
different reactions than being unvaccinated when flu-like symptoms appear. The idea is that non-
flu respiratory diseases have symptoms like the flu, but the vaccine does not provide any immunity
benefit to prevent them. Thus, flu vaccination should not affect the probability of being diagnosed
with a non-flu disease, so any effect on this probability would imply a change in how individuals
react when being diagnosed sick with respiratory disease. In particular, if vaccinated employees
felt more protected, they might have been less likely to go to the doctor when they felt flu-like
symptoms, decreasing the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu disease. In particular, this
would concern cases of mild illnesses where it is up to the individual to decide to go to a doctor or
not.
To implement this test, we exploit the richness of the data on medical diagnoses that allows us to
identify cases of non-flu respiratory illnesses. We exploit a policy intervention of the Ecuadorian
government that happened in our investigation period. In January 2018, Ecuador experienced a
significant increment of flu cases nationwide (Epidemiologica 2018). As a result, the Ecuadorian
government launched a massive media campaign asking the population to go to the doctor if they
felt any flu symptoms. If vaccinated individuals felt protected, we argue that they may not have
followed the government’s recommendation, resulting in fewer visits to the doctor and fewer non-
flu respiratory diagnoses in that month.
We estimate the reduced-form effects of vaccination by month during our investigation period.
Figure 3 presents the effects of being assigned to the workweek on flu and non-flu respiratory
diagnoses. As with the cross-section estimates in Table 8, assigning employees to the workweek
does not affect the probability of being diagnosed with the flu in any month. The point estimates
are smaller than 0.7 percentage points in magnitude and insignificant at conventional levels. These
results further confirm that the vaccination campaign was ineffective. Regarding non-flu diagnoses,
if vaccination did not induce individuals to feel more protected, we would expect to find no effect
on the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu respiratory disease. This is true in November,
December, and February. However, in January, when the government asked individuals to go to
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the doctor, being assigned to the workweek decreased the probability of being diagnosed with a
non-flu respiratory disease by 7.2 percentage points.
Figure 2.3: Reduced Form Estimates of the Effect of Vaccination on Diagnosed Sickness
Notes: This figure presents the reduced form effect of being assigned to the workweek on the probability of being
diagnosed sick by month. The left panel presents the effect of assignment to vaccination on the workweek on flu
diagnoses, and the right panel presents the effect of assignment to vaccination on the workweek on non-flu respiratory
diagnoses. The figure presents the point estimate and the 9% heteroscedastic robust confidence interval. November
includes cases of diagnosed sickness detected since November 12, after the vaccination campaign.
We also estimate the effect of assignment to the workweek on non-flu diagnoses collapsing the
data of the four months to a cross-section. In this specification, being assigned to the workweek
decreased the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu respiratory disease by 7.7 percentage
points (Appendix Table A5), almost identical to the effect in January. This result suggests that
employees assigned to the workweek, who were more likely to get vaccinated, felt protected, and
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went less to the doctor when they felt flu-like symptoms. These estimates are consistent with the
hypothesis of riskier behavior among vaccinated individuals, as they appeared to think that they
are protected against the flu.
Figure 2.4: Reduced Form Estimates on the Probability of Going to the Onsite Doctor
Notes: This figure presents the reduced form effect of being assigned to the workweek on the probability of going
to the onsite doctor. The figure presents the point estimate and the 95% heteroscedastic robust confidence interval.
November includes sick days granted since November 12, after the vaccination campaign.
We can also investigate if vaccination affects the likelihood of going to the doctor at the on-site
health center. The bank’s on-site health center is a convenient feature for its employees because
they do not have to ask for time off to go to the doctor as they can take a few minutes of their work
time to go to the health center. Before the intervention, the on-site doctors account for 77 percent
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of all cases of diagnosed sickness. If vaccinated individuals felt more protected, they may have
been less likely to visit these doctors when the government launched its media campaign. Figure
4 presents the effects of assigning employees to the workweek on the probability of going to the
on-site doctor by month. There was no significant effect in November, December, and February.
In January, being assigned to the workweek for vaccination decreased the probability of going to
the onsite doctor by 8.6 percentage points (21% of the baseline). This finding is consistent with
moral hazard.
In an additional test for moral hazard, we look at self-reported habits and cultural beliefs related
to preventing the flu. In the post-intervention survey, the bank asked its employees how often they:
(i) exercise, (ii) take nutritional supplements, (iii) use an umbrella when it rains, and (iv) wash
their hands. Washing hands is a proven measure against the flu; exercising and taking nutritional
supplements may improve overall health, and many people, including Ecuadorians, believe that
carrying an umbrella helps to prevent the flu or other respiratory illnesses. Psychology research
show that cultures across the world associate the fact that the flu virus survives longer on a cold and
wet environment with the belief that individuals catch the flu by getting wet or cold (Au et al. 2008;
Sigelman et al. 1993; Baer et al. 1999; Helman 1978).32
Table 9 shows the effects of assigning employees to the workweek on these outcomes. As-
signing employees to the workweek did not affect how often employees wash their hands (1.2% of
the baseline), which is not surprising since almost all employees report that they wash their hands
regularly. Assigning employees to the workweek had a negative but statistically insignificant ef-
fect on how often employees exercise (4.9% of the baseline) and how often they take nutritional
supplements (19.5% of the baseline). The effect on how often employees carry an umbrella is
statistically significant. Being assigned to the workweek decreases the frequency of carrying an
umbrella by 1.22 points (17.6% of the baseline) on a Likert scale where one means “never” and
ten “all the time.”33 We can also investigate heterogeneous effects across individuals’ beliefs on
32. Also, since Quito is on the Equator Line, there are no marked seasons in the year. In Quito, temperatures in a
day can fluctuate between the upper forties (◦F) and the lower eighties (◦F). There are no accurate forecasts for rain.
33. This effect is significant at the 5% level (p-value=0.012) and robust to adjusting for multiple comparisons fol-
lowing Anderson (2008).
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the effectiveness of the vaccine using the pre-intervention survey. We find that the effect is driven
by individuals who believe the vaccine is very useful in preventing the flu (Appendix Table A7).
Thus, this result suggests that vaccinated individuals feel protected, so they neglect other measures
that they believe to be helpful in order to prevent respiratory illnesses.
Table 2.9: Reduced Form Estimates on Health-Related Habits
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the reduced form effects of being assigned to the
workweek on four daily habits and activities related to health and preventing the flu. All specifications control for
Quito fixed effects. Column 2 presents the reduced form estimates. Column 3 presents the number of individuals who
answered the survey question.
2.5.3 Other Interpretations of the Results on Moral Hazard
In the previous section, we provide several pieces of evidence supporting the idea that flu vac-
cination caused a moral hazard problem. In the following, we discuss whether other interpretations
of these findings not related to moral hazard could explain the results. Misdiagnoses could be a
competing explanation. If doctors are not able to distinguish the flu from other non-flu respira-
tory diseases, then some of the non-flu cases could have been flu cases. However, as we observe
diagnoses from 72 different doctors from different health centers and hospitals, it is unlikely that
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doctors systematically misdiagnosed the flu. Also, the results are robust to using a broader defini-
tion of flu-related illness. Finally, misdiagnoses do not explain why vaccinated individuals report
being less likely to carry an umbrella as a cultural protective measure against the flu.
We could also think that doctors misdiagnose conditional on whether a person got vaccinated
or not. When a doctor learns that a person who shows flu-like symptoms got vaccinated, the doctor
might be more likely to misdiagnose those symptoms as a non-flu respiratory disease. However,
the results in Figure 3 show that employees assigned to the workweek, who are more likely to get
vaccinated, were diagnosed less with non-flu respiratory diseases.
Another potential concern is the fact that the data on medical diagnoses correspond to employ-
ees who went to the onsite doctor or an external doctor during working hours, while employees
who went to an external doctor outside working hours, who were diagnosed sick but were not
granted a sick day, are coded as healthy. This measurement error will not bias the flu and non-flu
estimates as long as it is uncorrelated with the assignment to the workweek. However, if employ-
ees assigned to get vaccinated during the workweek are more likely to go to an external doctor
after work, then this would overestimate the effect on non-flu respiratory diagnoses. We bound the
effect to address this potential concern (Lee 2009). First, we calculate the treatment-control differ-
ence in the proportion of healthy individuals. Then, we trim this difference from the control group
(assigned to vaccination on Saturday) to obtain an upper bound, and we trim this difference from
the treatment group (assigned to vaccination on the workweek) to obtain a lower bound. The effect
of being assigned to the workweek on the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu respiratory
is always negative and bounded between 5.4 and 9.8 percentage points (Appendix Table A6).
Finally, an alternative to moral hazard is the idea of adverse selection: employees with higher
risk tolerance regarding health are more likely to get vaccinated and to engage in risky health
behavior. However, adverse selection cannot be a driver of our results because we use an exoge-
nous source of variation on take-up. The marginal individual who gets vaccinated is a person who
would not have gotten vaccinated if assigned to Saturday. This variation is uncorrelated with the
underlying risk preferences or other traits of employees that could determine adverse selection.
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2.6 Conclusions
Individual behavior may threaten the success of health interventions in multiple ways. First
and foremost, individuals can decide not to participate. In this paper, we find that a small price
change, as well as information nudges that appeal to the selfish or altruistic benefits of vaccination,
does not induce a change in behavior. In contrast, reducing opportunity costs has a substantial
effect on participation in a vaccination campaign for working-age employees. Additionally, peers
are an important factor that influences vaccination in the workplace. Regarding the health benefits
of the intervention, flu vaccination did not have a significant effect on any of our outcomes. While
we cannot rule out that the flu vaccine was medically ineffective, we find evidence consistent with
moral hazard, i.e., individuals adopting riskier behaviors after getting vaccinated. Moral hazard
constitutes a second way through which individual behavior can limit the effectiveness of health
interventions.
To answer the question of whether the vaccination campaign was economically beneficial for
the company carrying out this health intervention, we can perform a back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion of the net benefit of this campaign. This analysis has the limitation that we are not able to fully
quantify all of the possible effects that vaccination may have on outcomes relevant to the bank, like
morale and productivity.34 Our calculation suggests that the net benefit of the campaign was nega-
tive regarding sick days. In the best-case scenario, the treatment may result in a net gain of $0.17
regarding gains in work attendance during the flu season, which is not enough to compensate the
bank for its costs that include vaccine subsidies of $2.57, $5.05 and $9.99 per vaccine.35
34. A channel pertaining to company morale is the perception of individuals that the company cares more about their
health when assigned to the work-week which leads them to behave differently. However, we cannot find evidence for
that channel using data on organizational perceptions from our post-survey. Appendix Table A8 presents imprecise
estimates on self-reported productivity and the duration of the workday measured by the employees’ magnetic cards
swipes to enter and exit the bank. Albeit statistically insignificant, the point estimates suggest that assigning employees
to get vaccinated in the workweek increased their perception on their productivity, while decreased the duration of
their workday by about a third of an hour. Given that the bank pays a fixed salary, this could suggest an increase in
productivity. However, in the absence of more precise measures of productivity, we cautiously conclude from this
analysis that there is no sizable productivity premium. One could argue that from the perspective of a company, sick
days have higher economic relevance, given that they often go along with re-assignment of tasks, compared to when
some employees are able to finish tasks and leave earlier than others.
35. The estimate’s confidence interval implies that at most assigning employees to the workweek could decrease the
likelihood of having a flu sick day by 0.5 percentage points. We take the median wage of the bank ($750), divide it by
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Our study allows us to draw multiple practical implications for health interventions. From a
research perspective, it is useful to employ a randomized encouragement design to circumvent
any ethical dilemma when studying the consequences of interventions relevant to people’s health.
It allows not only the study of potential health benefits and but also of behavioral changes in an
unbiased way. The presence of moral hazard in health-related behavior implies that firms and pol-
icymakers should consider this phenomenon in the design of interventions like vaccination cam-
paigns. A promising mechanism to mitigate it could be to increase awareness that the proposed
measure, such as flu vaccination, does not guarantee a 100% protection against illnesses. It might
be necessary to remind individuals to continue making use of other protective measures against
respiratory viruses and bacteria, instead of letting them rely only on the protection potentially pro-
vided by medical technology.
Another lesson learned from our investigation is how to raise participation in health interven-
tions. In this paper, we could find two cost-effective measures that increase vaccination take-up
in a workplace context where monetary aspects do not seem to play a significant role in the indi-
vidual willingness to participate in a health campaign. Decreasing opportunity costs is one option
to increase participation drastically, which suggests using mobile campaigns in days and locations
where people usually congregate. Also, since we find that peer behavior has an important effect on
vaccination take-up, and that following social norm could be the potential mechanism, employers
can increase participation in health campaigns by using mechanisms to incentivize groups of em-
ployees. Small rewards for the entire unit when the unit takes part could have significant effects
on participation rates. Evaluating the role of such peer incentives in health-related contexts is a
promising area for future research.
the average number of workdays in a month (22), and we multiply this value by 0.005.
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3. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE
3.1 Introduction
Universal health care allows every citizen to have equal access to health care that is not fi-
nancially punitive. It is generally seen as beneficial to society: universal health care is associated
with lower infant mortality, longer life-expectancy as well as positive labor and income effects
(Moreno-Serra and Smith 2012; Dizioli and Pinheiro 2016; Finkelstein et al. 2012). However,
more than fifty percent of the world’s population does not live in a universal health care system.
The World Health Organization has declared health a basic human right and stated its mission
to achieve universal health coverage world-wide by 2030 (Prince 2017). Institutions like the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations support such a
mission. While support of universal health care has increased over time (Pew 2017), what might
comprise the most efficient and equitable system requires a better understanding of the underlying
economic considerations such as the cost-benefit trade-off.
Under universal health care, supplementary private insurance often provides added individual
benefits, such as faster and personalized health services through additional purchases of benefits
that include reduced wait times, the choice of doctors, and private hospital rooms. It also provides
spill-over social benefits by reducing demand and cost on the public health sector. While univer-
sal health care systems in the developed world are correlated with reduced access cost and lower
overall health costs, they are associated with longer wait-times, which generally leads to systems
that offer both public insurance as well as private insurance due to the tradeoff between equity and
efficiency of health care provision.1 Currently, the exact welfare implications of universal health
care with supplementary private insurance remain obscure. While the benefits of being privately
insured over being uninsured have been studied extensively (see e.g. McWilliams et al. 2004;
Wilper et al. 2009), there is a gap in knowledge for systems implementing public and private and
1. See Figure A1, A2, A3.
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insurance simultaneously. Existing research does not address whether the existence and coverage
of private health insurance under universal health care increases individual and societal welfare.
There also remains scant overall evidence on the long-run consequences of private health insurance
coverage. This study initiates to fill in these gaps.
A common problem with studies of insurance is adverse or advantageous selection, i.e. indi-
viduals with specific characteristics select into insurance. We solve this problem by employing
data from the health care system of Australia. By international standards, Australia represents a
low-cost system marked by good health outcomes (Schneider et al. 2017). Administrative tax data
spanning multiple years across a large ten-percent panel sample of individuals in Australia allows
us to identify the potential benefits and hidden costs arising from private health insurance under
universal health care using a policy that creates an unconventional natural experiment.
The Australian policy that introduces price-discrimination by age called the Lifetime Health
Cover (LTHC) is exploited for this study. It rewards (punishes) early (delayed) purchase of private
health insurance. A regression kink design (Card et al. 2017) is utilized to investigate demand
responses of private health insurance where high-quality public insurance is the baseline. With
this large administrative sample of observations, precise estimates can be obtained and hetero-
geneity and implications for policies are explored. The empirical effect of private health insurance
on health expenditures, mortality, work expenses, gross salary, and student debt is evaluated via
a reduced-form regression kink approach to obtain local average treatment effects at the policy
threshold.
This study contributes to numerous strains of literature. First, the studies which investigated
three major Australian policies incentivizing private health insurance coverage either used highly
aggregated time-series (Butler 2002; Frech et al. 2003; Ellis and Savage 2008) or cross-sectional
data (Palangkaraya and Yong 2005, 2007; Stavrunova and Yerokhin 2014). With a few exceptions
(Kettlewell 2018), these studies were based on self-reporting from surveys (Cameron et al. 1988,
Buchmueller et al. 2013; Cheng 2014), which have potential reporting problems due to social de-
sirability and memory issues. Those problems can be reduced with tax data due to government
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sanctions from misreporting. While previous investigations mainly focus on explaining one his-
toric jump in private health insurance coverage around the millennium, the coverage is investigated
more broadly in the current study. Since the data spans more than a decade, an examination of re-
sponses is possible for the same individual directly after an event of interest, thus allowing for a
direct look at the effectiveness of the policies in the short- and long-run.
Second, impact evaluation is at the core of health economics and has been done in domains
such as incentivized exercises (Charness and Gneezy 2009), wearables (Handel and Kolstad 2017),
and TV consumption (Chadi and Hoffmann 2018). Yet, impact studies of private health insurance
under universal health care have thus far been neglected. The current study provides the first large-
scale investigation of unbiased private health insurance estimates on mortality and income while
also assessing long-run moral hazard via health expenditures. (Hall et al. 2005) provides one of the
few studies on mortality in a universal health care system, finding that private health insurance is
negatively associated with three-year mortality for prostate cancer patients from Western Australia.
The robustness of this finding is unclear since both, sorting based on low risk health characteris-
tics (advantageous selection) and high risk health characteristics (adverse selection) was reported
in Australia (Buchmueller et al. 2013; Kettlewell 2018), and the direction of the true bias is un-
known. The present study can account for sorting and provide unbiased estimates by exploiting
the exogenous policy variation.
While adverse selection can be observed here, no evidence for moral hazard based on the ad-
ministrative tax health expenditure measure is found. No effect of private health insurance on mor-
tality is detected either, likely due to the relatively young age of individuals in the study sample.
This study contributes to the scarce literature of health insurance coverage on financial obligations
such as debt and work expenditures as well. We investigate whether there are any potential un-
intended consequences when obtaining health insurance. Surprisingly, gross salary is reduced for
individuals that are more likely to be covered privately. One likely partial mechanism is ex post
income manipulation of the reported gross income since expenses are higher for the insured. Also,
paying the premiums could change the repayment rates of student debt and reduce other expendi-
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tures. No evidence of a reduction in work-expenditures reported to the Australian Taxation Office
in detected, yet an increase in student debt for those covered by private health insurance is appar-
ent, indicating delay of repayments.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the background of Australian health
policies as well as the specific policy used for identification is introduced. Section 2 briefly dis-
cusses the underlying theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents
the empirical strategy. Section 5 tests the identification assumption. Section 6 presents the impact
of the exogenous penalty policy on private health insurance coverage in Australia. Section 7 dis-
cusses adverse and advantageous selection and shows the results for the long-run consequences of
private health insurance. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Background
Universal health care was first introduced in Australia in 1975 and has existed in its current
form since 1984. While private health insurance (PHI) did not disappear, it experienced a decline
until approximately 1999. Figure 1 illustrates the drop in PHI through the proxy called hospital
cover which covers insurance benefits for stays in the hospital.2 The reduction in coverage raised
the concern that healthy low-cost individuals would drop out over time while unhealthy high cost
individuals would remain in the insurance market (known as adverse selection death spiral; Cutler
and Zeckhauser 1998; Einav and Finkelstein 2011) making insurance increasingly unprofitable and
leading to the collapse of the private health insurance system. Subsequently, Australia established
three tax-related health policies to increase insurance coverage: the Medicare Levy Surcharge, the
Private Health Insurance Rebate and the Lifetime Health Cover loading.3 After the introduction of
the three policies at the turn of the millennium, coverage indeed stabilized.
2. Another part of insurance is called extras cover which covers services such as dental, physiotherapy or chiro-
practic treatment which are commonly not covered by the hospital cover.
3. A question raised in the Australian private health insurance literature is by how much private health insurance
take-up was increased by each individual policy as well as an advertisement campaign by the government promoting
private health insurance take-up at the time. Due to the relatively close introduction of the policies, it is difficult to
disentangle the effects. This paper will not try to answer this question. It will specifically focus on the Lifetime Health
cover that introduces mandatory discrimination by age to evaluate demand responses and the consequences of private
health insurance when public insurance is the baseline.
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Figure 3.1: Australian Private Health Insurance Coverage
Notes: This figure displays Australian private health insurance (hospital insurance) coverage over time. The percentage
of individuals which are privately insured drastically decreased until the change of the millennium when the Australian
government introduced three private health insurance policies, among others the Lifetime Health Cover.
The Medicare Levy Surcharge was an additional 1% tax on taxable income on affluent singles
(families) with taxable income above $50,000 ($100,000) who failed to purchase PHI. Both, the
income threshold as well as the tax penalty increased over time. The Private Health Insurance
Rebate initially covered 30% of the private health insurance premiums. Age-related thresholds
were introduced over time, yet benefits were also reduced to phase out this costly policy. Neither
of these two policies interfere with the third policy of interest: the Lifetime Health Cover.
With the introduction of the Lifetime Health Cover (LTHC) on 1 July 2000, individuals who
delay initial sign-up for PHI are penalized with a higher premium than those that purchased PHI
while younger. The policy is completely independent of income and applies to every Australian.
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Figure 3.2: Lifetime Health Cover – Policy Schedule
Notes: The exogenous policy leads to a price increase of a certain percentage (called Loading) on top of the premium
costs based on the age of first sign-up of private health insurance purchase and a growth-rate difference from the left
to the right hand side of the threshold of 2 percentage points.
The introduction of the LTHC policy did not result in any increase in premiums for those
individuals below the age of 31. Figure 2 illustrates that premiums increase by 2% with each
additional year after age 30 for which an agent decided to delay sign-up. An individual purchasing
private health insurance for the first time at age 40 has to pay 20% more than what he would
have paid, had he signed up at age 30. This price surge based on initial purchase – called a
loading – increases up to 70% for individuals signing up for the first time at age 65. At the
time of the policy introduction, the loading was locked in at an infinite horizon. The law was
changed on April 2007, requiring the loading to be dropped for agents that were continuously
covered through private health insurance over ten years.4 Until 2007, the National Health Act from
4. The Lifetime Health cover policy is also known as an unfunded lifetime community rating. Gale and Brown
(2003) claim that the policy is actuarial fair, i.e. the premium is equal to the expected claims.
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1953 prohibited premium discrimination based on age, health-status, or other circumstances which
effectively establishes a community rating for private health insurance. Crucially, the Lifetime
Health Cover (LTHC) was the exception to the community rating rule which requires uniform
pricing within the same territory. Those rules changed with the introduction of the Private Health
Insurance Act in 2007 which specifically prohibits discrimination by age (except for the LTHC),
health status, gender, sexuality, race, religious beliefs, and claims history. While price variation by
state of residence was explicitly allowed, it is difficult for companies to price discriminate by state
to offset the mandatory price penalty.5
3.3 Theoretical Framework
The Lifetime Health Cover policy introduces price discrimination by age. It changes the price
of private health insurance each year that purchase is delayed past the age of thirty, leading to an
increase in private health insurance premiums when initial sign-up happens later rather than earlier
in life. Given that the policy asks health funds to price-discriminate by age but price discrimination
by age is not feasible in any other way, it seems impossible for firms to respond to this price change
to offset the law optimally to attract higher revenue. Therefore, the theoretical framework and
analysis focuses on the consumer side.
Imagine an agent i that maximizes utility with respect to health consumption xs and non-health,
residual consumption ys over a finite time horizon until s = t, t + 1, ..., T until death (T ) subject
to the available budget ws.
max
x,y





∀s : pxxs + pyys = ws (3.2)
5. In a binary way, firms could reduce premiums minimally by 2% for states with individuals that are on average
above 30 while they could increase prices by 2% in states where individuals are on average below 30. This would not
off-set the whole mandatory price schedule but just a tiny fraction. Increasing the difference beyond 2% will introduce
adverse selection given that old individuals have higher health risks. It further seems infeasible since no state has
tax-payers that are on average below 30 over our period of interest. The overall average age is 42.
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In this simple model, the premium change represents an impact on the price of health services
ps, where insurance is a subset of health services. The Lifetime Health Cover changes the price








T with an exogenous
price increase for individuals above the age of 30, s.t. ps < p
′
s.
Figure 3.3: Lifetime Health Cover – Price Change
Notes: The exogenous Lifetime Health Cover policy leads to a price change on health for agents above the age of 31
and reduces health demand and increases the demand for residual consumption (i.e. the other goods).
Figure 3 displays that change in price for a 35-year-old person who suddenly must pay a higher
price for insurance given that the agent is relatively myopic. It implies that the agent did not
sign up for cover before the introduction of the policy but is only considering to sign-up after the
introduction of the policy which leaves the agent to face the price change at that point in time. The
price increase leads to a reduction in demand in the health good xs and an increase in demand in
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the residual good ys. Given this framework where health is an investment good, demand for the
health good is expected to be downward sloping.
3.4 Data
A novel data set called A-Life was provided by the Australian Taxation Office. It consists of a
panel of ten percent of Australian taxpayers from 1999 to 2012 and is utilized for this study.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Notes: H is the bandwidth of age. The remoteness index has values from 0 to 4.
92
These data will be used to estimate the causal effects of private health insurance within the
universal health care system of Australia. The country has a population of 24.21 million citizens
(World Bank 2018), 1.8 million of which are available in the panel, which implies a tax base of
18 million individuals. I restrict the set of included individuals to those between 18 and 60 years
of age to avoid any potential confounding effect of retirement. The main sample includes 243,298
unique taxpayers which are followed throughout a decade to investigate the effect of the policy on
the following outcomes: medical expenses, mortality, gross salary, work expenses, and outstanding
student debt.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the tax data. The average Australian taxpayer is 41 years
old, has a dependent child, a partner, is an Australian resident, and lives in a densely populated area.
The average gross salary over the full period of interest is $32,651 with 44% of individuals having
private health insurance as measured by hospital cover. The main sample includes individuals
above and below the age of 30 with a bandwidth of H=6. The average age of the main sample is
30 by construction with otherwise relatively similar characteristics to the full data.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Ideally, we would like to randomly assign agents to have private health insurance vs. not
to obtain the average treatment effect on health, labor, and budget outcomes, which would be
identified via the following clean ordinary least square regression for agent i at time t:
Yit = β0 + β1PHIit + εit (3.3)
Such an approach, however, is ethically and practically infeasible. Alternatively, imagine a
world where one randomly assigns different prices of private health insurance contracts in a field
experiment to the general population or a subset thereof. This would allow us to use an instrumental
variable approach where individual compliance is expected to decrease with increasing exogenous
premiums. By instrumenting private health insurance coverage through the price, one would obtain
the effect of insurance on the outcomes for the set of compliers. This can be achieved by scaling
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up the reduced form (5) by the first stage (4), as shown in the two equations below.
PHIit = γ0 + γ1priceit + νit (3.4)
Yit = δ0 + δ1priceit + ζit (3.5)
Closely related, the instrument employed in this setting is using a kink in the policy and with
it the regression kink design. While random assignment is not used in its purest form, the quasi-
random assignment of individuals to the policy schedule is sufficient to identify effects from differ-
ences in slopes generated through the premium increase at the threshold. The following first stage
and reduced form equations are used to identify the local causal estimate from the policy kink at
the age of thirty.





i2000 + α3agei2000 × 1(agei2000 ≤ 30) + νit (3.6)





i2000 + ρ3agei2000 × 1(agei2000 ≤ 30) + ζit (3.7)
The regressions are shown in a bandwidth |agei2000|| < H with the H = 6 as the main band-
width. Robustness of the results is tested with respect to the bandwidth. The reduced form (6) can











The most powerful first stage is a version of percentage changes using log(PHIit) and log(Priceit).
However, such a first stage can only be used when aggregating by age which results in a substantial
loss of power since age is only available at a yearly level. Therefore, intent-to-treat (reduced form)
estimates for the impact of private health insurance are shown instead. To demonstrate that the first
stage is reasonable and that intent-to-treat effects are based on the mechanism of the loading pol-
icy, the identification is employed without the logarithm for a conservative estimate. The Lifetime
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0 if age ≤ 30
0.02 if age > 30
(3.9)
Intent to treat percentage premium increases are employed based on the policy-schedule, i.e.
the loading of the Lifetime Health Cover and we can observe the change in the growth rate of











Since the loading increases by 2 pp. every year past age 30, the most conservative first stage
slope change is 0.02 and can be fixed by construction.
3.6 Testing the Identification Assumption
For a regression kink design to provide unbiased estimates, it is necessary that only the growth-
rate of the outcome changes due to the policy, i.e. there is no other factor that induces the change
in the growth-rate. I test this identifying assumption in three ways: I check for manipulation of the
running variable, smoothness of covariates and I run placebo-tests.
3.6.1 Manipulation of the Running Variable
A necessary first check regards any possible manipulation of the reported running variable age.
Based on the policy incentives one might suspect that agents could systematically report being
below the age of 31 to receive no price punishment. However, such manipulation is extremely
difficult since age must be reported the first time a person enters the taxpayer database and for
every tax filing thereafter to a powerful government agency, Australian Taxation Office (ATO).
The ATO can and does cross validate information per individual over time. It is further possible
for the ATO to cross-check the stated age with official birth certificates. In recent years, the ATO
alleviated the tax-filling procedure by receiving information directly from the employers to pre-fill
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tax forms for submission which are another source to cross-check to ensure consistency in tax
filing statements. It implies that any misreporting would have to be done in at least two official
registries and with the employer. Beyond those large hurdles, the ATO is able to punish individuals
not only in monetary terms but also with criminal charges when individuals do not comply with
the agency.6
Figure 4 shows the probability density distribution over age. It is relatively smooth across the
cut-off. However, there is a minor mass peak right before the kink. The related McCray test shows
a significant relationship at the five percent level. Now, if one would not know the institutional
setting, this peak might be worrisome. However, the peak can be traced back to an increase in
birth rates in the 1970s (Figure A4). Unless the parents of those individuals systematically decided
to give birth more often while forecasting a policy that is implemented thirty years later and was
only debated in 1997, manipulation seems impossible. One might still worry that pure statistical
association could confound the estimates. Yet, it can be demonstrated that the coefficient of private
health insurance coverage obtained is not an outlier in the distribution of estimates, but rather the
mean of the distribution. This was accomplished through 10,000 jackknife Monte Carlo simulation
cycles wherein 1% of the population at the left hand-side of the cutoff was randomly dropped
at each iteration (Figure A5). Therefore, neither manipulation is detected nor do any potential
associations of the unlucky birth-peak coinciding with the policy influence the estimates.
6. The Australian Taxation Office has three types of penalties: i) failure to lodge penalty up to $10,502, ii) After
years a default assessment based on income is conducted and iii) a maximum penalty $8,500 or imprisonment for up
to 12months is the most extreme type.
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Figure 3.4: Probability Density Distribution of Private Health Insurance over Age
Notes: The figure shows the likelihood of having private health insurance coverage as a probability density function
for each age group in the year 2000, i.e. at the time of the introduction of the policy.
3.6.2 Smoothness of Covariates
Table 2 shows the effect of the slope-change on the covariates. Almost all variables are sta-
tistically insignificant which means that the covariates cannot explain the underlying treatment. It
is reasonable to conclude that private health insurance demand only changes through the policy;
therefore, any intent-to-treat effects of insurance on health, labor, and budget outcomes can only
be induced due to the change in the growth-rate of the price from the left to the right hand side at
the age of 30 in the year 2000.
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Table 3.2: Smoothness of Covariates
Notes: The bandwidth H=6. The remoteness index has values from 0 to 4.
3.6.3 Placebo-Tests across Age and Time
Finally, we carry out two placebo checks to make sure that the assignment of the kink happens
at the correct age and time. Placebo-kinks are placed at different values of the age distribution with
subsequent checks on whether the regression kink design retains predictive power to change private
health insurance demand at these kinks. The adjusted R2 values for the age-based placebo-test is
very high at the policy-kink and lower at the placebo kinks (not shown). It means the predictive
power of the kink is large and we conclude the age of 30 is the correct kink.
The time-period prior to the introduction of the LHC policy was examined for any potential
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issues since the policy was initially publicly discussed in 1997. Gale and Brown (2003) have
previously implied that responses to price increase may have started one month prior to policy
implementation. Due to data limitation, no year prior to 1999 is available. However, there is
no significant change in the slope during the year 1999. The main demand responses occurred
during the year 2000 and is driven – as expected – by new purchases. No kink is observed in the
demand of private health insurance for individuals that already had coverage in 1999; however, a
kink is apparent at the year of policy implementation for those that were not covered in 1999 and
incentivized by the policy (not shown).
3.7 Private Health Insurance Coverage
Given the change in the growth-rate of the premiums for initial purchase (see Figure 2), a
change in the growth-rate of private health insurance coverage is expected, i.e. the quantity de-
mand.
Figure 5 shows the private health insurance coverage propensities over the distribution of age.
Below the age of 30, the growth rate of private health insurance coverage is relatively steep and
it drops after the kink point. This is consistent with a reduction in the quantity demanded due to
an increase in the price of health goods, i.e. in particular private health insurance. This change
in slope is used as a conservative first stage to estimate the impact of private health insurance. To
estimate the change in coverage, the loadings assigned to each age-cohort are utilized to obtain a
first stage estimate of 0.02 with a very high F-value of 713,247 for the main bandwidth (H = 6).
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Figure 3.5: Private Health Insurance Coverage at Time of the Policy Introduction
Notes: The figure shows mean private health insurance coverage for each age group in the year 2000, i.e. at the time
of the introduction of the policy. In a hypothetical scenario without the linear price increase schedule, private health
insurance growth would be higher than in the current scenario where private health insurance is suppressed by schedule
that yearly increases the price of private health insurance. The growth rate difference of the left and right hand side is
between 2 and 4 pp.
Table 3 displays the reduced form and second stage estimates. All reduced form estimates have
F-values beyond 10 which means that there is a strong first stage. However, a different first stage
could theoretically be obtained using the logarithm of insurance coverage. Since this is not possible
without aggregation and loss of power, only the intent-to-treat estimates for the later consequences
of private health insurance are shown. For the main bandwidth of individuals between the ages
of 25 and 36 (H=6), the private health insurance growth rate drops by 2.1 pp. when moving from
below (and including) the age of 30 to above the age of 30 using the main specification without
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controls.
Table 3.3: Policy-Induced Demand for Private Health Insurance
Notes: In parenthesis are heteroskedastic standard-errors, generated via the delta method. All estimates are calculated
for the year 2000, the year of the policy introduction. The first stage is the intent-to-treat loading schedule applied
resulting in a first stage of 0.020*** with an F-value of 713,247 for H=6; A polynomial of degree P=2 was used for
the running variable age.
The reduced form probit estimate is slightly larger but within the confidence interval of the
ordinary least square coefficient while the coefficient with controls is smaller and remains within
the confidence interval. The coefficients are marginally larger when we increase the bandwidth up
to 3.1 (3.6) pp. reductions of the growth rate for OLS (Probit) but, overall, the results are robust.
The second stage results for ages between 25 and 36 show that an increase in the price by 1 pp.
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reduces demand by more than 1 pp. The coefficient with controls is within the confidence interval
of the main specification. Coverage is negatively affected by the change in price: demand is
downward sloping. We conclude that there is a robust first stage of the penalty policy on coverage
which allows us to proceed to estimate the intent-to-treat estimates of being insured.
3.8 Effects of Private Health Insurance
Several questions regarding the purchase of private health insurance are discussed in this sec-
tion.
Table 3.4: From Correlation to Causality – Health, Labor, and Budget Considerations
Notes: In parenthesis are heteroskedastic standard-errors, generated via the delta method. All estimates are calculated
for the years 2000-2012. A polynomial of degree P=2 was used for the running variable age based on the year 2000 and
a bandwidth H=6. The mortality coefficients are very small (low incidence), percentage changes are based on mean
comparisons of those with and without private health insurance using the fourth digit after the coma (not shown).
What is the role of information asymmetries for Australian insurance contracts? Does the Aus-
tralian insurance market exhibit adverse selection, advantageous selection, or moral hazard? What
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are the impacts of being privately insured on health, labor market outcomes, and personal budgets?
If there would be no behavioral response after being exogenously insured, the benefits of private
health insurance can manifest themselves in reduced health expenditures, lower mortality, an in-
crease in gross salary, and no budget responses. However, moral hazard might lead to an increase
in health expenditures.
Given longer stays in hospitals due to more convenient amenities, private health insurance can
also lead to reduction in salaries. From a budget perspective, individuals who are exogenously
pushed into private health insurance coverage might experience increased budget constraints re-
sulting in reduced work expenses and an increase in outstanding student debt due. Agents might
also be inclined to manipulate their reported gross salary to compensate for their premium ex-
penses. The results are displayed in Table 4 and they are discussed in the next two sections.
3.8.1 Adverse Selection, Advantageous Selection and Moral Hazard
Acting upon information asymmetries is a commonly observed human behavior for health in-
surance, either in the form of adverse (advantageous) selection, i.e. the attraction of high (low)
risk health types, or in the form of moral hazard, i.e. the change in risk behavior after obtaining
insurance. A crucial question is whether the Lifetime Health Cover policy which discriminates
by age (as well as the other policies at the time) was necessary to reduce adverse selection. Are
unhealthy individuals more likely to select into private health insurance? Standard selection tests
for insurance markets compare expected costs of the insured vs. expected costs of the uninsured.
If the expected costs are larger for the insured than the uninsured, one might conclude that adverse
selection exists. However, as Einav and Finkelstein (2011) point out, the positive correlation test is
a joint test of moral hazard and adverse or advantageous selection, at least in the absence of differ-
entiating the two problems of information asymmetry through any other means. Fortunately, the
exogenous variation in PHI data provided through the current design allows for a differentiation.
The first row in Table 4 shows the correlations of private health insurance with the outcomes
of interest. There is evidence of positive selection on medical expenses, mortality, gross salary
and work expenses and student debt due. Medical expenditure and private health insurance are
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positively correlated by AU$ 38.45 for those individuals between 25 and 36 that grew older by 13
years in the time-horizon of interest. The reduced form estimation reveals that there is no moral
hazard in the classical sense since having private health insurance does not visibly increase medical
expenditures. It implies that all the variation from the OLS correlation with medical expenditure
can be attributed to adverse selection. While it is a small amount in absolute terms, the relative
impact is a large 170% increase in comparison to not being privately insured. A simple back of the
envelope calculation reveals a total adverse selection cost of AU$ 9,354,808 for this young sub-
group. This finding also confirms the intuition that exogenous variation of private health insurance
coverage is crucial to obtain unbiased estimate of the effects.7
3.8.2 Health, Labor, and Budget Considerations
From Table 4 it is evident that private health insurance does not lead to changes in health in
the reduced form (intent-to-treat). This strongly implies that relatively young individuals do not
obtain any health benefits over the long horizon of 13 years when purchasing insurance, at least
for the medical expenditure and mortality measures inspected in this study.
The main labor market outcome is gross salary from the Australian tax data. Intent-to-treat
reductions of gross salaries around AU$1,000, or 3% of the baseline, are observed. While, one
might expect increases in salary due to a faster return to the labor force when privately insured, it
appears the opposite is the case. The private health insurance industry states the benefits of having
coverage in addition to public insurance are the free choice of doctors, private rooms, and reduced
wait-times for health services. Potentially, the convenience of a private room over a shared room
might induce individuals to stay longer in the hospital when they are sick. This results in them
foregoing the next best alternative, i.e. working and obtaining a higher residual income. Hence,
those individuals with private health insurance forgo opportunity costs from the variable pay com-
ponent of their income. Unfortunately, no direct tests of this hypothesis are currently possible with
the data at hand, as individual-level data on the length of hospital stay is lacking. However, it
7. We take the average correlation and multiply the number of individuals that are the main bandwidth, i.e. AU$
38.45*243,298 = AU$ 9,354,808.
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appears that the effect is driven by a sub-group of individuals with the highest residual income: the
self-employed. Self-employed individuals forgo AU$1,500 of residual income when insured. This
finding is robust (not shown).8 External aggregate data from the Australian Health and Welfare In-
stitute shows a positive correlation of the length in the hospital and being privately insured (AIHW
2017).9 Those two pieces of evidence together reinforce the idea that individuals forgo income by
staying in the hospital for a longer period of time. However, since there is no effect on medical
expenditures, this explanation is unlikely.
Another explanation is ex post income manipulation. Agents who get privately insured, have
higher expenses but the same income. To optimize, they will report a lower income which leads
to a lower tax burden if the ATO does not detect misreporting. The explanation of income ma-
nipulation is consistent with the observation that the self-employed drive the gross salary effect.
However, since there is also an effect from the employed – albeit at a lower level. Therefore, ex
post income manipulation can only partially explain the results.
Finally, the availability of budget restriction measures, such as work-related expenses and out-
standing student debt, allowed us to test the effect of private health insurance on personal budgets.
While suffering the consequences of having to pay the premium, individuals may substitute away
from non-health expenditures. There are no effects of private health insurance coverage on work-
related expenses. However, there is some evidence for the substitution hypothesis which displays
the unintended consequence of policies that push people into private health insurance. Private
health insurance increases the intent-to-treat amount of student debt due by AU$ 8.90. This is a
12% increase with respect to the baseline. It indicates that individuals with private health insurance
delay their student debt repayments that they owe the government. If everyone would have student
debt and coverage in this sample, it would imply a burden of AU$ 2,165,352.10 According to the
Australian Taxation Office, the number of people with outstanding student debt was 1,188,000 in
8. All results are robust. Among others, robustness checks for my intent-to-treat results entail going beyond a
polynomial of degree 2, checking for potentially spurious life-cycle effects by adding age and quadratic age or year
fixed effects as well as adding the covariate set displayed in Table 1.
9. Private patients stay 3.5 (2.2) days on average vs 3.1 (1.9) days for publicly insured patients in public (private)
hospitals.
10. AU$ 8.90*243,298 = AU$ 2,165,352.
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2006 and it is steadily increasing. A back of the envelope calculation implies that extending cov-
erage to those individuals could result in a delay of student debt payments of an amount of AU$
10,573,200.11
3.9 Conclusion
We document that the change in the growth rate of the price, changes the growth rate of in-
surance coverage. The Australian market seem to exhibit adverse selection which implies that the
concern of an adverse selection death spiral that motivated the government interventions incen-
tivizing private health insurance take-up at the millennium was justified. We do not find positive
effects of private health insurance but some unintended consequences. In particular, we do not
find any effects of private health insurance on the measures of health and even negative effects on
gross salary which are likely driven by ex post income manipulation to reduce the premium burden
from private health insurance. We also find evidence for substitution due to increased student debt
indicating repayments slowing down for those being insured.
For the relatively young individuals of the ages between 25 and 48 private health insurance
coverage does not seem to pay off. However, the largest benefits might not be observable yet in
this study. For example, non-emergency surgery wait-times for privately insured individuals are
significantly lower than for publicly insured individuals and the likelihood to have non-emergency
surgery increases with age. This study underlines that we must understand health insurance more
holistically to be aware not only of the benefits but also of the costs that can arise from increasing
supplementary insurance in a universal health care system.
11. AU$ 8.90*1,188,000 = AU$ 10,573,200.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
My three essays on the Demand and Welfare in Health Economics employ quasi-experimental
and experimental methods to investigate causes, intended and unintended consequences from tech-
nologies and institutions in the domain of individual health, well being and the labor market.
In Section 2, we ask whether television consumption is an economic good or bad and whether
it can be seen as a prime example of irrational behavior. Consistent with the literature on nega-
tive social effects of television consumption is a wide-held belief that watching TV is generally
harmful. However, it is unclear whether television consumption is individually detrimental and if
so: why do individuals then watch so much television in the first place? We study the causal ef-
fects from television consumption using a large-scale natural experiment in West Germany where
households in a few geographically restricted areas received commercial television via terrestrial
frequencies. Contrary to previous research, we find no health impact when television consumption
increases. For life satisfaction, we even find positive effects. Additional data support the notion
that television is not an economic bad and that non-experimental evidence seems to be driven by
negative selection.
In Section 3, we study how individual behavior may affect the effectiveness of medical tech-
nologies, in the context of flu vaccination. We find that reducing opportunity costs increases
vaccination take-up substantially and that peer behavior can influence participation in vaccina-
tion campaigns. These results suggest that decreasing opportunity costs is one option to increase
participation drastically and that employers and policymakers can increase participation in health
campaigns by using mechanisms to incentivize groups of people. We also find evidence consistent
with vaccination causing a moral hazard problem. Our study provides several pieces of evidence
that speak to the idea of riskier behaviors regarding health among vaccinated individuals. Forgoing
other protective measures and increasing risky behavior could partially explain the ineffectiveness
of vaccination and can improve our understanding why health interventions may sometimes fail.
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In section 4, I study the unintended consequences of being privately insured in the universal
health care system of Australia. A novel regression kink design in conjunction with a policy which
punishes individuals who delay the purchase of private health insurance allows me to circumvent
the adverse selection problem, i.e. that unhealthy individuals might be more likely to have insur-
ance. After being exogenously insured, just having insurance can lead to individuals using more
health services which can be captured through medical expenditures. However, it appears that
private health insurance does not cause moral hazard despite evidence of adverse selection. Sup-
plementary insurance does not change mortality or work expenses but it changes the budget. We
observe an increase in student debt which is consistent with premium payments crowding out debt
repayments to the government. There is a loss of gross income from private health insurance which
is consistent with income under-reporting to reduce expenses from premium payments.
Overall, the chapters of my dissertation emphasize how technologies and institutions can shape
behavior and that technologies can lead to unintended consequences which need to be carefully
considered when implementing policies to improve individual health and labor market outcomes.
The first study on the consequences of television consumption highlights that the common per-
ception of TV being an economic bad seems to be wrong. Our finding is consistent with agents
maximizing utility while imposing negative externalities on others. This knowledge is important
for policy-makers to pick the most effective policy which takes this reality into account. Similarly,
vaccination causing risky behavior needs to be carefully considered by policymakers so that the
effectiveness of vaccination is not diminished. Finally, when the government incentives individu-
als to take up private health insurance, individuals might under-report their income to compensate
for the expenses that they incur when insured. Those offsetting behaviors could be detrimental to
the success of policies and the overall budget of the government, and, hence, policies designed to
circumvent such actions are important to improve individual and societal welfare.
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APPENDIX I
TELEVISION, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
I.1 Appendix A – Historical details
In the following, we provide information on various aspects related to television in Germany,
for which we have screened available historic news coverage. Aspects that these reports shed light
on are a) the German people’s (negative) views on television, b) positions of the German Supreme
Court and interpretations of it, and c) the (limited) proliferation of private TV in Germany in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Figure A1 shows a timeline of events and illustrates important phases
of the historical development. We provide references and links to sources, if we find those in the
internet. Checks of all links were conducted on September 14, 2019. Note that original source
documents are all in German.
a) Perception of (private) television in Germany and political debate
To illustrate what Germans think about television, we refer to the president of the European
Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in our introductory quote. This quote was taken from the ZDF
TV talkshow “Berlin Mitte” with host Maybrit Illner and is from October 12, 2006, when von der
Leyen participated as Germany’s former Federal Minister of Family Affairs. Her statement was
well-received by the audience and can be watched, e.g. here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
z0LMjPHSoNs.
Evidence for Germans’ negative views on television are ubiquitous and go back to the mid-
dle of the 20th century. An early example of media coverage on TV and its potential implications
for society is an article in DER SPIEGEL from April 13, 1950 (https://www.spiegel.de/
spiegel/print/d-44448169.html) with the title “TV makes stupid” (“Fernsehen macht
dumm”). This article, in Germany’s most-read news magazine, informs about a severe decline in
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educational standards in Californian schools, which the article linked directly to the proliferation
of television in the US at that time.
DER SPIEGEL also reported on the situation in Europe in the late 1970s when citizens in
countries like Italy initially experienced private TV. An article from December 17, 1979 (https:
//www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-39685909.html) had the title: “Private TV –
more stultification of the masses?” (German: “Privatfernsehen: Nur noch Volksverdummung?”).
The report refers to “porn shows with the beauties of the night” on Italian TV and concludes
that television in Italy has degenerated into a family peep show since the public-media monopoly
was lifted. This reminds the SPIEGEL reporter of how “American TV chains anesthetize their
audiences around the clock.” The article then continues to cover the efforts of the federal govern-
ment under the social-democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to prevent private TV in Germany
and cites, among others, leading social-democrat Egon Bahr who warned of a “convenient end of
democracy.” Representatives of the other political camp included conservative minister-president
of Lower-Saxony Ernst Albrecht (and father of Ursula von der Leyen) who argued for freedom of
choice and appeared to disagree with the notion of stultification through proliferation of private TV.
Another article in DER SPIEGEL from October 10, 1979 (https://www.spiegel.de/
spiegel/print/d-39868784.html) covers in more detail how the federal government in
Germany thought to keep the public-media monopoly intact and cited chancellor Helmut Schmidt
with his statement that “we must not stumble into dangers that are more acute and dangerous than
nuclear energy” when talking about private TV. Schmidt also was convinced that private TV “could
change the structures of the democratic society.” Instead of promoting the proliferation of televi-
sion, the Chancellor suggested that it would be good to have a television-free day of the week.
Ministers of the federal government under Schmidt followed his lead, including the minister of the
interior, Gerhart Baum, who saw a need to “protect a humane democratic society against harmful
influences of information overload and manipulation of public opinion” for which changes to the
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German constitution were considered as an option. Justice Minister Hans-Jochen Vogel, concur-
ring with this idea, argued that the freedom of information guaranteed under Article 5 of the Basic
Law (Germany’s de-facto constitution) should be ”restricted” by its Article 6, which protects the
family. Vogel stated: “We cannot allow information overload to destroy the privacy of the family.”
Given all this, it is no surprise that the German public was not enthusiastic about private
TV when it was started in the 1980s. DER SPIEGEL reported on August 1, 1983 (https:
//www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-14018801.html) that a clear majority of 70%
considered the current public TV offer as “sufficient” and only 5% of Germans considered private
TV as “necessary” in a survey. However, over the years the media coverage of private TV changed.
One example is a report in DER SPIEGEL on July 17, 1989 (https://www.spiegel.de/
spiegel/print/d-13494730.html), in which the success story of RTLplus is described.
The channel celebrated record ratings of 7.2 million viewers when covering a major sports event
in Wimbledon with German tennis player Boris Becker. The same article also reported that Ger-
man media corporation Bertelsmann, a partial owner of DER SPIEGEL, invested heavily into
RTLplus (owning 38.9% of the shares). The rising popularity of RTLplus is also documented
in actual market shares, which climbed steadily from almost zero in the mid-1980s to a his-
torical peak of 18.9% in 1993. This can be seen in an illustration on the Wikipedia page of
RTL (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/RTL_Television), which also points out
that limited access explains the development of market shares in the channel’s early years.
b) Supreme Court decisions and interpretation
The 1981 Supreme Court Rule (BVerfGE 57, 295), also labelled the “3rd broadcasting deci-
sion” (“3. Rundfunkentscheidung”) enabled the proliferation of private TV in Germany. Accord-
ing to the original text (http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv057295.html), there
was a “special situation of broadcasting caused by the scarcity of transmission frequencies” which
in the eyes of the court justified the public-media monopoly until then. During the introduction
of private TV, the newspaper DIE ZEIT described lifting the ban in an article on March 30, 1983
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(https://www.zeit.de/1984/01/kabel-frei/komplettansicht) as follows: “Ca-
ble and satellite are nevertheless capable of revolutionizing electronic media. Both end the decade-
long lack of television transmission. Just this technical bottleneck has always served as a final jus-
tification for the public service broadcasting system and for the political imperative to deny private
access to this medium.”
With its 1981 decision, the Supreme Court expanded on an earlier landmark decision from 1961
(BVerfGE 12, 205), i.e. the 1st broadcasting decision (“1. Rundfunkentscheidung”). In this early
decision (http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv012205.html), Germany’s Supreme
Court confirmed the existence of a public-media monopoly. It also required an independent orga-
nization of frequencies for new public media outlets. The rule arose due to a heated conflict in
the late 1950s about Germany’s second public TV broadcast ZDF, adding to the first public TV
channel ARD (see Figure A1). One of Germany’s major political parties, the social-democratic
party, was the initiator of this legal case in an effort to fight what was called “Adenauer-TV”
(in reference to the conservative chancellor) and meant television controlled by the federal gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court shared those concerns of social-democrats and called for political
independence of the organization of Germany’s media. As a direct consequence of the Court rule,
a sub-organization of the Deutsche Bundespost was in charge of the construction of new transmit-
ter stations with the distinct purpose to provide frequencies for public media outlets, while state
governments were in charge of the frequency usage. After the Supreme Court decision of 1961,
stations were built for the new public TV channel ZDF. During that time, there was also a realistic
prospect of additional public broadcasts, such as regional public TV programs at the state level and
further radio programs. Given that those plans for future public broadcasts were uncertain, new
transmitter stations built after 1961 had varying capacities for possible additional broadcasts, all of
which however were expected to be for public media during the construction phase.
When the Court re-formulated its position in 1981, it was clear from the actual text about
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the restrictions on broadcasting and how those could be “eliminated in the course of modern de-
velopment” that new technologies like cable and satellite were seen as the way for private TV to
reach German households. However, it was not explicitly stated by the Court, that still available
terrestrial frequencies could not be used by private TV channels. Since the Court saw a scarcity
of those terrestrial frequencies as the reason for the public monopoly, there was no expectation of
many open frequencies. Therefore, for the few frequencies available in the 1980s, it was legally
possible to broadcast private TV on them, as long as i) they were established for this particular
purpose (of broadcasting public TV) and ii) the state government, in which the station was located,
agreed to have private TV being put on the air.
c) Limited reach of private TV: cable, satellite and terrestrial frequencies
As a result of the legal framework established by Germany’s Supreme Court, the federal
government under Helmut Kohl decided to roll out private TV in Germany via cable. Several
pieces of evidence however document the delays in expansion of Germany’s cable net. Already
in 1984, few days after private TV started in Germany, DER SPIEGEL reported on January 9
(https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13508379.html) that “Post Minis-
ter Schwarz-Schilling has lost track of his cable projects.” The article described miscalculations
and unexpected costs in the rollout of cable. On January 27, 1984, newspaper DIE ZEIT (https:
//www.zeit.de/1984/05/im-kabel-verfangen/komplettansicht) headlined a
report asking whether Schwarz-Schilling could become a “Minister of Crisis” for the Kohl gov-
ernment. In this report, a media expert described cable TV in Germany as a “billion-dollar
grave” that the Deutsche Bundespost cannot cope with in the long-term (which turned out to
be a good prediction since this public institution was dismantled ten years later). On Septem-
ber 3, 1984, DER SPIEGEL had the headline the “Cable TV: The debacle is here” (https:
//www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13509973.html) and described “miscalcula-
tion with billions, chaotic charges policy, gadgets with outdated technology: Christian Schwarz-
Schilling brings the state-owned company Bundespost with his favorite project - cable global,
television total - in financial difficulties.“ In consequence, there was a very slow spread of cable
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TV across Germany from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. As reported by the federal government
in 1988 due to a request in the German parliament, cable TV was unavailable in 85.2% of West
German households. This figure included data from West-Berlin, which had the highest state-level
access rate with 31.6%. The state of NRW had a cable access rate of 11.8%. Detailed figures
for all federal states are on the German Wikipedia page (https://de.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Kabelfernsehen). Because German households had to pay a non-negligible amount of
money for cable TV, actual use of cable TV was even lower. On April 6, 1987, DER SPIEGEL
(https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13521242.html) reported that less
than half of households who technically could have ordered cable TV did not order it because of
“high connection fees”. More than a third of German households still had no access to cable at
the end of 1995, according to the above Wikipedia page, in reference to the Deutsche Telekom (a
successor of the Bundespost).
The other option for private TV was satellite. Watching private TV via their own satellite
dishes became the norm for Germans throughout the 1990s. Thereby satellite TV emerged as
an important transmission channel since millions of German households still had no access to
cable TV. For satellite TV, we can safely rule out that this affects our results for our main in-
vestigation period in the late 1980s. There is news coverage from our main period of investiga-
tion, in form of a report in DIE ZEIT of July 1, 1988 (https://www.zeit.de/1988/27/
mami-hol-pudding/komplettansicht), illustrating why satellite TV was practically ir-
relevant in Germany in the 1980s due to the activities of the Deutsche Bundespost. The article
reports on a new direct-transmitting satellite that was announced as a possible supplement for ca-
ble but turned out “to be a total failure” which after being launched “floats as a mummy in space”
due to technical problems. According to DIE ZEIT, a successor satellite was planned for the next
year but this “will hardly bring more viewers to private programs” because of “a new transmission
standard” that required a special decoder, a technology that was not even on the market. Clearly,
due to large investments into cable, the Bundespost had strong incentives to not foster satellite
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TV as an alternative (similar to providing terrestrial frequencies to private TV). In this context,
the above-cited article in DER SPIEGEL from September 3, 1984 is illuminating, as it describes
the concern of the Bundespost that satellite could render all the investments into cable useless if
it becomes the norm. The article reports on efforts by post minister Schwarz-Schilling to prevent
“satellite reception by anyone” and to thereby ensure that Germans need cable to watch private TV.
Due to satellite TV not being an option before the 1990s and delays in the expansion of ca-
ble TV, a time window of several years was created in which still available terrestrial frequencies
were enormously important for the private TV channels. In consequence, there was a limited num-
ber of regions in which German households could watch private TV via regular antennas. The
limitation of these terrestrial frequencies was a direct result of the legal framework established by
Germany’s Supreme Court. How those limitations worked in practice is demonstrated in the news
coverage from the late 1980s, such as in the above-referenced DIE ZEIT report from July 1988.
The article describes how private TV channels received the rights to broadcast on the terrestrial
frequencies in the state of NRW. Tele5 owner Silvio Berlusconi “jumped on the bandwagon at the
last minute” to apply for the attractive terrestrial frequencies in this state. He realized that the cable
net in Germany was “tight” and that the terrestrial frequencies were thus absolutely essential for
the TV providers. NRW with its history as a large coal-producer and highly populated was the “key
region” to determine the winner in the competition for market shares in the new TV landscape. To
assuage the social-democrat run state government of NRW, Berlusconi promised a “quality pro-
gram” and that he would “support the left” when he was given the “juicy” frequencies in NRW.
Despite all the efforts by Berlusconi, however, the state of NRW preferred the channel RTLplus due
to several “concessions” agreed upon by the owners, e.g. the Bertelsmann corporation. The chan-
nel started as a broadcaster from Luxembourg, but the decision was made to move to Cologne, the
largest city of NRW. DIE ZEIT stated that the deal “was worth it” since RTLplus could expect to
reach “up to six and a half million viewers” thanks to being preferred in the competition for trans-
mission frequencies. DER SPIEGEL also reported on this NRW deal in an article from March 27,
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1989 (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13495757.html), in which the
term “juicy” was used to describe the powerful terrestrial frequencies in NRW (“die leckeren ter-
restrischen Frequenzen in Nordrhein-Westfalen“). The report emphasizes the importance of these
powerful frequencies to reach large numbers of households and sheds light on other facets of the
secret deal that was referred to as a “crooked number” by an insider.
An article by DER SPIEGEL from January 9, 1989 (https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/
print/d-13493795.html) describes the efforts to overcome the restrictions on terrestrial fre-
quencies by Silvio Berlusconi. While his channel Tele5 had difficulties to obtain frequencies, it
was “beyond question” for Berlusconi that an expansion of terrestrial frequencies was technically
possible. Based on studies by his own technicians, Berlusconi was confident that new transmitter
stations “covering the entire territory” of Germany would allow exceeding the preexisting net-
works. DER SPIEGEL speculated about Tele5 expansions which “could suddenly bring the dis-
tressed commercial channel the economic breakthrough.” However, it is no surprise, given the
legal framework, that the German regulatory bureaucracy (“Aufsichtsbürokratie”) stopped such
efforts. The Bundespost even tried to prevent Tele5 from getting the available low-power frequen-
cies, which were already greenlighted by state governments. In consequence, Berlusconi sent his
team of technical experts from Italy “on a journey across the Alps” to disprove false claims of the
Bundespost, according to which there were no available frequencies. While those local frequen-
cies were then given to Tele5, the article further describes Berlusconi’s failure to get one of the
powerful frequencies in the West or in the North. This was explained with a lack of support for
Berlusconi in German politics, especially among conservatives who thought that the Italian could
sympathize with social-democrats. All this happened as part of what was called a “battle for the
frequencies” by DER SPIEGEL, a battle in which the Italian media tycoon had to recognize defeat.
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Figure I.A1: Timeline for Proliferation of Commercial Television in West Germany
Notes: The following abbreviations for TV channels are used in this table: ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-
rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland), ZDF (Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen), and RTL (Radio
Télévision Luxembourg). Note that the organizers of the latter channel dropped the „plus“ from the channel’s name on
November 1, 1992.
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I.2 Appendix B – Sensitivity analyses
In the following, we discuss the results from a plethora of sensitivity analyses, which we con-
duct for our main analysis based on SOEP data, as reported in the paper. Aspects that we shed light
on are a) determination of TV signals (i.e. calculation method, signal strength thresholds, linear
signal strength instrument), b) sample restrictions (i.e. regions considered in the analysis, movers
exclusion), c) alternative definitions of TV consumption, and d) additional covariates (i.e. further
survey control variables, weather influences).
a) TV signals
We start our sensitivity analyses by inspecting whether the method of TV signal calculation
could affect the results. In Table B1 we provide a check for the aggregation method of regional
signal strength. In our main analysis, we used the most precise method, i.e. the one square kilo-
meter raster calculation and then averaging all raster values within a county using the mean. For
comparison, this is shown in Column (1). Column (2) shows that switching from mean to me-
dian, does not alter the results at all. We also calculated the signal strength on the municipality
and county level directly, without raster calculation. For the county level, we determine the signal
strength either at the geographical center of the region or at the population-center. This information
comes from a geo service and reflects the inner city of a county’s largest town. We use the latter
to define signal strength at the municipality level. To use the information on signal strength at the
municipality level for our SOEP analysis at the county level, we aggregate municipality signals
either as the mean (i.e. average signal strength across all municipalities within a county) or as the
median. The first stage coefficients are slightly smaller in comparison to the more precise raster
calculation, but still highly significant and robust in all cases. Comparing the results for mean and
median aggregation in Columns (3) and (4) reveals no difference. For the least precise calculations
based on one signal value per county in Columns (5) and (6), we find that the coefficients of the
TV signals using the population-center are remarkably robust, while using the geographic mean
within a county leads to a weaker first stage. This underlines the importance of considering the
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location of the population when determining TV signal reach at the regional level.
Second, we discuss the role of the threshold level of the signal strength which is used to de-
fine treatment and control regions. By changing the threshold, we are more (or less) optimistic
regarding the reach of TV signals for German households when we use lower (or higher) threshold
values in dBuV/m. Similar checks are conducted in Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016) whose default
threshold is slightly higher than ours, while for radio signals analysed by Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)
the default threshold is lower than ours. By varying the minimum signal strength from 50 dBuV/m
to 65 dBuV/m stepwise, column after column, we consider a range of thresholds that involve those
used in the literature. Table B2 shows that the results do not change when we vary the signal
threshold. In all the columns, the instrument is still highly significant for each dBuV/m value
allowing always for instrumentation with an F-value above 10. Consistently, the results on the sec-
ond stage do not change qualitatively. Television increases life satisfaction for any of the threshold
values, while individual health is not impaired in any case, in line with the findings in the main text.
Third, we check our decision to focus on signal strength thresholds for a binary distinction
between regions with sufficient signal strength and those without, in contrast to interpreting signal
strength in linear fashion. One reason for doing so is that TV signal quality does not increase
linearly in signal strength but discontinuously, as pointed out in related research (Bursztyn and
Cantoni 2016). One could argue that either a household receives a program or not, with little hap-
pening in between. To nevertheless assess our decision empirically, Table B3 shows the results
when we employ a linear variable of signal strength in dBuV/m. We also vary the use of our stan-
dard control variable set. The results in Columns (3) and (4) conform qualitatively to the results
established via binary treatment indicator, which are shown in Columns (1) and (2).
b) Sample restrictions
In a fourth step, we check the robustness of our main findings regarding changes to the sam-
ple. Table B4a presents the first set of results from sensitivity analyses where we exclude regions
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from the set of non-affected control group regions. We show both the first stage and reduced form
results. Column (1) shows the results without any adjustment. In column (2), we show the esti-
mates when we only condition on “clean control regions.” For this purpose, we exclude all regions
which did not receive TV signals from powerful frequencies but could have received TV signals
on frequencies with low power. In column (3), we drop all counties with early cable projects in
the mid-1980s (Hasebrink 1989). These cable projects were in Munich, Dortmund, Ludwigshafen,
and Berlin. Then, we drop data from megacities with about one million inhabitants, i.e. Hamburg,
Munich and Cologne in column (4). This test excludes regions that are not necessarily affected
by terrestrial TV signals, given higher chances of cable access. In column (5) we exclude border
regions, in which individual TV consumption was arguably not affected by private TV as much,
given that foreign TV was potentially available. By doing so, we exclude some counties which re-
ceived a 200 kW signal from the Wesel transmitter, so that this check results in rather conservative
estimates. Finally, in column (6), we apply all restrictions simultaneously. The table shows that
the coefficients are all robust.
Table B4b completely cleans the control region by only accounting for control regions that
do not have a transmitter. Thereby we drop counties in which there were local frequencies for pri-
vate TV with very low power (close to zero kW), so that the signal did not even surpass our signal
strength threshold in the county where the stations was located. When we move from the main
results from column (1) to column (2), the F statistics for the first stage increase slightly and thus
the instrument remains strong. Another curious case is the state of Rhineland Palatinate which bor-
ders Luxembourg. Luxembourg was the original location of the channel RTLplus and the Minister
president Vogel was highly in favor of promoting private television. Therefore, we drop the state
of Rhineland Palatinate in column (3), which again leads to a small increase in F statistics. When
we restrict the sample to controls without stations and exclude the state of Rhineland Palatinate in
column (4), the findings on increased TV consumption and higher life satisfaction due to private
TV remain strong. Overall, there are no significant differences in coefficients across specifications
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which leads us to conclude that the results are robust.
Table B5 provides robustness checks for our exclusion restriction regarding individuals who
move between regions during our investigation period. We show the first stage and reduced form
effects based on the private TV signals using different restrictions for moving individuals. Column
(1) shows the results based on our main restriction, as described in Section 2, where we include
observations only if the same person is observed in the same county, in which he or she lived in
1989. The idea behind using 1989 as the reference year is to maximize the number of treatment
observations, which implies having a left-skewed distribution of observations across years in our
main sample. In Column (2), we shift the reference year and include only individual observation
if the person is observed in the same county, in which he or she lived in 1988. Column (3) shows
results with the strictest mover restriction where each individual is observed always within the
same county throughout the investigation period. This goes along with a substantial loss of sample
size. Column (4) shows the results without accounting for any compositional change in the sample
due to relocations, thereby maximizing the sample size. In this case, individuals are observed in
different counties if they move between regions during the investigation period. This prevents us
from clustering standard errors at the county level in our fixed-effects analyses. To allow for a
comparison of results, we always employ individual-level clustered standard errors across specifi-
cations in Table B5. We observe that the coefficient for the first stage decreases when we compare
the strictest mover exclusion restriction in Column (3) to having no mover restriction in Column
(4) while the results for our preferred definition as used in the paper lies in between. In any case,
the reduced form results for our main outcome variables do not change qualitatively.
c) Alternative definitions of TV consumption
In Table B6, we show the results from checks of our manipulation variable television con-
sumption. Using various approaches based on different definitions of this variable, we address the
potential role of outlier, i.e. high levels of TV consumption. Column (1) shows the main results for
comparisons. We windsorized television consumption to levels below 100 and 70 hours per week
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to exclude outliers in Columns (2) and (3). The first stage and the reduced form results remains
stable. As a different approach, we log-transform television consumption in Column (4) which
reduces the sample size only slightly since it excludes individuals that do not watch TV. Receiving
the signal increases TV consumption by 7.9% on the first stage.
In Table B6, we further alter our variable reflecting television consumption. In a first step,
we estimate the impact of the television signal on different levels of television consumption, i.e.
the first, second, third, and fourth quartile of the distribution are used as dependent variables in
Columns (7), (8), (9), and (10). Receiving a signal improves the share of individuals in the highest
quartile of television consumption, while it reduces the likelihood of being observed in the lowest
quartile. In a final step, we use the raw measures of television consumption which are split into
television consumption during the workweek, including Saturday (Column 5), and the weekend,
i.e. Sunday (Column 6) in the SOEP. We find that TV consumption is increased more on the
weekend than during the week, but in both cases, private TV reception yields significantly positive
effects in TV consumption.
d) Further control variables
Table B7 provides a robustness check of the first stage and reduced form effects based on the
private TV signal using different sets of control variables. Column (1) shows the main results.
Column (2) adds the standard control set, which slightly increases the first stage coefficient. The
standard control set includes gender, age, quadratic age, household size, owner of dwelling, main
tenant of dwelling, education (in years), and survey month. Column (3) shows the main results
with survey controls, i.e. survey week, day of the interview, number of survey participations in
the SOEP and whether the survey was administered orally or filled out by the survey participant.
Column (4) shows results when controlling for both standard controls and survey controls. The
first stage remains stable in all cases and reduced form results for our main outcome variables are
robust.
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Similar, in Column (5) we add weather controls, i.e. temperature and sunshine hours on the
day of the interview as well as average temperature and average sunshine hours over the last four
weeks prior to the interview. We use a weather dataset that was prepared for a different project
and allows us to check the role of weather influences for our results. Regional identifiers at the re-
gional policy region level are used, which is one level higher than counties in the German regional
hierarchy. Each of the 74 regions in West Germany at the time consists of at least one county (four
counties on average) and has a weather station that allow us to merge the SOEP data with weather
data for analyses. The data on regional weather conditions for each (interview) day are from the
German weather service and are explained in detail in Chadi (2017). We find that adding weather
controls does not alter the results. Finally, in Column (6) we include all three control sets. The first
stage and reduced form remain unaltered.
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Table I.B1: TV signal calculation method
Notes: Dependent variable is weekly TV consumption in hours. Private TV is a dummy variable indicating whether
the SOEP respondent lives in a county for which a 200kW TV signal based on terrestrial frequencies was calculated.
The columns show results using different signal calculations for the county level. The baseline specification contains
year-fixed effects without control variables. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of
significance are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.B2: TV Signal strength thresholds
Notes: Dependent variables reflect time in hours per week that a person spends watching TV (first stage) and life
satisfaction, health satisfaction, doctoral visits on the extensive margin – i.e. visited a doctor – and the number of
doctor visits (second stage). Private TV is a dummy variable indicating whether the SOEP respondent lives in a
county for which a 200kW TV signal based on terrestrial frequencies was calculated. The columns show results with
different signal calculations from 50, 55, 60 and 65 dB. The baseline specification contains year-fixed effects. County-
level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.B3: Binary Signal vs Continuous Signal
Notes: The dependent variables are health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the
extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. The instrumented independent
variable is TV consumption in hours. The private TV signal is based on 200KW. The baseline specification contains
year-fixed effects. The set of control variables contains gender, age, quadratic age, household size, owner of dwelling,
main tenant of dwelling, education (in years), and survey month. See Table D2 for descriptive statistics on the control
variables used. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.B4a: Sample checks: exclusion of regions I
Notes: The dependent variables are health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the
extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. The instrumented independent
variable is TV consumption in hours. The private TV signal is based on 200KW. The baseline specification contains
year-fixed effects. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.B4b: Sample checks: exclusion of regions II
Notes: The dependent variables are health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the
extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. The instrumented independent
variable is TV consumption in hours. The private TV signal is based on 200KW. The baseline specification contains
year-fixed effects. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.B5: Sample checks: exclusion of movers
Notes: The dependent variables are health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the
extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. The instrumented independent
variable is TV consumption in hours. The private TV signal is based on 200KW. The baseline specification contains
year-fixed effects. Individual-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.B6: Definition of TV Consumption
Notes: Dependent variable is health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale and doctoral visits on the intensive (number
of doctor visits) and extensive margin (visited a doctor). The instrumented independent variable is TV consumption in
hours. Q1,Q2,Q3 are the first, second and third quartile. The baseline specification contains year-fixed effects without
control variables. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: SOEP data are from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.B7: FE Regressions with different sets of controls
Notes: The dependent variables are health and life satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale as well as doctoral visits on the
extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. The instrumented independent
variable is TV consumption in hours. The private TV signal is based on 200KW. The baseline specification contains
year-fixed effects. The standard set of control variables contains gender, age, quadratic age, household size, owner of
dwelling, main tenant of dwelling, education (in years), and survey month. The survey controls contains the day of
the week of the survey and the interview mode. The weather controls contains temperature and sunshine hours on the
day of the interview and over the last four weeks prior. See Table D2 for descriptive statistics on the control variables
used. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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I.3 Appendix C – Income and Consumption Sample
In this Appendix, we a) describe the income and consumption sample (EVS) data that we use
for empirical analyses and b) exploit household ownership information on the number of TV. The
latter serves as a complementary test for the plausibility of the calculated TV signals, i.e. whether
receiving private TV encourages not only TV watching (as examined in the SOEP) but also TV
ownership.
a) Preparation of data analysis and discussion of its limitations
To merge EVS data with TV signals for the late 1980s and early 1990s, we use two waves of
this repeated cross-sectional sample on consumption and expenditures. The earliest available EVS
data wave with regional identifiers of households below the state level is from 1988. For the subse-
quent EVS wave of 1993, regional identifiers are also available. This information on the regional
level of the data is needed for the merger with our TV signals data. Available to us are municipality
indicators, which allows using the EVS data at a lower hierarchical level compared to the SOEP
(see Figures D3 and D4 for a visual comparison). Apart from potential increases in precision when
using TV signal information at the municipality vs. county level, we have to consider special data
regularities and other minor caveats for our analysis of the EVS data.
Data protection plays an important role for our analysis of the EVS data at the municipality
level. We work with a restricted use version that is only available for research on the premises
of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. As researchers, we can differentiate between all the
different municipalities, in which EVS participants reported on their lives, but we cannot uniquely
identify any municipality. To maintain the anonymous nature of the municipalities, we searched
for possible problem cases when deciding about data restrictions concerning the territory included
in the analysis. When we restrict the EVS data to West Germany, we exclude the two municipal-
ities of West Berlin (as in our SOEP-based analysis) and Helgoland prior to the data merger. The
island of Helgoland had a separate transmitter station that started broadcasting several private TV
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channels with low power but exceptionally early in 1987, according to the official records. This
would, in principle, allow us to perfectly identify all the data from interviews with individuals
living on this island. Therefore, we exclude Helgoland with its low case numbers to ensure data
protection.
Representativeness is one of the features of the EVS but the dataset available to us is limited in
this respect for the following reasons. First, the German statistical office could obtain municipality
information from most of the official interviewer records, but in some areas of Germany, this was
not possible for the wave of 1988. In consequence, we condition on West German municipalities
that are included in both EVS data waves of 1988 and 1993. Second, we also lose some munici-
palities that are affected by regional reforms at the municipality level. Fortunately, such cases are
rare in our investigation period and mostly took place in unpopulated areas.
Underestimation of effects is another issue in our analysis of the EVS data, given the timespan
between 1988 and 1993. First, EVS data collection takes place throughout the year, which for
1988 could slightly conflict with the fact that the most important treatment variation in terrestrial
frequencies of private TV started within that year (see Table D1). This could lead to a weakening
of the TV effect on individual behavior in our analysis. Second, in 1993, the treatment of private
TV exposure has taken place for several years in some regions, compared to non-treated regions.
However, cable and satellite are certainly no rarity anymore in this year, which may also contribute
to possible underestimation of effects.
b) Plausibility of TV signal identification in the EVS data
We exploit information on the reported number of TV sets. Generally, the number of house-
holds without any TV set is marginal (roughly 4% in 1988). Most individuals have one TV in their
household. However, in our investigation period, more and more households bought a second TV
set, which provides some variation. The results for the most powerful instrument (200kW ERP) as
well as for a less powerful version (20kW ERP) are shown in Table C1. We also vary the signal
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strength threshold from low (50 dBuV/m) to high (65 dBuV/m), similar as in Table B2 for the
SOEP data.
Table C1 shows increases in the number of TV sets in treatment regions, suggesting that in-
dividuals responded to the availability of private TV via terrestrial frequencies. There seem to be
some pre-treatment differences in case of the less powerful instrument with 20kW in Panel A. This
could be due to endogeneity but also due to early start of TV broadcast in 1988. The effects are
stronger in the bottom Panel B for the most powerful instrument based on minimum frequency
power of 200kW. This is in line with the analysis of the SOEP data and further substantiates our
preference of this particular instrument. In regard of the signal strength threshold, we now observe
(weak) differences in the effect between all threshold levels. While the coefficients are overall
similar in all four cases, for our main instrument definition of 200kW power the default threshold
55 dBuV/m has the largest coefficient. This speaks for our default choices. Finally, in additional
analyses (not shown), we find that the likelihood of having a second TV in the household increases
significantly if we use a binary indicator for having two or more TV sets. A possible interpreta-
tion is that family members wanted to have the opportunity to watch different TV programs at the
same time and thus bought a second TV set, which then explains increases in TV watching that we
observe in the SOEP data.
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Table I.C1: Number of TV sets and different definitions of TV signals
Notes: Dependent variable is number of own TV sets. Private TV in Panel A (B) is defined as living in regions with
20kW (200kW) powered TV signals starting in 1988. The baseline model is a difference-in-difference specification
showing reduced form estimates. Municipality-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of signifi-
cance are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: EVS data are from 1988 and 1993.
148
I.4 Appendix D – Additional figures and tables
Figure I.D1: Example TV set from 1988
Notes: This is a 16 inch Zenith TV set. It was one of the options to watch television during the 1980s. The picture is
taken from Ebay.com.
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Figure I.D2: Antenna Pattern (Transmitter Wesel)
Notes: The illustration shows the antenna pattern for frequency channel 52 (used by RTLplus in 1989) from the
transmitter station Wesel. The first and third column in table stands for the direction (0 means north, 90 means east,
180 means south, and 270 means west). Second and fourth column information in the table is the power of the signal
(aimed at each direction).
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Figure I.D3: Terrestrial TV signals of Transmitter Wesel (County Level)
Notes: The map shows the Western regions of NRW and illustrates reception of RTLplus via terrestrial frequencies
based on the Longley-Rice propagation model.
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Figure I.D4: Terrestrial TV signals of Transmitter Wesel (Municipality Level)
Notes: The map shows the Western regions of NRW and illustrates reception of RTLplus via terrestrial frequencies
based on the Longley-Rice propagation model.
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Table I.D1: Transmitter Stations Used by Private TV Channels in 1989 (min. power 10 kW)
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Table I.D2: Statistics for main SOEP data sample
Source: SOEP data from 1987 to 1989.
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Table I.D3: Statistics for own survey
Source: Own data from 2015.
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Table I.D4: Terrestrial TV and long-run health effects (Doctor Visits and Hospital Visits)
Notes: The independent variable is the 200kW private TV signal. The dependent variables in Panel A are doctoral
visits on the extensive margin (visited a doctor) and number of doctor visits in the last three months. No information
on doctor visits is available in the SOEP for the year of 1990. The dependent variables in Panel B are hospital visits
on the extensive margin (visited a hospital), number of hospital visits, number of hospital nights, and log number of
hospital nights in the entire year. No information on doctor visits is available in the SOEP for the years of 1989 and
1992. The baseline model is an individual fixed effects specification with year-fixed effects showing reduced form
estimates. The set of control variables contains gender, age, quadratic age, household size, owner of dwelling, main
tenant of dwelling, education (in years), and survey month. See Table D2 for descriptive statistics on the control
variables used. County-level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance are * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.




II.1 Appendix – Tables
Table II.A1: Regression Discontinuity Effects of Higher Price on Vaccination Take-Up
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the local average treatment effects of a small price
change on vaccination take-up. We report the normalized coefficient at a wage of $750 and a bandwidth of $300.
Individuals who earn more than $750 paid $7.49 for the vaccine, while employees whose wage is below this threshold
paid $4.99. There is no visible discontinuity across the threshold — all specifications control for city fixed effects.
Column 1 presents our main estimates without adding additional controls. In Column 2, we test the robustness of the
main estimates controlling for the vaccine’s price, income, tenure, division in the company, gender, age, and education
level. Column 3 presents the estimates using only employees in Quito, the city where we implemented our four
treatments. In Column 4, we exclude 12 individuals who were assigned to vaccinate in the workweek but went to
vaccinate on Saturday. Reducing the bandwidth in steps of $50 to $150 does not change the results.
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Table II.A2: Recall Information Statements
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the effects of the different treatments on measure-
ments of recalling the altruistic and selfish statements. The post-intervention survey collects these measures on a scale
from 0 to 100.
158
Table II.A3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Vaccination Take-up
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the effect of the different treatments on vaccination
take-up for different subgroups in the study’s population.
159
Table II.A4: Robustness Check on Peer Effects Estimates
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. The bank has 116 units with more than one employee.
This table presents the effect of peers’ vaccination take-up on the individual’s vaccination decision. We measure the
proportion of peers vaccinated and the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek in percentage points. Thus, the
estimates represent the effect of a one percentage point change in the proportion of peers. We define peers as all
employees who work in the same unit. All specifications control for Quito fixed effects and individual assignments to
the workweek. Column 1 controls for the number of employees in each unit. Column 2 controls for the number of
employees in each unit and peers’ age and gender.
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Table II.A5: Robustness Check on Effects of Vaccination on the Flu
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents robustness checks of the effects of being assigned to
the workweek on the probability of being diagnosed sick because of the flu using different definitions of the flu. All
specifications control for Quito fixed effects. Panel b additionally considers control variables for the vaccine’s price,




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents bounds for the effect of being assigned to the
workweek on the probability of being diagnosed with the flu and other non-flu respiratory diseases. All specifications
control for Quito fixed effects.
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Table II.A7: Heterogeneous Effects on Using an Umbrella
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the intent-to-treat effect of being assigned to the
workweek on instances of carrying an umbrella and heterogeneity with beliefs of vaccine effectiveness splitting beliefs
at the median on a Likert-scale of 8/10. Column 2 presents the reduced form estimates. Column 3 presents the number
of individuals who answered the survey.
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Table II.A8: Reduced Form Effects on Productivity
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,***p<0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the intent-to-treat effect of the assignment to the
workweek on self-reported measures productivity and duration of the workday. The post-intervention survey collects
these self-reported measures on a scale from 0 to 10. The swipe card information corresponds to January and is
measured in hours.
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II.2 Appendix – Figures
Figure II.A1: Treatment Message: Control
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the control group. Translation: Dear Employee, we are running
an influenza vaccination campaign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Thursday, November 9, from 8:30
to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you, the price is $4.95, which will be deducted from your
payroll if you choose to get vaccinated. If you have questions, please contact _____. Let’s get vaccinated!
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Figure II.A2: Treatment Message: Opportunity Cost (Saturday)
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the “Saturday” treatment group. Translation: Dear Employee, we
are running an influenza vaccination campaign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Saturday, November 11,
from 8:30 to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you, the price is $4.95, which will be deducted
from your payroll if you choose to get vaccinated. If you have questions, please contact _____. Let’s get vaccinated!
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Figure II.A3: Treatment Message: Altruism
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the “Altruistic Treatment” group. Translation: Dear Employee, we
are running an influenza vaccination campaign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Thursday, November
9, from 8:30 to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you, the price is $4.95, which will be
deducted from your payroll if you choose to get vaccinated. Getting vaccinated yourself also protects people around
you, including those who are more vulnerable to severe flu illness, like infants, young children, the elderly and people
with dangerous health conditions that cannot get vaccinated If you have questions, please contact _____. Let’s get
vaccinated!
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Figure II.A4: Treatment Message: Selfish
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the “Selfish Treatment” group. Translation: Dear Employee, we
are running an influenza vaccination campaign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Thursday, November 9,
from 8:30 to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you, the price is $4.95, which will be deducted
from your payroll if you choose to get vaccinated. Vaccination can significantly reduce your risk of getting sick,
according to both health officials from the World Health Organization and numerous scientific studies. If you have
questions, please contact _____. Let’s get vaccinated!
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Figure II.A5: Locations of the Bank in Ecuador
Notes: The map contains the locations of the bank in Ecuador (orange), where we implemented our intervention.
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Figure II.A6: Timeline of Experiment Implementation
Notes: The bank sent the pre-intervention survey on October 18. The bank sent emails with the different treatments on
November 1 using the Human Resources Department mailing account. Furthermore, it sent a reminder on November 7.
The vaccination campaign took place between November 8 and November 11. The post-treatment period (Ecuadorian
flu season) went from November 13 to March 1. The bank sent the post-intervention survey during March and April
2018.
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Figure II.A7: Vaccination Campaign: Influenza Vaccine
Notes: The above package contains the influenza vaccine used in the campaign. This vaccine protects against four
strands of the flu, two from type A and two from type B.
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Figure II.A8: Vaccination Campaign: Flu Shot in Action
Notes: Immunization at the firm.
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Figure II.A9: Vaccination Take-up around $750 Wage Threshold
Notes: This figure presents the evolution of vaccine take-up around the $750 threshold with a bin size of $10. Individ-
uals who earn more than $750 paid $7.49 for the vaccine, while employees whose wage is below this threshold paid
$4.99.
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Figure II.A10: Age Distribution of Employees in Units
Notes: This figure presents the distribution of age within each of the company’s working units.
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Figure II.A11: Frequency Distribution of Employees in Units
Notes: This figure presents the number of employees in each of the 142 units.
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APPENDIX III
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Figure III.A1: Foregone Doctoral Visits and Private Provision of Health Care
Notes: All countries aside from the United States have systems of universal health care. Overall foregone doctoral
visits increase with the share of private health expenditure. Australia has a share of foregone doctoral visits that is
below the level that is expected given private expenditures. Source: OECD, WHO, The Commonwealth Fund, 2016.
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Figure III.A2: Wait Time for Doctoral Appointments and Private Provision of Health Care
Notes: Wait-times are generally higher with lower private provision of health goods but this trend reverses when private
expenditures are too high, as in the case for the United States. Australia has lower wait-times than expected given its
share of private expenditures. Source: OECD, WHO, The Commonwealth Fund, 2016.
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Figure III.A3: Health Expenditures and Private Provision of Health Care
Notes: Health expenditures are relatively high for the only developed nation without universal health care, i.e. the
United States. There seems to be an optimal balance between private and public provision of health goods. Australia
performs better than predicted. Source: OECD, WHO, The Commonwealth Fund, 2016.
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Figure III.A4: Australian Birth Rates over Time
Notes: This figure shows an increasing trend of official birth registered from 1901 to 2017 in Australia. The peak
in births around 1970 coincides with the peak visible in the frequency distribution of the Australian Taxation Office.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016.
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Figure III.A5: Monte Carlo Simulation of Private Health Insurance Beta Coefficients
Notes: This figure displays 10,000 coefficients from jack-knife Monte Carlo simulation where 1% of individuals
below the age of 30 are dropped for each run. The coefficient obtained without the simulation is identical to the
average coefficient of the distribution which implies that the minor peak in the frequency distribution does not create
any association issue for the treatment effects.
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